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The Unimportance of Being Earnest:
ParamountRewrites the Rules for
Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate
Takeovers
by
PAUL L. REGAN*

Introduction
With its February 1994 decision in ParamountCommunicationsv.
QVC Network,1 the Delaware Supreme Court made yet another noteworthy contribution to the law of corporate takeovers. The court's
opinion builds substantially on a decade's foundation of major corporate governance cases and undoubtedly will serve as the definitive
precedent by which the conduct of directors will be assessed in future
2
takeover cases.
In affirming the Court of Chancery's decision to enjoin various
defensive measures, stock options, and other devices that impeded a
fair auction for control of Paramount Communications, the court de3
clared that its analysis was "well-established" by its prior decisions.
To be sure, the decision may be construed as a straightforward application of principles announced in Unocal and Revlon.4 But such a
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.S. cum
laude, Villanova University, 1979; J.D. magna cum laude, Temple University School of
Law, 1982. Prior to July 1994, the author was associated with the Wilmington, Delaware
office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flor. The author gratefully acknowledges the
helpful comments of Rob Saunders of Skadden Arps on earlier drafts of this Article. The
views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of
his former employer.
1. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). The Delaware Supreme Court previously had issued an
order affirming the decision of the Chancery Court. Id at 36 n.1.
2. I& at 51 ("The holding of this case on its facts, coupled with the holdings of the
principal cases discussed herein where the issue of sale of control is implicated, should
provide a workable precedent against which to measure future cases.").
3. Id. at 43; see also id. at 46, 51.
4. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). That is, (i) defensive
measures will be subjected to enhanced judicial scrutiny and (ii) the directors' narrowly

[1251
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reading misses the import of the decision, namely, the emphasis the
court places on the significance of change-of-control transactions to
shareholders. 5 Accompanying this new emphasis on transaction significance is the corresponding unimportance-at least for purposes of
determining whether to apply enhanced scrutiny-ascribed to the directors' care, disinterestedness, and good faith in earnestly seeking the
best available transaction. This article argues that Paramount'sformulation of the test for enhanced judicial scrutiny represents an unwarranted intrusion into the managerial authority of the board of
directors.
The Delaware Supreme Court announced in Paramountthat enhanced scrutiny will be applied to assess both the process and the substantive results of director decision making in every change-of-control
case. 6 Significantly, the court chose not to limit enhanced scrutiny to
those instances of director conduct that raise suspicion about the directors' motivations, such as a target board's adoption of defensive
measures 7 or unequal treatment of competing bidders. 8 Such threshold concerns about directors' motivations and good faith have been
replaced with an all-encompassing concern for (i) the significance of a
takeover to the corporation's owners and (ii) the perceived need to
"ensure" a "reasonable" outcome. 9 Accordingly, instead of relying on
the "omnipresent specter" of potential self-interest ascribed to all directors "where issues of corporate control are at stake,"10 the court
articulated a new rationale.
Essentially, the Paramount court's rationale for applying enhanced scrutiny in every corporate takeover case is as follows: A
board's decision to sell control represents a unique opportunity for
shareholders to receive maximum value for their investment; 1 accordfocused and primary obligation in a change-of-control context is to "maximiz[e] ...the
company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55; accord Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
5. The Paramountdecision also is noteworthy for its helpful clarification of the circumstances under which Revlon duties are triggered. See infra Part IV.B(2).
6.

Paramount,637 A.2d at 42, 43, 45, 47-48.

7. E.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d 946; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355-57
(Del. 1985); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179-81; Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1342-44 (Del. 1987); see also infra Part II.B.
8. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989).
9.

Paramount,637 A.2d at 43, 45.

10. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1287; see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
11. Paramount,637 A.2d at 43, 45, 47-48. The court also emphasized the "significant
diminution in the voting power" of shareholders who find themselves in the minority of a
corporation that has come under majority ownership "by a single person or entity, or by a
cohesive group acting together ... ." Id. at 42; see also id. at 43, 45. The court's novel

November 1994]

THE UNIMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST

ingly, even if a selling corporation's directors adopt no defensive

measures and treat all bidders equally, the court will nevertheless act
as an "oversee[r]" of the board's decisions to "ensure that the directors have acted reasonably. 1

2

Paramountthus states without apology

that Delaware courts will review "the substantive merits of a board's
actions" by evaluating, among other things, whether the "directors'
3
decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.'
This formulation has disturbing ramifications for the business
judgment rule and its vital role as a mechanism for accommodating
the "twin objectives of managerial freedom of action and responsibility to shareholders."'

4

As Professor Dooley has explained, there is a

tension between these twin objectives-the "antithetical" values of
board authority (judicial deference) and responsibility to shareholders
(judicial review)-because "more of one means less of the other."' 5
Yet, "any feasible governance system must and does contain elements
of both" values; accordingly, the "question of mix is critical.' 6 The

Paramount decision may represent a new judicial activism in Delaware and a shift toward a model of corporate governance which unreliance on voting rights cases to further justify enhanced scrutiny in all change-of-control
transactions is discussed in Part IV.
12. Paramount,637 A.2d at 42, 43. The court's emphasis on transaction significance
also pervaded its discussion of the directors' Revlon duties in change-of-control
transactions:
There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders than
a sale of control or a corporate breakup. Each event represents a fundamental
(and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from a
practical standpoint. It is the significance of each of these events that justifies: (a)
focusing on the directors' obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to
the stockholders; and (b) requiring a close scrutiny of board action which could
be contrary to the stockholders' interest.
Id. at 47-48.
13. Id. at 45.
14. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 n.4 (Del. 1984); see also id. at 812; Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) ("The [business judgment] rule
operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs
of a corporation."); Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus.
LAw. 461, 471 (1992) (the business judgment rule "must not only protect the authority of
the board, but, given the necessity of both Authority and Responsibility, it must also attempt to achieve some accommodation between the two conflicting values").
15. Dooley, supra note 14, at 464.
16. Id.at 463-64. As Professor Dooley explains: "If the board is never made accountable for its decisions, it is liable to exercise its powers irresponsibly vis-a-vis the shareholders. On the other hand, the power to hold a party accountable is the power to interfere
and, ultimately, the power to decide." Id.at 470.
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duly emphasizes responsibility to shareholders at the expense of
17
managerial authority, freedom, and innovation.
Through the vehicle of the Paramountdecision, this article examines anew Delaware's enhanced scrutiny test and the developing ra-

tionale for its application in all change-of-control transactions. Part I
begins this analysis with an examination of the business judgment rule
and the traditional justifications for judicial deference to the business
decisions of informed and disinterested boards of directors. Part II
discusses the early development of the enhanced scrutiny test, from its

announcement in Unocal in 1985 through a flurry of takeover cases
that culminated with In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litiga-

tion,' 8 a 1989 Chancery Court decision involving the largest takeover
in history. 19 Part III examines the enhanced scrutiny test for changeof-control transactions from the perspective of Macmillan and its
progeny. Although not entirely clear on the issue, Macmillan appeared to announce that Unocal's enhanced scrutiny test also would

apply to evaluate the conduct of directors in an auction for corporate
20
control.
17. Whether a new judicial activism is in fact emerging in Delaware remains to be
seen. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Delaware Supreme Court recently has announced a number of decisions, including its order affirming the Chancery Court's decision
in Paramount,that were decidedly favorable to the interests of litigation-minded shareholders. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1122 (Del. 1994)
(reversing judgment entered by Chancery Court in favor of defendants in cash-out merger
transaction and directing "redetermination" of entire fairness of merger to shareholder
plaintiffs and other minority shareholders); Cede, 634 A.2d at 345 (reversing a Chancery
Court judgment in favor of Technicolor directors who had approved a merger transaction
with MacAndrews & Forbes and ordering that directors' conduct be subjected on remand
to the entire fairness test); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993) (addressing certified question from federal district court and finding demand excused in double derivative
suit); In re Tri-Star Pictures Litig., 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993) (reversing Chancery Court's
dismissal of shareholder class action complaint attacking allegedly wasteful corporate
transaction that occurred prior to cash-out merger); Paramount Communications v. QVC
Network, Nos. 427, 1993 & 428, 1993 (Del. Dec. 9, 1993) (order) (affirming order of Chancery Court preliminarily enjoining various defensive measures deployed in connection with
Viacom's proposed acquisition of Paramount).
18. C.A. No. 10389, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 73 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, amended Feb. 14,
1989), appeal refused, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989).
19. Deborah A. DeMott, The Biggest Deal Ever, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1 (1989) ("The contest for ownership and control of RIR Nabisco, Inc .... resulted in the largest corporate
control transaction in the United States to date.").
20. Mill Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989). Significantly,
in Macmillan and the opinions that followed, the court continued to justify such scrutiny
based on "omnipresent" concerns with directors' motives "where issues of corporate control are at stake .. " Id. at 1287 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
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Lastly, Part IV examines the Paramountdecision and concludes
that the Delaware Supreme Court has inappropriately expanded the
role of the courts by requiring judicial assessment of the wisdom of
directors' decisions in all corporate takeovers. This article argues that
the undisputed significance of a change-of-control transaction is, without more, an insufficient doctrinal basis to displace the deference
otherwise accorded to decisions made in good faith by informed and
disinterested directors, even in the context of a corporate takeover.
To be sure, the significance of a change of control to the corporation's
owners requires that directors earnestly strive to achieve what they
advisedly and in good faith believe is the best result for shareholders.
But it does not follow from a finding of "importance" or "significance" that the business judgment rule-with its foundational requirements of director care and loyalty-is inadequate to protect
shareholders' interests in this context.
Enhanced judicial scrutiny should be reserved for director conduct that raises a reasonable doubt about the directors' motivations,
such as the use of defensive measures to thwart a takeover or the disparate treatment of competing bidders in an auction. Absent some
such identifiable reason to question the directors' bona fides, enhanced scrutiny should not be applied. In other words, the fact that a
sale or change of control is important is no reason to assume that an
informed and disinterested board is prone to dysfunction and failure.
I. The Business Judgment Rule and the Justifications for
Deference
It is a "cardinal precept" of Delaware law "that directors, rather
than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation. '21 This foundational principle, codified in the Delaware General
Neither Macmillan nor the cases that followed (until Paramount)explicitly stated that
enhanced scrutiny was required in this context because of the importance of change-ofcontrol transactions to shareholders' interests. See infra Part III. Compare Macmillan,
559 A.2d at 1287 (citing concern-as basis for application of enhanced scrutiny-that
"board may be acting primarily in its own interests" where "issues of corporate control are
at stake") with id at 1281 (noting that while a board may rely in good faith on information
furnished by others, it "may not avoid its active and direct duty of oversight in a matter as
significant as the sale of corporate control").
21. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); see also Cede, 634 A.2d at 360
("Our starting point is the fundamental principle of Delaware law that the business and
affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.");
Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767,772-73 (Del. 1990) ("[D]irectors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
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Corporation Law, 22 serves as the analytical starting point for virtually
all of the major Delaware Supreme Court decisions involving issues of
23
corporate governance.
The business judgment rule,24 an "extension" of this bedrock organizational principle, 25 provides for "great deference" by the courts
to the "managerial decisions of. . . directors. '26 Through the operaForbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986) ("The ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation falls on its board of directors.").
22. The Delaware Code provides in pertinent part: "The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate
of incorporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
23. See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 41-42 (Del.
1994); Cede, 634 A.2d at 360; Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1150 (Del. 1990) ("Time-Warner"); Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1280; Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179; Unocal,
493 A.2d at 953.
24. Commentators have suggested that the business judgment rule protects directors
and management from personal liability for their business decisions, while the business
judgment doctrine protects the decision itself from being invalidated. See Joseph Hinsey
IV, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project:
The Rule, The Doctrine,and The Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 611-13 (1984); Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315,323 n.26 (1987) (similarly differentiating between the business
judgment rule and the business judgment doctrine); E. Norman Veasey, The New Incarnation of the Business Judgment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 503, 505-06
(1986) (suggesting that the degree of deference accorded to directors' decisions under the
business judgment rule "may differ substantially" in a "transactional justification" setting
in which injunctive relief is sought); Thomas C. Pelto, Sr.. Note, False Halo: The Business
Judgment Rule in Corporate Control Contests, 66 TEx. L. REV. 843, 850 n.40 (1988) (arguing that the courts should repudiate the business judgment rule only in takeover cases in
which shareholders seek injunctive relief). As noted in Revlon, the Delaware courts have
not observed this distinction in terminology-between the business judgment rule and the
business judgment doctrine-in "transactional justification cases .... " Revlon, 506 A.2d at
180 n.10. This article will use the term "business judgment rule" to embrace both concepts.
25. Cede, 634 A.2d at 360; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985) ("[T]he business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified
in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed
by or under its board of directors."); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("The business judgment
rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under
Section 141(a).").
26. Paramount,637 A.2d at 42, 45 n.17. Section 4.01(c) of the American Law Institute's PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS articulates the business judgment rule as follows:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills
the duty under this Section if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested [§ 1.23] in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
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tion of the business judgment rule, "neither the courts nor the stockholders" are in a position to "interfere," through litigation, with the
decisions of the directors.2 7
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of
the corporation.
AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE:
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994) [hereinafter "ALl GOVERNANCE

ANALYSIS AND

PROJECr"]. The
REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION Acr plainly supports a more deferential business judgment rule than that which the ALl GovERNANE PROJECr envisions. See REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION Acr § 8.30, Official Comment (3d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter "RMBCA"]. The RMBCA does not attempt to codify the rule, however, because "[t]he elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances for its application are continuing to be developed by the courts." Id. at 221.
Professor Dooley has criticized the ALL GOVERNANCE PRomcr's formulation of the
business judgment rule because it improperly invites a judicial assessment of the wisdom of
the directors' decisions:
The use of the phrase "rationally believes" in subsection (c)(3) signals an even
more consequential deviation from existing law because it calls for an evaluation
of the directors' judgment, thereby effectively shredding the business judgment
rule. To the extent that "rational" is to be equated with "reasonable," the trier of
fact is invited to second-guess not only the procedural aspects of the decision, but
its substantive soundness as well. In that event, the business judgment rule becomes meaningless, and the test for negligent management becomes the same as
the test for negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
Dooley, supra, note 14, at 478 (footnote omitted).
27. Paramount,637 A.2d at 42; see also Cede, 634 A.2d at 360 ("[T]he [business judgment] rule operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business
and affairs of a corporation."); Dennis J. Block et al., The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of the Scope of JudicialReview, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 67 (1993) ("In general terms,
under the business judgment rule, courts will not interfere with a business decision if it is
made in good faith by disinterested directors after reasonable investigation and does not
constitute an abuse of discretion."); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary
Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 60 (1985) ("[FMor
most intents and purposes, the [business judgment] rule operates to safe harbor disinterested corporate decisionmakers from attacks on the basic wisdom of their decisions.");
Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the Unocal/Revlon
Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 989, 991 n.10 (1993) ("Under the business judgment rule, the board
prevails whenever it can articulate a rational, unselfish business purpose for its actions.").
The business judgment rule has been described by the Delaware Supreme Court as
"both a procedural guide for litigants and a substantive rule of law." Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). As a procedural matter, the
business judgment rule creates an evidentiary "'presumption that in making a business
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
company."' Citron, 569 A.2d at 64 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). Consequently, a
shareholder plaintiff challenging the actions of a board of directors has the initial burden to
rebut the rule's "powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the directors .....
"
Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. The plaintiff thus is charged at the outset with the "burden of
providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one
of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care." Id. In Citron, the
Delaware Supreme Court described a shareholder plaintiff's evidentiary burden in this regard as follows: "The burden falls upon the proponent of a claim to rebut the presumption
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The Rationale for Deference

Many reasons have been advanced for the great deference accorded to directors' decisions. As discussed below, courts frequently
explain this deference as a recognition of their own lack of competency to assess the wisdom of business decisions. 28 A more compelling rationale is that the business judgment rule encourages
entrepreneurial risk-taking by directors and upholds the board's au29
thority as centralized decisionmaker for the firm.
(1)

The Professed Concern for Judicial Competency

Courts routinely explain the deference they accord to directors'
decisions as a recognition of their "institutional incompetence ... to
pass upon the wisdom of business decisions. ' 30 Some commentators
by introducing evidence either of director self-interest, if not self-dealing, or that the directors either lacked good faith or failed to exercise due care." Citron, 569 A.2d at 64. The
substantive aspect of the business judgment rule is triggered when a plaintiff fails to provide evidence sufficient to overcome the rule's presumption of propriety with regard to
director decision-making. If the plaintiff's evidence is found wanting, "the business judgment rule, as a substantive rule of law, will attach to protect the directors and the decisions
they make." Id. In that event, the court will give "great deference to the substance of the
directors' decision and will not invalidate the decision... [and] will not examine its reasonableness .... Paramount,637 A.2d at 45 n.17; see also Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. As Professor Dooley has explained, "the rule precludes judicial review of board decisions that are
honest and carefully thought out, but just plain wrong from the standpoint of advancing
the shareholders' interests." Dooley, supra note 14, at 470. Consequently, a board's decision will be disturbed in this context only if it "cannot be 'attributed to any rational business purpose."' Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971)); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ("A hallmark of the business judgment
rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's
decision can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose."'). Chancellor Allen has described this language as an "escape hatch" test in which the court reviews the substance of
a board's business decision "for the limited purpose of assessing whether that decision is so
far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith." In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,
780-81 & n.5 (Del. Ch. 1988).
28. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
30. Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,502, at 97,220 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1378 n.14 (Del. 1993) ("courts are 'ill-equipped' to make business decisions")
(quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-28 (N.Y. 1979)); Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., C.A. No. 10866 (Del. Ch. July 14, revised July 17, 1989), reprintedin
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 748 (1990) [hereinafter "Paramount Communications"] ("[T]he
important benefits of the business judgment rule ... includ[e] designation of authority to
make business and financial decisions to agencies, i.e., boards of directors, with substantive
expertise."), aftd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988)
("[B]usinessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information and
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have criticized this competency rationale as unpersuasive, given the

willingness of the courts to tread into other disciplines that involve as
much complexity as managing the affairs of a public company and require analyses of matters in which the courts' expertise presumably is

no greater 31 In their thoughtful discussion on this subject, Professor
Dooley and then practitioner Norman Veasey (now Chief Justice of
the Delaware Supreme Court and author of Paramount)astutely observe that the competency rationale "rings false to those who are accustomed to seeing courts take over the administration of entire
school and prison systems ....

32

(2) EntrepreneurialRisk-Taking
A more persuasive rationale for deference is that the business

judgment rule is intended to encourage innovation and entrepreneurial risk-taking by corporate officers and directors. 33 Seen in
judgment not possessed by reviewing courts."); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("This deference-the business judgment
rule-is, of course, simply a recognition of the allocation of responsibility made by section
141(a) of the General Corporation Law and of the limited institutional competence of
courts to assess business decisions."); Dennis Honabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh
Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control, 65 CmI.-KENT L. REv. 681, 686 (1989)
("[C]ourts frequently announce that they are reluctant to review the acts of directors because they lack the expertise to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions."); Dennis J.
Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in ShareholderLitigation at the Turn
of the Decade,45 Bus. LAW. 469, 490 (1990) ("[T]he [business judgment] rule keeps courts
from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decisionmaking, a task which they are
admittedly ill-equipped to handle.").
31. E.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437, 1439 (1985) (notion "that judges lack competence in making business
decisions" does "not explain.., why the same judges who presumably are able to resolve
other commercial disputes are unable to decide whether a business decision was made
negligently"); Note, "What's in a Name?". The Business Judgment Rule After Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado,34 CASE W. RES. L. Rnv. 340,346-47 (1984) (explaining that courts defer to
a board's decision not because "directors are blessed with a special business acumen" but
rather because deference "foster[s] proper and efficient corporate management").
32. Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative
Litigation,44 Bus. LAW. 503,521 (1989); see also R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAW. 1337, 1342 (1993) ("Courts readily
plunge into many areas, e.g., construction, ecology, and accounting, where they have only
limited or no experience and where their expertise, if any, is not obvious.").
33. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 521. The introductory note to the ALI Governance Project's discussion of the business judgment rule likewise explains the rule as
encouraging entrepreneurial activity:
The basic policy underpinning of the business judgment rule is that corporate law
should encourage, and afford broad protection to, informed business judgments
(whether subsequent events prove the judgments right or wrong) in order to stimulate risk taking, innovation, and other creative entrepreneurial activities. Shareholders accept the risk that an informed business decision-honestly undertaken
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this light, the business judgment rule promotes a policy which
presumes that investors in a company-and perhaps society as a
whole-benefit by encouraging talented people to pursue their managerial vision unfettered by the fear that courts, with the benefit of 20/
34
20 hindsight, will find their decisions to have been flawed.
and rationally believed to be in the best interests of the corporation-may not be
vindicated by subsequent success.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
RECOMMENDATIONS, Part IV (Duty of Care and The Business Judgment

ANALYSIS AND

Rule), Introductory Note, at 135 (1994); see also Davis, supra note 27, at 75 (explaining that the business
judgment rule "promot[es] managerial creativity and risk-taking by removing the risk of
liability for decisions that turn out poorly"); Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do
Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984) ("The business
judgment rule gives managers the freedom to err, and thus it facilitates risk-taking."); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for
Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1491 (1984) ("Sophisticated modern courts further explicitly
recognize that the private sector entrepreneurial process cannot operate unless managers
are given the latitude to be innovative and experimental and, therefore, to make mistakes."); Daniel J. Morrissey, Defensive Tactics In Tender Offers-Does Anything Go?, 53
TENN. L. REV. 103, 120 (1985) ("Judges, illsuited to re-examining complex commercial
decisions and fearful of fostering overly cautious business planning, have routinely deferred to the mercantile decisions of corporate management."); Comment, JudicialReview
of Antitakeover Devices Employed in the Noncoercive Tender Offer Context: Making Sense
of the Unocal Test, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 240 (1989) (noting that the business judgment
rule encourages informed risk-taking by directors by protecting them from personal liability for their decisions); Mary A. Lopatto, Note, Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors: The
Business Judgment Rule and Procedural Review of the Special Litigation Committee, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 791 (1985) ("[Tlhe rule is based on the notion that directors, in the
course of performing duties on behalf of a corporation, take risks and make mistakes for
which they should not be held legally accountable.") Pelto, supra note 24, at 846 ("[T]he
rule encourages informed risk taking by directors because it shields them from personal
liability for honest, informed judgments."); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985) ("Business judgment rule exists to protect and promote full and free exercise of managerial power granted to ... directors.").
34. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 32, at 1342 ("More persuasive reasons for the
rule are its role in encouraging qualified men and women to serve as directors and motivating them to be willing to take entrepreneurial risks."); Block et al., supra note 30, at 490
("[T]he rule recognizes that business decisions frequently entail risk, and thus provides
directors the broad discretion they need in formulating dynamic and effective company
policy without fear of judicial second-guessing."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
437, 444 (1993) ("It is often in the interests of shareholders that directors or officers choose
the riskier of two alternative decisions, because the expected value of a more risky decision
may be greater than the expected value of the less risky decision."); Honabach & Dennis,
supra note 30, at 686 (noting the argument "that increased scrutiny will force directors and
officers to adopt overly conservative business policies"); cf. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in CorporateLaw: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 270 (1986) ("If agents are penalized
for poor outcomes, as well as poor performance, they will tend to undertake lower risk
projects.") (footnote omitted). In Solash v. Telex, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 93,608 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988), Chancellor Allen articulated a justification
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This policy effectively recognizes that the rewards of such risktaking are more readily realized when the threat of liability does not
loom simply because a decision may turn out badly.35 The Official
Comment to Section 8.30 of the RMBCA expresses this concept well:
[T]he courts recognize that boards of directors and corporate managers continuously make decisions that involve the balancing of
risks and benefits for the enterprise. Although some decisions turn
out to be unwise or the result of a mistake of judgment, it is unrea36
sonable to reexamine these decisions with the benefit of hindsight.
for deference that appeared to combine the competency rationale with the value of promoting such entrepreneurial innovation:
Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts and because there is
great social utility in encouraging the allocation of assets and the evaluation and
assumption of economic risk by those with such skill and information, courts have
long been reluctant to second-guess such decisions when they appear to have
been made in good faith.
Id. at 97,727.
35. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1196 (1981) (noting
the profit-reducing cost of obtaining complete information for every business decision and
the likely shareholder attack on any decision with a bad outcome on the basis that the
managers purportedly "gathered too little information.") Moreover, as Chancellor Allen
astutely observed in Time-Warner, any number of variables, even luck, can affect the outcome of a business decision, and Delaware law squarely places the authority for making
such decisions on the board of directors:
The value of a shareholder's investment, over time, rises or falls chiefly because
of the skill, judgment and perhaps luck-for it is present in all human affairs-of
the management and directors of the enterprise. When they exercise sound or
brilliant judgment, shareholders are likely to profit; when they fail to do so, share
values likely will fail to appreciate. In either event, the financial vitality of the
corporation and the value of the company's shares is in the hands of the directors
and managers of the firm.
Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., C.A. No. 10866, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at 8889 (Del. Ch. July 14, revised July 17, 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
36. RMBCA § 8.30, Official Comment; see also id. ("[RMBCA] Section 8.30 defines
the general standard of conduct for directors. It sets forth the standard by focusing on the
manner in which the director performs his duties, not in the correctness of his decisions.");
Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 444 ("Under a reasonableness standard of review . . .
factfinders might too often erroneously treat decisions that turned out badly as bad decisions, and unfairly hold directors and officers liable for such decisions."); Comment, supra
note 33, at 240 ("[A]ny evaluation made by the courts will have the benefit of hindsight,
necessarily distorting judicial perception of the situation faced by the directors."); Pelto,
supra note 24, at 846 (explaining that the rule "discourages courts from evaluating business
decisions in hindsight").
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The Board as Centralized Decisionmaker

Related to the value of entrepreneurial risk-taking is the "value
of centralized decisionmaking for the stockholders. 3 7T Professor
Dooley and former-practitioner Veasey thus have emphasized that the
business judgment rule operates to protect stockholders from each
other by preventing "unwarranted interference" by one or a few
stockholders in the board's management of the enterprise:
The power to hold to account is the power to interfere and, ultimately, the power to decide. If stockholders are given too easy access to courts, the effect is to transfer decision-making power from
the board to the stockholders or, more realistically, to one or a few
stockholders whose interests may not coincide with those of the
larger body of stockholders .... Although it is customary to think
of the business judgment rule as protecting directors from stockimportant function of protectholders, it ultimately serves the more
38
ing stockholders from themselves.

To afford stockholders easy access to the courts would, as Chancellor
39
Allen has remarked elsewhere, "make of courts super-directors.
37. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 522; see also TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition
Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at 27-29 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989),
reprintedin 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169, 1186 (1989) ("While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New England town meeting; directors, not stockholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, subject
however to a fiduciary obligation...."); cf. Commonwealth Assocs. v. Providence Health
Care, Inc., C.A. No. 13135, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 231, at *25 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1993) ("In a
technological, market economy these corporate enterprises require broad power and discretion in the hands of boards and managers in order to enable the enterprise to adapt to
changing markets in a timely way."); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1982) (describing business judgment rule as embodiment of principle that directors, as managers constrained by discipline of the capital
markets-rather than judges, who are not similarly constrained-should make business
decisions); Fischel & Bradley, supra note 34, at 283 (noting that business judgment rule
recognizes, among other things, "the specialization of function in public corporations
whereby managers are entrusted to make business decisions and shareholders rather than
managers bear business risks"); Morrissey, supra note 33, at 120 ("[T]he business judgment
rule has been aptly justified as an acknowledgment of the board's managerial prerogatives.") (footnote omitted).
38. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 522. Given this earlier emphasis on the value
of avoiding stockholder interference with board decisions (and thereby protecting stockholders from themselves), it is worth noting Chief Justice Veasey's exposition of the business judgment rule along these general lines in the Paramount decision. Compare
Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) ("Under normal circumstances, neither the courts nor the stockholders should interfere with the managerial decisions of the directors.") (emphasis added) with Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) ("The [business judgment] rule operates to preclude a court
from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.").
39. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS
9, at *41 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, amended Feb. 14, 1989).
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According to Professor Dooley, "[t]he business judgment rule can
only be understood as intended to protect the authority of the board
and thus to promote the value of Authority. ' 40 The rule achieves this

objective by sharply limiting those instances in which shareholders will
be permitted to enlist the court's aid to interfere with the board's deci-

sions.41 In short, courts are reluctant to second-guess business decisions that go awry, but not because judges are ostensibly less qualified
than directors to make business decisions. The point is that the courts
are certainly no better qualified than directors in such matters and the

corporation law vests the directors-not the courts or the shareholders-with the authority to make managerial decisions for the firm. 42
(4) Summary

The courts' oft-cited rationale of judicial incompetency regarding
complex business judgments has been discredited as "nearly indefen-

sible." 43 The more persuasive explanations for the courts' deference
to board decisions can be summarized as follows:
(a) Promoting the value of entrepreneurial risk-taking and
innovation;
(b) Recognizing as unreasonable a rule that otherwise would subject directors to liability when, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight,
their decisions may appear mistaken or unwise; and
(c) Upholding the board's managerial authority as centralized decisionmaker by preventing shareholder interference with this
authority.
40. Dooley, supra note 14, at 470; see also AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, PRINCIPLES OF
GovERNANcE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Part IV (Duty of Care
and the Business Judgment Rule), Introductory Note, at 135 (the special protection afforded business judgments is also based on a desire to limit litigation and judicial intrusiveness with respect to private-sector business decisionmaking); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d
767, 774 (Del. 1990) ("[T]he business judgment rule operates as a judicial acknowledgement of a board of directors' managerial prerogatives.").
41. Dooley, supra note 14, at 470 ("[A]ffording shareholders the right to demand frequent judicial review of board decisions has the effect of transferring decision-making authority from the board to the shareholders.").
42. See Paramount,637 A.2d at 42 ("Under normal circumstances, neither the courts
nor the stockholders should interfere with the managerial decisions of the directors.");
Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., C.A. No. 10866, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *89
(Del. Ch. July 14, revised July 17, 1989) ("The corporation law does not operate on the
theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow
the wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the
duty to manage the firm."), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
43. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 521; see also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
CoR'oRAT
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With this framework of deference in mind, it is appropriate to explore
those instances in which the courts will override the board's authority
and give priority to the value of accountability.
B.

When the Value of Accountability Predominates: The Exacting
Scrutiny of Entire Fairness

As we have seen, the business judgment rule reflects an assumption that investors benefit from a model of governance in which the
board of directors has clear authority to manage the enterprise. Thus,
there is thought to be "great social utility" 44 in encouraging directors
(and the managers they hire to help formulate and implement corporate policy) to pursue their entrepreneurial vision efficiently, without
the chilling threat that their decisions will be second-guessed by the
courts. Given these perceived benefits, when does this model of deference succumb to the competing value of accountability to stockholders? As shown below, the value of accountability, or responsibility, is
elevated-and that of deference diminished-when there is good reason to question the proper functioning of the board.
(1) The Entire Fairness Test
In the exercise of their power to manage the corporation, "directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its
shareholders. ' 45 The "traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary" who undertakes to act on behalf of a corporation and its stockholders are the
"[d]uty of care and duty of loyalty. '46 In its recent decision in Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,47 the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized
that "[e]ach of these duties is of equal and independent significance. '"48 Consequently, when a shareholder plaintiff provides evidence that the directors breached either or both of these duties, 49 the
44. Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988).
45. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); see also Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939).
46. Cede, 634 A.2d at 367; see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (directors, being
"vested with the responsibility for the management of the affairs of the corporation," must
execute their duties "with the recognition that [they act] on behalf of others").
47. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
48. Id. at 367.
49. Although the directors' duty of good faith was not identified in Cede as one of the
"traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary," id., it is plain from the decision that evidence of a
breach of the director's basic duty to act in good faith would be independently sufficient to
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evidentiary presumption of the business judgment rule (i.e., the

threshold presumption of propriety attaching to the directors' decision) is rebutted.5 0 In that event, the "burden shifts to the defendant

directors to prove.., to the trier of fact the 'entire fairness' of the
transaction to the shareholder plaintiff."'51
Under this "entire fairness standard of judicial review," 52 the defendant directors must demonstrate that the challenged transaction
"was the product of both fair dealing and fair price. '53 In Weinberger

v. UOP, Inc.,54 the Delaware Supreme Court underscored the rigorous nature of this test by requiring the directors to establish "their
utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the
bargain" in a manner "sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by
55
the court."
rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule. See id. at 361 ("To rebut the rule, a
shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching
their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good
faith, loyalty or due care.").
50. Id. at 361.
51. Id. (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 710 (Del. 1983)).
52. Id.; see also Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTnA L. REv. 93,
111 (1979) (observing that the business judgment rule should not be available to directors
who do "not exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and available facts before voting").
53. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the
court elaborated on the analytical components of the entire fairness test and explained that
the fair dealing and fair price aspects of the test must be examined in the overall context of
the transaction and not as part of a bifurcated analysis:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The
former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of
the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness
relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and
any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's
stock.... However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair
dealing and fair price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since
the question is one of entire fairness.
Id. at 711 (citations omitted).
54. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
55. Id. at 710. In its recent Paramount decision, the Delaware Supreme Court referred to the test of entire fairness as requiring "even more exacting scrutiny" than the
intermediate level of judicial review involved in the enhanced scrutiny test. Paramount
Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994).
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(2) Duty of Loyalty Concerns
Delaware courts have long required that directors give precedence to "the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders...
over any interest possessed by a director .... -56 The court's classic
formulation of this principle in Guth v. Loft, Inc.57 continues to be
cited regularly:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his
duty .... The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty
to the corporation
demands that there be no conflict between duty
58
and self-interest.

Thus, one "essential" prerequisite to the application of the business
judgment rule "is the fact that there has been a business decision...
''59 If
by a disinterested and independent corporate decisionmaker.
the evidence shows that "there is no independent corporate deci'60
sionmaker, the court may become the objective arbiter.
The Delaware courts have generally defined a director as independent "only when the director's decision is based entirely on the
corporate merits of the transaction and is not influenced by personal
or extraneous considerations." ' 6 1 When a director receives a substan56. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
57. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
58. Id. at 510, cited in Cede, 634 A.2d at 361; Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1280, 1284 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710;
see also Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship-A Response to Professor
Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 107, 109 (1993) ("[T]he duty of loyalty rule as stated in the seminal Delaware case of
Guth v. Loft, Inc. is still a guiding principle of Delaware corporate law today.") (footnote
omitted).
59. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Block et al., supra note 27, at
71 ("The protection afforded by the business judgment rule only shields corporate decisionmakers and their decisions from judicial second-guessing where, among other things,
the decisionmakers are not subject to disqualifying conflicts of interest with respect to the
subject matter of their decision.").
60. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376 (footnote omitted); see also AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("This unwillingness to assess
the merits (or fairness) of business decisions of necessity ends when a transaction is one
involving a predominately interested board with a financial interest in the transaction adverse to the corporation.").
61. Cede, 634 A.2d at 362.
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tial benefit from voting to support a transaction, that director "cannot
be objectively viewed as disinterested or independent. '62
When such personal interests exist for a majority 63 of the directors, the law sensibly declines to accord deference to the business
judgment of the board.64 In the language of Guth v. Loft, the courts-

given their knowledge "of human characteristics and motives" 65-will
assume under such circumstances that even highly-skilled business

people may succumb to the temptation to pursue selfish ends at the

potential expense of the stockholders. 66 The entire fairness test may
62. Id. (citing ER, Esr L. FOLK, III, ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL COR§ 141.2 at 141:33 (3d ed. 1992)). As the Cede court explained, "[c]lassic
examples of director self-interest in a business transaction involve either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from a transaction not received by the shareholders generally." Id.
63. For purposes of determining whether a board of directors is deemed interested or
lacking in independence, the Delaware courts traditionally have required a showing of
interest or lack of independence on the part of a majority of the directors. Paramount
Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994); Nixon, 626 A.2d at
1370, 1375-76; Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988); AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d
at 111; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984). As Professor Dooley has
succinctly observed:
Where the board cannot claim a majority of disinterested members, Responsibility trumps Authority, and with good reason. If the board's decision was clouded
with self-interest, there is no reason to assume that its action was intended to
benefit the shareholders. Indeed, the contrary inference seems more likely, and
there is no reason to preserve the authority of the board.
Dooley, supra note 14, at 487.
64. In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court took aim at critics who charge that
Delaware law fails to account for the "structural bias" that is said to exist in the corporate
boardroom:
We recognize that drawing the line at a majority of the board may be an arguably
arbitrary dividing point. Critics will charge that we are ignoring the structural
bias common to corporate boards throughout America, as well as the other unseen socialization processes cutting against independent discussion and decisionmaking in the boardroom. The difficulty with structural bias in a demand futile
case is simply one of establishing it in the complaint for purposes of Rule 23.1.
We are satisfied that discretionary review by the Court of Chancery of complaints
alleging specific facts pointing to bias on a particular board will be sufficient for
determining demand futility.
473 A.2d at 815 n.8. In their scholarly commentary on this subject, Professor Dooley and
former-practitioner Veasey read this discussion in Aronson as a clear rejection of the entire
structural bias argument. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 534 ("[T]he structural
bias argument has no logical terminus. That perhaps explains why it was clearly'rejected
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson.") (footnote omitted).
65. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
66. Dooley, supra note 14, at 487; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (referring to "unyielding principle that corporate fiduciaries shall abjure every temptation for personal profit at the expense of those they serve"); id. at 1281
("When presumably well-intentioned outside directors remove themselves from the design
and execution of an auction, then what occurred here, given the human temptations left
PORATION LAW
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be seen in this light as both a deterrent against managerial opportunism 67 and a statement that the trust placed in the board must be

earned-and will not be assumed-when a majority of the directors
has benefitted personally from a decision of its own making.68
unchecked, was virtually inevitable."); Block et al., supra note 27, at 67 (explaining that
deference is not accorded to decisions of interested fiduciaries "because of the danger such
fiduciaries will make business decisions for their personal benefit and to the detriment of
the corporation").
67. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Contractual Freedom In Corporate Law: The
Mandatory/EnablingBalance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1618, 1620-24 (1989).
68. Block et al., supra note 27, at 77 ("The law regulates interest conflict transactions
because experience shows that people may be injured."). Like most states, Delaware has a
statutory procedure for preventing director conflicts from voiding corporate action. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1991); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,
365-66 (Del. 1993); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-05 (Del. 1987); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,222 (Del. 1976); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & J. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.9 at 4-207 et seq. (2d

ed. Supp. 1993); FOLK, ET AL., supra note 62, at § 144:5; Block et al., supra note 27, at 78
("The rationale underlying such statutes appears to be that business judgment rule protection is appropriate for an interested director or officer transaction where 'a fully informed
majority of disinterested directors properly applies its business judgment in good faith to
authorize the transaction."') Dooley, supra note 14, at 488-90. Section 144(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law "protects corporate actions from invalidation on grounds
of director self-interest if such self-interest is: (1) disclosed to and approved by a majority
of disinterested directors; (2) disclosed to and approved by the shareholders; or (3) the
contract or transaction is found to be fair 'as to the corporation."' Cede, 634 A.2d at 365
(quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1991)).

An interesting question, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is whether a
predominantly interested board can obtain business judgment rule protection under Section 144(a)(1) if the majority of interested directors disclose their personal interests to the
disinterested minority and obtain their independent vote of approval for the transaction.
See, e.g., id. at 366 n.34 ("[S]ection 144 removes the 'interested director cloud' from a
transaction through three alternative methods and permits an otherwise interested transaction to be brought within the protection of the business judgment rule."); Marciano, 535
A.2d at 404-05 n.3 ("[A]pproval by fully informed disinterested directors under section
144(a)(1), or disinterested stockholders under section 144(a)(2), permits invocation of the
business judgment rule."). On the other hand, such approval by the disinterested minority
of directors might serve only the more limited purpose of immunizing the transaction
against a challenge for voidness but not against judicial review for fairness. See § 144(a)
("No contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors...
shall be void or voidable solely for this reason .... ) (emphasis added); Fliegler,361 A.2d
at 222 (Section 144(a) "provides against invalidation of an agreement 'solely' because such
a director or officer is involved. Nothing in the statute sanctions unfairness ... or removes
the transaction from judicial scrutiny."); see also Marciano, 535 A.2d at 404 ("The ratification process contemplated by section 144 presupposes the functioning of corporate constituencies capable of providing assents."); Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 454 (arguing for an
intermediate standard of review of board approval of interested director transactions
under section 5.02 of the ALI GOVERNANCE PROJECT); Joel Seligman, The New Corporate
Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993) ("[O]ne could debate whether or not a board committee could be sufficiently independent in this context to justify business judgment rule
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(3) Duty of Care Concerns

Delaware law also requires that board action be the product of an
informed and deliberative decision-making process. Thus, "[u]nder
the business judgment rule there is no protection for69directors who

have made 'an unintelligent or unadvised judgment."'
To invoke the protection of the business judgment rule, "directors

have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision,
of all material information reasonably available to them. ' 70 Once the
directors have become appropriately informed, "they must then act
with requisite care in the discharge of their duties."' 71 Over the years,
the Delaware courts have established that the "concept of gross negligence" is the appropriate standard for determining whether a board's
lack of information or care in making a decision is actionable. 72
The Delaware Supreme Court "has consistently given equal
weight to the [business judgment] rule's requirements of duty of care
and duty of loyalty," both before and since Van Gorkom.73 For example, in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,Inc.,74 the Delaware Supreme Court

emphasized that evidence of a board's breach of its duty of care independently rebuts the presumption of the business judgment rule and
triggers the scrutiny of the entire fairness test. 75
review...."); Claire M. Dickerson, Interested Directorsof New York Corporationsand the
Burden of Proof,1988 COLUM. Bus. L. Rlv. 91, 106-07 (1988) .("[I]f.there are too few
disinterested directors approving a transaction to satisfy the criteria of section 713 [New
York's version of § 144], the business judgment rule will not prevent a review by the courts
of the inherent fairness of the transaction. .. .") (footnote omitted); Dooley, supra note 14,
at 489 (the "solely hedge" in section 144(a)(1) and comparable state statutes "might have
been intended to preserve the right to obtain de novo judicial review of fairness, even after
approval or ratification").
69. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933)).
70. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Cede, 634 A.2d at 367.
71. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
72. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
73. Cede, 634 A.2d at 367.
74. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
75. Id. at 361, 367 (adopting Chancery Court's presumed findings of gross negligence
by defendant directors, reversing Chancery Court judgment in favor of directors and directing Chancery Court to apply entire fairness standard of review on remand); see also
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (directing judgment in favor of shareholder plaintiffs in
action where (i) "considerations of motive" were deemed "irrelevant" and (ii) directors
were found to have breached their duty of care); cf Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532
A.2d 1324, 1337-38 (Del. Ch. 1987) (breach of directors' duty of care in parent-subsidiary
merger supported determination that merger transaction failed to satisfy entire fairness
test).
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The Delaware courts' concern with the duty of care as an independently significant component of board action makes sense. It certainly makes little or no difference to shareholders whether their
investment is affected adversely by a board's gross negligence or by
acts of board disloyalty. 76 In either case, the essential fact is that investors may have sustained economic loss because the board's decision-making process has gone awry. Consequently, when a board's
decision is likely the product of a dysfunctional process-in this context because there is evidence that the directors have been grossly
negligent-the law quite sensibly displaces the model of deference
with that of judicial scrutiny.
Courts do not defer to the directors' talent and vision when gross
negligence is established because of the assumption that talent and
vision will not overcome the likely flaws inherent in any decision
reached with seriously deficient information or care. If in fact there
are benefits worth preserving from such a decision, the law affords a
mechanism to sustain them. Nevertheless, because confidence in the
proper functioning of the decision-making body is lost, the courts will
only uphold the board's action in this context if the directors can establish that the challenged transaction is entirely fair to the company's
shareholders. 77
(4)

Summary

When talented people make decisions that are tainted by significant influences unrelated to the merits of the matter at hand-such as
self-interest or demonstrably inadequate information or care-courts
are far less interested in the skill and entrepreneurial vision of the
decisionmakers than in the destabilizing influences that likely infected
the decision-making process. The law assumes-reasonably, given its
assumptions about human nature-that the hoped-for benefits of deference are remote in light of the potential mischief presented by a
76. Dooley, supra note 14, at 486 ("From an economic perspective, lapses in diligence
are indistinguishable from lapses in fidelity: both are instances of self-interested behavior
that reduce the value of the residual interest."). In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme
Court further demonstrated its concern for acts of director disloyalty that arise in an environment where outside directors fail to exercise appropriate oversight, especially with regard to transactions in which management directors are interested. Mills Acquisition Co.
v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264-65 (Del. 1989); see also id. at 1281 ("When presumably well-intentioned outside directors remove themselves from the design and execution
of an auction, then what occurred here, given the human temptations left unchecked, was
virtually inevitable.").
77. Cede, 634 A.2d at 367 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del.
1983); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873).
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self-interested or uninformed decision. More is gained than lost in
such circumstances when the law requires directors to account to the
stockholders by establishing that their decision is deserving of the
court's approval.
In short, a decision made by directors "under an influence which
sterilizes their discretion" 78 may be sustained, but only if the directors
can persuade the court that the challenged action of the board is entirely fair to the stockholders. 79 Courts will uphold and preserve the

potential benefits of the managers' entrepreneurial vision in this context,8° but they start with the sensible assumption that such benefits
are nonexistent until the directors convincingly demonstrate
otherwise.
H.

Enhanced Scrutiny-The Early Years

The early 1980s witnessed a sharp increase in corporate takeover
activity.81 A number of federal courts in this era held that a target
board's decision to adopt defensive measures in response to a hostile
takeover bid was entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule.82 In its 1984 decision in Pogostin v. Rice,83 the Delaware
Supreme Court ruled that the business judgment rule was equally ap78. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
79. E.g., Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
80. As Judge Winter has explained, the fairness analysis for self-dealing transactions is
designed to preserve transactions which are beneficial to the corporation:
To be sure, there is a risk of self-dealing that may damage the corporation, but
such losses must be measured against the cost of prohibiting all such transactions
including those that are beneficial. The rule evaluating self-dealing transactions
by the standards of arms-length bargaining thus seeks to distinguish between beneficial and harmful transactions.
Ralph K. Winter, On "Protecting The Ordinary Investor," 63 WASH. L. REv. 881, 893
(1988).
81. See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1253 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("The recent years have seen a massive proliferation of corporate takeover battles."); Dennis J. Block & Yvette Miller, The Responsibilitiesand Obligationsof Corporate
Directorsin Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44 (1983); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to
ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 249 (1989); Louis Lowenstein, PruningDeadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation,83 COLUM. L. Rnv. 249,274 (1983);
Note, Defensive Strategies and the Business Judgment Rule: Does Almost Anything Go in
Delaware?, 11 DEL J. CORP. L. 535 (1986).
82. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-81 (2d Cir.
1980); Panter v. Marshall-Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,293-96 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-04 (2d Cir. 1980); see
also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981); William T. Quillen, The Federal-State CorporateLaw Relationship-A Response to
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plicable under Delaware law "in the context of a takeover." 84 The

Pogostin court did not, however, specifically apply the rule to a
board's use of defensive measures to thwart a takeover. 85 That analy-

sis would come in "the watershed year of 1985 in Delaware jurisprudence," 86 when the Delaware Supreme Court announced in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 87 that directors are required to satisfy an
"enhanced duty" in this context because of the "omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders ....
,,88 The nature of
the Unocal enhanced duty and its suspension of the "customary pre-

sumptions of the business judgment rule" 89 are discussed further
below.
Within months of Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court issued
Moran v. HouseholdInternational,Inc.,90 a decision in which the court
validated the "poison pill," an innovative defensive measure that em-

powers a board of directors to negotiate directly with a tender offeror
on the stockholders' behalf and, in theory, to rebuff an unsolicited

offer which the board concludes advisedly and in good faith is inade-

quate. 91 On the heels of Moran came Revlon, a decision which clariProfessor Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59
BROOK.

L.

REV.

107, 110 (1993).

83. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
84. Id. at 627.
85. The directors in Pogostin rejected an unsolicited tender offer but apparently took
no steps to block the offer. 480 A.2d at 622, 627. Pogostinwas used later in the decade to
support the "just say no" defense-a moniker borrowed from the slogan for former First
Lady Nancy Reagan's anti-drug campaign. Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense". May Target Boards "Just Say No"?
Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 382 (1990); see, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989) ("A refusal to entertain
offers may comport with a valid exercise of business judgment.") (citing Pogostin, 480 A.2d
at 627); Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990) (same);
see also Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 n.13 (Del. 1994)
("[T]his Court has recognized the prerogative of a board of directors to resist a third
party's unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer.") (citing Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 627).
86. E. Norman Veasey, Book Review, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 573, 576 (1990) (reviewing
D. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS (3d ed. 1989)) [hereinafter, "Veasey, Book Review"].
87. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
88. Id. at 954.
89. E. Norman Veasey, Duty of Loyalty: The Criticality of the Counselor's Role, 45
Bus. LAW. 2065, 2075 (1990) [hereinafter, "Veasey, Duty of Loyalty"].
90. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
91. Id. at 1354; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180-81 (Del. 1986). A poison pill typically involves "a plan by which shareholders receive
the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substantial premium on the occurrence
of a stated triggering event." Id. at 180. It is the poison pill's threat of devastating eco-
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fled that a board's narrowly focused obligation in the context of a sale
of control is to obtain "the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders." 92 Revlon was not especially clear, however, on the standard
of judicial review that applies to claims arising in the takeover setting
(as opposed to Unocal's antitakeover context).
Through the trilogy of Unocal, Moran, and Revlon, the Delaware

Supreme Court laid the analytical foundation for a wave of fast-paced
lawsuits that accompanied the accelerated takeover activity of the late
1980s.93 Whenever the courts applied enhanced scrutiny to examine a
nomic consequences to a hostile acquiror that empowers the target's directors (who retain
the power to dismantle the device) to negotiate directly with any potential acquiror. See,
e.g., Facet Enterprises, Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., C.A. No. 9746, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS
51, at *9 (Del. Ch.Apr. 15,1988) (noting advice of target board's legal counsel that poison
pill would "increase the board's negotiating power with [the bidder] and allow it more time
to develop, and explore financial alternatives"); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d
1059, 1083 (Del. Ch.) ("Through its power to redeem the rights before a triggering event
occurs the Household Board has assumed a plenary negotiating role."), affd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239,
1247 (Del. Ch.1985) (explaining that, by adopting a poison pill, "[t]he Revlon Board thus
assumed a great degree of responsibility by providing a substitute for the marketplace
which ordinarily would judge the merits of Pantry Pride's, and any other potential acquiror's, tender offer"), affd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of the poison pill as a focal point in
the takeover battles that erupted in the mid-to-late 1980s. See William T. Allen, A Glimpse
at the Struggle for Board Autonomy in American CorporationLaw, Remarks at Stanford
Law School (Apr. 5, 1990), at 6 (characterizing the poison pill as a "most audaciously
brilliant corporation law innovation"); DeMott, supra note 19, at 19 ("A pill, in effect,
extends the time over which any given takeover contest will run, arguably enhancing the
likelihood that higher offers will en'ierge."); Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate
Stock, 16 DEL. J. Cons. L. 485, 523 (1991) (the "upshot" of a board's deployment of a
poison pill "is that purchases of large amounts of stock require the approval of a corporate
board of directors as well as the decisions of individual shareholders") (footnote omitted);
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance In the Age of Finance Corporatism,136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 31 (1987) ("The rights plan... forces a raider to negotiate with the target's board
to determine if it desires a second-step merger, and helps to ensure that the raider will not
abuse the tender offer process."); Dale A. Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute: Of
Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J.CoRP.L. 879, 919 (1988) ("In essence, the goal of a poison pill plan is to create an event so onerous that no one can afford
to trigger the plan with an unapproved acquisition, thus forcing all potential acquirors to
seek the blessing of the existing board.") (footnote omitted); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom
Should the CorporationServe? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16
DEL. J.CoRP.L. 33, 34 (1991) ("The most unique of these [defensive] efforts, of course,
was the 'poison pill,' more euphemistically known as 'shareholders' rights plans."');
Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pills And Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DuKE LJ. 54, 61
("Poison pills ... give incumbent board members maximum flexibility to remove a pill's
deterrent effects, if and when they decide to do so.").
92. 506 A.2d at 182.
93. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 251-54; Veasey, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 89, at 2075 (referring to the increase in takeover activity during the late
1980s).
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board's decision to adopt antitakeover measures, they invariably relied on Unocal's "omnipresent specter" 94 rationale-i.e., the suspicion

that directors who try to block a takeover might be acting primarily
out of an improper desire to perpetuate their control. 95 Significantly,

however, the courts continued to apply a conventional business judgment rule analysis to "Revlon" claims arising from a board's approval
96
of a sale or change of control.

A.

The Enhanced Business Judgment Rule

As discussed below, Unocal announced a new "intermediate standard of review" 97 to govern a board's adoption of defensive measures.
In Moran, the court applied Unocal's enhanced scrutiny test to uphold
the validity of a poison pill.
(1) Unocal

In 1985 the board of directors of Unocal Corporation was confronted with an unsolicited tender offer by Mesa Petroleum Co. and
its affiliates. 98 Mesa made "a two-tier 'front loaded' cash tender offer
for ... approximately 37% ... of Unocal's outstanding stock at a price

of $54 per share." 99 Upon receiving advice from their investment
94. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
95. See infra Part II.B.
96. In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989),
the Delaware Supreme Court later criticized the Chancery Court's failure to apply enhanced scrutiny in takeover cases. See infra note 196.
97. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 251. In AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986), Chancellor Allen suggested that Unocal's "intermediate" standard of review was developed to provide the courts with more
flexibility because a determination whether to apply the business judgment rule or an entire fairness analysis frequently is outcome determinative:
Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so
powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the
appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation. Perhaps for that reason, the Delaware Supreme
Court recognized in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., Del. Supr., 493 A.2d
946 (1985), that where a board takes action designed to defeat a threatened
change in control of the company, a more flexible, intermediate form of judicial
review is appropriate.
Id. at 111, quoted with approval in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); see
also Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1279.
98. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. Mesa Petroleum was controlled by T. Boone Pickens,
Jr., whom the court described as "a corporate raider with a national reputation as a 'greenmailer"') Id. at 956.
99. Id. at 949. Shares not tendered to Mesa would be exchanged in a second-step
merger transaction for "junk bonds" purportedly worth $54 per share. Id. Regarding the
coercive nature of such offers, the Delaware Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is now well
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bankers that Mesa's proposal was inadequate, the Unocal boardcomprised of a majority of outside directors-rejected Mesa's proposal and implemented a defensive "self-tender offer."'10 Significantly,
Unocal's self-tender specifically denied Mesa, then a 13% stockholder
of Unocal, any opportunity to participate. 101
Mesa challenged the defensive self-tender as .a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties to Mesa as a Unocal stockholder. 0 2 The

Chancery Court preliminarily enjoined Unocal from proceeding with
the self-tender, reasoning that the business judgment rule did not apply to a discriminatory exchange offer. 103 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed and upheld the Unocal board's action as a reasonable
response to the coercive and financially inadequate Mesa tender offer.' °4 In reaching its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court announced its innovative, two-pronged analysis for assessing the validity
of a board's decision to implement antitakeover measures.
As a preliminary matter, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the protection of the business judgment rule
05
is afforded to a board when addressing a pending takeover bid.
However, because of the "omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests"' 0 6 in resisting a takeover-and
thus "may" have breached its duty of loyalty' 07-the court imposed an
recognized that such offers are a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they
will receive at the back end of the transaction." Id. at 956.
100. Id. at 950. The directors authorized the self-tender offer "to provide the stockholders with a fairly priced alternative to the Mesa proposal." Id. Under the terms of the
Unocal self-tender, as later amended, Mesa offered to exchange debt securities with an
aggregate par value of $72 per share for 49% of Unocal's outstanding shares. Id. at 951.
101. Id. at 949, 951.
102. Id. at 952-53.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 958-59.
105. Id. at 954 (noting that a board's duty in addressing a pending takeover bid "is no
different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less
entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment") (footnote omitted).
106. Id
107. Id. (emphasis added). In formulating the two-part analysis of the enhanced scrutiny test, the court in Unocal cited the classic Guth v. Loft articulation of the duty of loyalty: "In the board's exercise of corporate power to forestall a takeover bid our analysis
begins with the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation's stockholders." Id. at 955 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d 503,510 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939). See also Dooley, supra note 14, at 518 ("[lIt is clear
that the question of motive is the predominant influence that has shaped the Delaware
approach to board resistance. It drives both the initial assignment of justification to directors and the substantive standards of the Unocal rule.").
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enhanced duty upon directors in this context. 08 This duty triggers a
two-part "judicial examination at the threshold" into the directors' actions. 10 9 Only if the directors satisfy both parts of this threshold re-

view will they retain the protections of the business judgment rule. 110
In light of the "inherent conflict" that directors are thought to
face when confronting a pending takeover bid,"' they first must show
"that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's

stock ownership. 1" 2 However, the real significance of Unocal lay in
108. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. As authority for its conclusion that the directors might
well act out of an improper (i.e., selfish) motive in this context, the Unocal court relied on
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962). In Bennett, the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded-based essentially on the authority of a law review note discussing the Chancery Court's decision in Bennett (see infra note 350)-that "directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult" when they cause
the corporation to purchase its own shares "to remove a threat to corporate policy when a
threat to control is involved." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Bennett, 187 A.2d at 409).
The Unocal court's reliance on Bennett to question the motives of a predominantly disinterested board in responding to a takeover bid is at least questionable. See infra note 350.
109. In his thoughtful discussion on Unocal, then-practitioner Veasey offered the following analysis of the two-part threshold test:
The application of an "enhanced" business judgment rule in contests for corporate control, as developed in Unocal and its progeny, implicates primarily two
concepts which depart from the traditional formulation of the rule and its rationale. The first is a threshold shifting in the burden of proof (or at least the burden
of going forward with the evidence) requiring directors to show by their good
faith and reasonable investigation that they reasonably perceived a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. The second involves judicial review of the reasonableness or proportionality of the corporate action taken in response to a
threatened takeover.
Veasey, Book Review, supra note 86, at 576.
110. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
111. Compare id. at 955 (noting the "inherent conflict" directors face in adopting defensive measures to forestall a takeover) with Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (noting the "potential for conflict" among
directors that Unocal addresses).
112. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 544-55 (Del.
1964)). The directors satisfy this first prong of the Unocal analysis "'by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation ... ' Id. at 955 (quoting Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555). The directors' proof in this regard is "materially enhanced" when the board approving the defensive
measures is "comprised of a majority of outside independent directors ..... ".Id.at 955.
This first prong of the Unocal analysis is essentially a reformulation of what previously
constituted the entire test under Cheff for assessing the validity of a defensive stock repurchase. See Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554-55. As Professors Gilson and Kraakman observed in
their thoughtful commentary on this subject: "Cheff framed a policy conflict/primary purpose test under which management's motives set the standard of review for defensive tactics. If a target's directors could demonstrate disagreement over corporate policy with a
would-be acquiror, they were presumed to act from business considerations rather than
self-interest." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 249; see also id. at 251.
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"the element of balance" required by the second prong of the enhanced scrutiny test. Under this second step, the court reviews the
that it is proreasonableness of a board's defensive response to ensure
113
portionate to the threat posed by the takeover bid.
Because of the "'omnipresent specter' of director interest in
maintaining control," 1 4 there was a defensible rationale for according
less deference than usual to Unocal's directors. On the other hand,
because no actual self-interest was demonstrated, there was no reason
to apply the entire fairness test." 5 Consequently, once the board satisfied Unocal's threshold test-and thereby removed the suspicions
about motives that arise when directors resist a takeover-it earned
the protection of the business judgment rule. 1 6 The reasonableness
or proportionality prong thus can be seen as providing a check on
directors' motives while avoiding the necessity of a finding on this elusive issue. 17
113. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (before a defensive measure may "come within the ambit
of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed").
Compare Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 251 ("The proportionality test brings a
novel, objective standard to the review of defensive tactics-a reasonableness test that
impliedly allows courts to identify and reject unreasonable tactics, whatever the motives of
their authors.") and Veasey, Book Review, supra note 86, at 576 (noting Unocal's "remarkable development" in requiring "judicial review of the reasonableness or proportionality of
the corporate action taken in response to a threatened takeover") with Johnson & Siegel,
supra note 24, at 330 (criticizing scrutiny under Unocal as "a toothless standard" that is
"fairly inconsequential and far less stringent than a fairness test").
114. Veasey, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 89, at 2075 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954).
115. Then-practitioner Veasey offered the following explanation of Unocal's intermediate level of judicial review:
The "enhanced" business judgment rule with its proportionality test is not a finding that in such cases there is necessarily a violation of the duty of loyalty. Accordingly, Unocal does not necessarily implicate court review for entire fairness,
unless it is determined that the business judgment rule does not apply.
Veasey, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 89, at 2075; see also Paramount Communications v.
QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994) ("Where actual self-interest is present and
affects a majority of the directors approving a transaction, a court will apply even more
exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction is entirely fair to stockholders.")
(emphasis added).
116. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
117. See Dooley, supra note 14, at 521 (suggesting that "the Unocal 'reasonableness'
test is intended to function as a filter for conflicted interest, rather than as an objective
measure of whether the board's action was reasonably calculated to maximize shareholder
wealth"); Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 314 (criticizing the pre-Unocal "primary purpose
test" as too easily evaded by the skillful planning of a target's advisors); Cheff v. Mathes,
199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (Del. 1962); Martin v.
American Potash & Chem. Corp., 92 A.2d 295, 302 (Del. 1952); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380
A.2d 556, 568-69 (Del. Ch. 1977); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 140-41 (Del. Ch. 1960).
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Moran

The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Household
International, Inc.118 is noteworthy more for its validation of the
poison pill defense than for its cryptic application of the principles
announced months earlier in Unocal. In 1984, Household International, Inc.'s board-consisting of a majority of outside directorsadopted a poison pill because of general concerns about "the threat in
the market place of coercive two-tier tender offers." 119 John Moran,
one of Household's own directors, filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of the poison pill. 120 In affirming the Chancery Court's judgment in favor of Household, the Delaware Supreme Court applied
Unocal's two-prong threshold test and concluded, with little elaboration, that the poison pill "was a reasonable defensive mechanism to
protect" Household from the threat of "coercive acquisition
2
techniques.' '

B. The Revlon Duty

In its landmark decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.,122 the Delaware Supreme Court further developed its
analysis of the enhanced duties of directors who resist a hostile takeover. The court also clarified directors' special responsibilities when
they authorize a sale or break-up of the company.'2 As discussed
below, in both aspects of the Revlon court's analysis-the use of de118. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
119. Id. at 1348, 1356. Although Household was not then faced with any specific takeover threat, the board nevertheless "was concerned about the increasing frequency of
'bust-up' takeovers." Id. at 1349 (footnote omitted).
120. Under the terms of the Household "Rights Plan," like any other poison pill, the
board could redeem the rights for minimal consideration and thereby eliminate the poison
pill as an obstacle to any offer it deemed adequate. Id. at 1349; see also Revlon Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del. 1986).
121. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57. The court emphasized elsewhere in its opinion that
the board could not use the poison pill "to arbitrarily reject" any tender offer:
There is little change in the governance structure as a result of the adoption of the
Rights Plan. The Board does not now have unfettered discretion in refusing to
redeem the Rights. The Board has no more discretion in refusing to redeem the
Rights than it does in enacting any defensive mechanism.
Id. at 1354. Professors Gilson and Kraakman criticized what they regarded as the absence
of any meaningful analysis of the proportionality element of the second prong of the enhanced scrutiny test in either Moran or Unocal. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 252.
122. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
123. Id. at 182. The court left uncertain, however, the standard of judicial review for
claims attacking a board's conduct in this setting. See infra note 149.
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fensive measures and the conduct of an auction for corporate control-the dominant theme was director loyalty.
In 1985, Revlon rebuffed Pantry Pride, Inc.'s overtures for a
friendly acquisition and adopted a poison pill.' 24 After Pantry Pride
commenced a hostile tender offer, Revlon initiated and then consummated a defensive self-tender offer for 10 million of Revlon's nearly
30 million outstanding shares in exchange for a combined package of
senior subordinated notes (the "Notes") and other consideration.12 5
Pantry Pride responded with a new tender offer but was again
rebuffed. 26 Revlon's board then authorized management to negotiate with other parties interested in acquiring the company, a step
which effectively precipitated an auction for control of Revlon between Forstmann Little & Co. ("Forstmann"), a friendly bidder favored by Revlon management, and Pantry Pride.127 Meanwhile, the

trading value of the newly issued Notes dropped sharply when the
Revlon board announced its intention to sell the company to Forstmann in a highly leveraged transaction.'2
Although on notice that Pantry Pride would top any bid by Forstmann, the Revlon board agreed to an acquisition by Forstmann at
$57.25 per share. 29 Revlon also granted concessions to Forstmann
that effectively ended the auction including, significantly, an asset
lock-up option on two major divisions of Revlon. 30 As part of the
124. Id. at 176-77.
125. Id at 177. Under the terms of the Revlon exchange offer, each share of common
stock accepted would be exchanged for one Senior Subordinated Note of $47.50 principal
amount and one-tenth of a share of $9.00 Cumulative Convertible Exchangeable Preferred
Stock valued at $100 per share. Id This package thus "was thought to produce a security
having a face value of $57.50 per share." MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon,
Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1248 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In the aggregate,
the Notes represented some $475 million of newly incurred Revlon debt. Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 177-78.
126. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
127. Id. at 177-78.
128. Id. at 178. Irate over these developments, numerous Noteholders threatened litigation against the company. Id.
129. Id. at 178-79. Forstmann's $57.25 per share offer was actually worth somewhat
less than its stated face amount when (i) discounted for the delays that the Forstmann
transaction required and (ii) compared to Pantry Pride's immediately available $56.25 per
share offer. Id. at 178 n.6. Pantry Pride subsequently raised its bid to $58 per share. Id. at
181.
130. Under the lock-up, Revlon granted Forstmann an option-exercisable in the
event another acquiror obtained 40% of Revlon's shares-to purchase Revlon's Vision
Care and National Health Laboratories divisions for $525 million, some $100-$175 million
less than the value ascribed to these assets by Revlon's financial advisor, Lazard Freres. Id.
at 178.
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deal, Forstmann agreed to support the value of the Notes (which had
continued to fall in the market) by an exchange of new notes. 131
The Delaware Chancery Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of (i) the lock-up option, (ii) a "no-shop" provision (that obligated Revlon to deal exclusively with Forstmann), and (iii) a
cancellation fee agreement (that required Revlon to pay $25 million
to Forstmann if their transaction was not completed). 132 The Chancery Court concluded that, by making concessions to Forstmann out of
concern for their personal liability to the Noteholders, rather than
maximizing the sale price of the company for the benefit of the stockholders, the Revlon directors had breached their duty of loyalty. 33
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the Revlon directors "breached their primary duty of loyalty" by entering "into an
auction-ending lock-up agreement with Forstmann on the basis of impermissible considerations at the expense of the shareholders .... -134
(1) Enhanced Scrutiny for Defensive Measures
Before specifically addressing the duties of directors in the auction context, the Revlon court first examined the company's pre-auction takeover defenses within the framework of Unocal's enhanced
scrutiny analysis. As it had done in Unocal, the court emphasized the
"omnipresent specter" of director self-interest that arises "when a
board implements anti-takeover measures . . . . 35 The court reasoned that this inherent potential for conflict justifies placing the burden on the directors to satisfy Unocal's threshold examination before
receiving the protection of the business judgment rule. 3 6 The court's
formulation of the enhanced scrutiny test for the antitakeover measures in Revlon thus reemphasized the concern for director loyalty that
justified diminished deference in Unocal.137 The court concluded that
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 179.
Id. at 175, 179.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del.

Ch. 1985); see also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179.
134. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; but see id. at 185 (noting that the Revlon board's approval of the asset option lock-up was based on "considerations other than the maximization of shareholder profit" and also represented "a breach of the directors' fundamental

duty of care").
135.

Id. at 180 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.

1985)).
136. Id. Accord Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341
(Del. 1987) (describing the "potential for conflict" that arises "[w]hen directors oppose a
hostile takeover").
137. The Revlon court described the two-part Unocal test as follows:
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the Revlon board's defensive measures-the poison pill and the exchange offer-were proportionate, and therefore valid, responses to
the threat posed by Pantry Pride's earlier inadequate takeover
proposals. 138
(2) Auction Duties

Revlon's principal significance lay in its explanation of the duties
of directors who oversee the sale or break-up of a corporation. 139 The

court emphasized that a board's responsibility changes dramatically in
this context and requires the directors to focus narrowly, on their obligation to obtain the best price for the stockholders:
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger or buy out with a third party was a recognition that
the company was for sale. The duty of the board had thus changed
from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities under the
Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and
effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became moot.
The directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion
the best price for the stockholdto auctioneers charged with getting
4°
ers at a sale of the company.'

The Revlon court concluded that the directors "breached their
primary duty of loyalty" by acceding to Forstmann's demand for the
lock-up agreement "on the basis of impermissible considerations,"
namely "shoring up the sagging market value of the Notes in the face
of threatened litigation by their holders.' 4 ' The court thus emphaThis potential for conflict places upon the directors the burden of proving that
they had reasonable grounds for believing there was a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness, a burden satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable
investigation. In addition, the directors must analyze the nature of the takeover
and its effect on the corporation in order to ensure balance-that the responsive
action taken is reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 180-81.
139. Revlon also marked the first occasion in which the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly described the intermediate level of review under Unocal as a test of "enhanced
scrutiny." Id at 184. Cf Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (referring to an "enhanced duty which
calls for judicial examination at the threshold").
140. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; see also Johnson & Siegel, supra note 24, at 341 ("Revlon
not only requires directors to maximize price once the company is for sale but also makes
clear that the directors' sole responsibility is to find a price that benefits their
shareholders.").
141. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. The court reasoned further that the Revlon board's "focus" on securing a deal with an acquiror committed to solving the Notes problem "was

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

sized that the board's concern for nonshareholder constituencies (like
the Noteholders) was inappropriate in the context of a sale of the

company. 142 The court likewise affirmed the Chancery Court's order

barring enforcement of the no-shop and cancellation fee agreements

because these provisions also violated the board's primary duty as "an
auctioneer responsible for selling the company to the highest
bidder."1 43
inconsistent with the changed concept of the directors' responsibilities at this stage of the
developments." Id.
142. Id. A board's consideration of the interests of nonstockholder constituencies in
the context of a takeover has been the subject of extensive judicial commentary. The Unocal court observed that in responding to an unsolicited bid, a board could consider the
"impact" of the offer "on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)...." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
In Revlon, the court clarified that a board's regard for the interests of such constituencies
(i) is limited by the general requirement that there be "rationally related benefits accruing
to the stockholders" and (ii) is inappropriate once an auction is under way and the board's
objective is not to protect the corporate enterprise "but to sell it to the highest bidder."
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. See also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1282 n.29 ("[A] board may consider ... the impact of both the bid and the potential
acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to
general shareholder interests .... "); id. at 1285 n.35 (permitting consideration of (i) "the
various constituencies, particularly the stockholders" and (ii) "any special factors bearing
on stockholder and public interests").
The concern for nonstockholder constituencies has also sparked considerable scholarly debate. Compare Lipton, supra note 91, at 43 n.193 (asserting that shareholder wealth
is enhanced by a concern for non-shareholder constituencies because "[a] corporation's
relationships with its employees, customers, and suppliers.., are heavily dependent on its
ability to foster good will with these groups") and Theodore N. Mirvis & Andrew R.
Brownstein, Stock-For-Stock Business Combinations and Directors' Responsibilities, 14
INST. ON ACQUISITIONS & TAKEOVERS 1, 19-20 (1994) ("In stock mergers not involving a
change in control ... the directors should appropriately take into account the impact of the
prospective transaction on the company, its employees, its customers and the community in
which it operates.") and John C. Coffee, Jr., Opinion,1 MERGERS & AcQuIsrrIONs L. REP.
981, 984-85 (1989) (commenting on Unocal and the proposition that a board's assessment
of the "threat posed" by a hostile offer may entail consideration of the offer's impact on
nonstockholder constituencies); with Sommer, supra note 142, at 55-56 (arguing that state
constituency statutes, which permit directors to consider nonstockholder interests, should
be construed in keeping with Delaware precedent so that directors may consider interests
of such other constituencies only "if that consideration is consistent with shareholder welfare") and Allen, supra note 91, at 22-25 (suggesting that state constituency statutes "may
have long-run implications for the efficiency of our economy") and Christopher J. Smart,
Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our Brothers' Keeper?, 1988
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 330 (1988) (criticizing the antitakeover policy of state constituency statutes because "[t]arget directors are well-suited to maximizing returns on invested
capital, but not to protecting non-shareholders from the dangers of takeover activity").
143. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. In this regard, the Revlon court emphasized that the
"directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions" when "bidders make relatively similar offers .... " Id. The court also
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Although the Revlon court alluded to Unocal in its analysis of the
directors' duties in the context of an auction, 144 the court's invalidation of the lock-up option rested principally, if not entirely, on the
court's conclusion that the Revlon directors "breached their primary
duty of loyalty." 145 Because the evidence showed that Revlon's directors had breached their fiduciary duties in this regard, their decision to
grant the asset lock-up to Forstmann was not entitled to deference
under the business judgment rule.' 46
(3) Summary
The court's enhanced scrutiny of the Revlon board's defensive
measures was justified by its concern with the effect of potential director disloyalty on the board's decision-making process. The Revlon directors satisfied the Unocal test for these defensive measures and
thereby dispelled any suspicions about their motives. 147
On the other hand, regarding the sale of the company, the evidence showed that Revlon's directors improperly favored Forstmann
over Pantry Pride for selfish reasons (avoiding liability to Noteholders) instead of resolutely pursuing the highest available price for the
shareholders. Consequently, because evidence of disloyalty demonexplained that "[m]arket forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's
shareholders the best price available for their equity." Id. (footnote omitted).
144. See, e.g., id. at 183 ("We must conclude that the merger agreement with Forstmann was unreasonable in relation to the threat posed."); id. at 184 ("[W]hen a board ends
an intense bidding contest on an insubstantial basis, and where a significant by-product of
that action is to protect the directors against a perceived threat of personal liability.., the
action cannot withstand the enhanced scrutiny which Unocal requires of director conduct."); id. ("The no-shop provision, like the lock-up option, while not per se illegal, is
impermissible under the Unocalstandards when a board's primary duty becomes that of an
auctioneer.").
145. Id. at 184. See also In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,781
(Del. Ch. 1988) (referring to Revlon as "a breach of loyalty case (Le., one in which the
board appeared not to be acting in good faith for the shareholders' benefit)"); Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 81, at 252-53 ("The Revlon case, moreover, may be consistent with
this minimalist construction [of Unocal's proportionality test] insofar as it pointedly invokes the directors' duty of loyalty in lieu of a proportionality argument when it enjoins
management's defensive lock-up option.").
146. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 185; see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition,
Inc., 781 F.2d 264,274-75 (2d Cir. 1986) (invalidating decision of target corporation's board
to grant asset lockup option to management-affiliated leveraged buy-out group where target board was found to have breached its duty of care); Stephen P. Lamb & Andrew J.
Tarezyn, Revlon and Hanson Trust: Unlocking the Lock-Ups, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 497
(1987); Kenneth J. Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.-The
Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested Mergers, and Its Effect on Lock-Ups and
Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 DEL. J. Copp. L. 473 (1987).
147. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
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strated that the Revlon board's decision-making process had functioned improperly in the auction, the directors were not accorded the
deference of the business judgment rule. 1 48 Although Revlon thus
clarified the obligations of directors in the sale of control context, the
standard of judicial review for claims in this setting remained
49
unclear.1
C.

Unocal and Revlon Claims in the Late 1980s: A False Dichotomy?

During the three-year period after Revlon was decided, the courts
applied Unocal with great frequency to assess the validity of various
defensive measures. In each case, the premise for applying enhanced
scrutiny was Unocal's "omnipresent specter" of potential director
disloyalty.
Meanwhile, the Chancery Court continued to work out its unsettled role with regard to a board's decisions in the context of an auction. One might logically have assumed that suspicions about director
loyalty in the antitakeover setting would not arise when a board was
in the "Revlon mode." 5 0 Indeed, some early Chancery Court decisions involving Revlon claims implied this.' 5' An analytical dichotomy
thus emerged during this era in which the courts applied Unocal's enhanced scrutiny to review defensive measures but applied the traditional business judgment rule to board decisions in the context of a
sale or change of control.
(1)

Unocal Claims

In
tial for
boards'
ample,

the late 1980s, the courts consistently cited directors' "potenconflict"'152 as justification for assessing the reasonableness of
decisions in resisting a takeover. In Polk v. Good,153 for exthe Delaware Supreme Court cited this "potential conflict of

148. Id. at 185.
149. As discussed infra, at Part III, it was not until the Delaware Supreme Court's
Macmillan decision in 1989 that the court explicitly announced that the enhanced scrutiny
test of Unocal also would apply, albeit in modified form, to director conduct in an auction
for control of a corporation. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 128788 (Del. 1989).
150. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., C.A. No. 10866, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS
77, *67 (Del. Ch. July 14, revised July 17, 1989), reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 738
(1990) (using "Revlon mode" as a shorthand description for a board's obligation to pursue
the best price for shareholders when a sale or break-up is inevitable), affd, 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1990).
151. See infra notes 165-182 and accompanying text.
152. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
153. 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).

THE UNIMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST

November 1994]

interest" in applying a Unocal analysis to uphold the Chancery
Court's approval of a derivative and class action settlement involving
a defensive repurchase of shares by Texaco, Inc.

54

In Ivanhoe Part-

Mining Corp.,155 the Delaware

ners v. Newmont
Supreme Court, again
referring to the "potential for conflict," upheld a defensive restructur56

ing transaction.
The Delaware Court of Chancery also consistently relied on the

"potential conflict" rationale in according diminished deference to the
decisions of various boards resisting threatened takeovers. In AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,s7,for example, the court
preliminarily enjoined Anderson, Clayton & Co. from pursuing a coercive self-tender offer that unreasonably precluded the company's

shareholders from choosing an unsolicited all-cash, all-shares offer by
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. 58 The Chancellor emphasized that Unocal's enhanced scrutiny test responds to the concern that a board
"may" be acting out of self-interest in this context:
[T]he Delaware Supreme Court recognized in Unocal . . . that
where a board takes action designed to defeat a threatened change
in control of the company, a more flexible, intermediate form of
judicial review is appropriate. In such a setting the "omnipresent
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests,"
493 A.2d at 954 (emphasis added), justifies the utilization of a standard that has two elements. 159
154. Id. at 537. Polk was actually decided on March 10, 1986, three days before the
Delaware Supreme Court issued its written opinion in Revlon.
155. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
156. Id. at 1341; see also id. at 1344 ("The Newmont board acted to maintain the company's independence and not merely to preserve its own control .... Thus, the Newmont
directors have satisfied their burden under Unocal, and their actions are within the ambit
of the business judgment rule."); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227,1239
(Del. Ch. 1988) (enjoining defensive restructuring transaction, the Chancery Court observed that "[w]here, as here, the transaction at issue develops in the context of a pending
takeover bid, even a disinterested board of directors 'may be acting primarily in its own
interests') (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
157. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
158. Id. at 108. The Chancellor's finding of unreasonableness may well have been
prompted in part by the Anderson, Clayton board's surprisingly nonmanagerial assertions
that (i) "the decision in this fundamentally economic contest lies properly with the shareholders"; and (ii) the board "has preserved the ability of the stockholders to choose between these two options." Id. at 112.
159. Id. at 111 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). Elsewhere in the opinion, the Chancellor again alluded to the elusive nature of director self-interest in this setting, observing
that the entrenchment effect of the company's coercive self-tender "creates a species of
directorinterest even on the part of outside directors ....
" Id. at 115 (emphasis added); see
also Veasey, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 89, at 2075 (the Unocal "proportionality test is not
a finding that in such cases there is necessarily a violation of the duty of loyalty").
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Numerous "poison pill" decisions in this period also relied, explicitly or implicitly, on Unocal's "omnipresent specter" rationale. 160
In City CapitalAssocs. v. Interco, Inc.,161 the Chancellor invoked Unocal in holding that the Interco directors could not use a poison pill to
protect a defensive restructuring transaction adopted in response to
an unsolicited all-cash, all-shares tender offer. 162 In applying enhanced scrutiny, the Interco court opined that Unocal responds to the
human frailties that can taint a board's decision-making process in the
context of a threatened change of control:
Unocal ...

recognized that in defending against unsolicited take-

overs, there is an "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interest . . . ." That fact distinguishes takeover
defense measures from other acts of a board which, when subject to

160. See, e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 436-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding continued use of poison pill as a "gavel to run an auction," the
court opined that the "enhanced duty" under Unocal is designed "[t]o deal with" the "inherent potential conflict of interests that exists when a Board is in the position of deciding
whether and how to defend against a takeover attempt"); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F.
Supp. 458, 473 (D. Del. 1988) (upholding continued use of poison pill: "The presence of a
hostile bidder strains the ability of a board of directors to act in the best interests of its
shareholders, because of 'the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in
its own interests .... ') (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954); Grand Metropolitan PLC v.
Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1988) (citing the "omnipresent specter of
potential director self-interest" addressed by Unocal and enjoining continued use of a
poison pill to block an all-cash, all-shares tender offer); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 71, at *29 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (enjoining effectuation of an auction-ending asset lock-up agreement, but upholding
continued use of a poison pill defense upon finding that "it may still have a role in maximizing values"); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., C.A. No. 10428, 1988 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 161, at *7, *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) (citing "potential for conflict" addressed by Unocal's enhanced scrutiny test and declining to order redemption of a poison
pill given "the short time the tender offer ha[d] been pending"); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy,
C.A. No. 10095, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *7, *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988) (refusing to
redeem rights under a poison pill where evidence showed that an auction involving competing bidders had not concluded); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., C.A. No.
10173, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, at *12, *15 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 1988) (citing the "higher
duty" imposed on directors by Unocal in light of the "potential for conflict" in takeovers,
but holding that the target board acted reasonably in refusing to redeem its poison pill for
an unsolicited offer at an inadequate price); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc.,
C.A. No. 9813, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 61, *26 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (citing Unocal, and
refusing to enjoin a poison pill where (i) the target's shares in market price were trading
higher than the tender offer price, and (ii) the poison pill was "serving a useful purpose in
allowing the Board to seek a more realistic offer"); Facet Enters., Inc. v. Prospect Group,
Inc., C.A. No. 9746, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 51, at *19-21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988) (citing
Moran-which applied Unocal analysis-and refusing to order redemption of a poison pill
where the target's board decided to conduct an auction and the pill would provide "a
reasonable opportunity to conduct and complete the auction").
161. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
162. Id. at 797-98.
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judicial review, are customarily upheld once the court finds the
board acted in good faith and after an appropriate investigation....
Unocal recognizes that human nature may incline even one acting in
subjective good faith to rationalize as right that which is merely personally beneficial. Thus, it created a new intermediate form of judicial review to be employed
when a transaction is neither self-dealing
163
nor wholly disinterested.

In each of these decisions in which Unocalwas applied, the courts
provisionally suspended the customary deference of the business judgment rule to address the suspicion with which directors are viewed
when they resist a takeover and preserve their control. In this same
era, however, a board's decision to approve a takeover was not regarded as an occasion for such suspicion.
(2) Revlon Claims

Throughout 1988 and 1989, yet another "watershed" era' 64 in
Delaware takeover jurisprudence, the Court of Chancery issued a
number of opinions resolving "Revlon" claims. Unlike the cases in
this same era in which courts applied enhanced scrutiny to antitakeover measures, the Chancery Court employed a conventional business
judgment rule analysis for cases involving a sale of control.
In Solash v. Telex Corp.,165 for example, Chancellor Allen applied
a business judgment analysis in upholding the decision by the directors of Telex Corporation to recommend an acquisition of the company by Memorex International, N.V. 166 In refusing to enjoin the
Memorex offer, the Chancellor noted that the plaintiffs had failed to
establish a reasonable probability of "overcoming the presumption of
sound business judgment."' 67 The court also rejected the plaintiffs'
duty of loyalty claims because the evidence failed to show any conflicting economic or other personal interests among the directors,
163. Id. at 796 (citations omitted). In Time-Warner, the Delaware Supreme Court criticized the analyses in Interco and Grand Metropolitan-inwhich the courts reasoned that
the only threat posed by an all-cash, all-shares tender offer is price inadequacy-as demonstrating an inappropriately "narrow and rigid construction of Unocal." Paranount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990). The court emphasized that the
"usefulness of Unocal as an analytical tool is precisely its flexibility in the face of a variety
of fact scenarios" and that the "open-ended analysis mandated by Unocal is not intended
to lead to a simple mathematical exercise .... " Id.
164. Veasey, Book Review, supra note 86, at 578.
165. [1987-1988 'ransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19,
1988).
166. Id. Interestingly, the Telex court suggested both the judicial competency and entrepreneurial risk-taking rationales for the traditional business judgment rule. Id. at
97,727; see supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
167. Id. at 97,728.
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"even if only in the somewhat diluted form present in every 'entrenchment' case.' 68 Thus, the court in Telex implicitly accepted the proposition that the "potential for conflict" that justifies enhanced scrutiny
in the Unocal context did not arise when directors approved a change169
of-control transaction.
In In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation,170 the Chancery Court explicitly refused to conduct a Unocal reasonableness review in rejecting attacks on the board's decision to agree to a topping
17 1
fee and break-up fee in an auction for control of J.P. Stevens & Co:
[T]his case involves neither a self-dealing transaction... nor corporate measures designed to defeat a threatened change in control
.... Thus, I do not regard myself as authorized by Unocal or any

other precedent of this court or the Supreme Court to pass upon the
reasonableness of the judgment to grant the topping fee or the expense reimbursement provision ....172

168. Id. at 97,727 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 97,728; see also id. at 97,727 ("Where there is no adverse financial or personal interest such as an alleged entrenchment motivation or effect, that question unquestionably implicates not the directors' duty of loyalty, but the duty of care."). Similarly, in
Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,660 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, revised Feb. 8, 1988), the court appeared to rely on a business
judgment rule analysis in rejecting a claim that the procedures employed in the sale of
Scientific Leasing, Inc. ("SLI") violated Revlon's requirements. Id. at 98,034. The Yanow
court was especially dismissive of the plaintiffs' assertion that, in lieu of a "firesale" auction, the directors should have at least contacted all companies that previously had expressed an interest in SLI and invited them to submit bids: "The real dispute boils down to
what specific methods corporate directors may use to elicit bids from potential acquirors.
That issue would appear to be normally a matter of director judgment that necessarily must
vary with each case." Id.
170. 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
171. One of the three competing bidders, West Pepperell, Inc., asserted that the J.P.
Stevens board violated its Revlon duties by improperly favoring rival bidder Odyssey Partners with an agreement to cause J.P. Stevens to pay Odyssey a topping fee (up to $8 million) and a break-up or expense reimbursement fee ($17 million) in the event its $64 per
share bid was surpassed by a rival bidder. Id. at 777, 781. The J.P. Stevens directors saw
the agreement to pay Odyssey a topping fee as necessary to induce Odyssey to increase its
bid from $61.50 per share to $64 per share under circumstances which nevertheless permitted rival bidders to acquire the company for a price in excess of $64 per share. Id. at 782.
172. Id. at 780 (citations omitted). Applying the business judgment rule, the court
noted that its review of the directors' business decision was limited to assessing whether
the decision was "so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith." Id. at 780-81 (footnote omitted).
Elsewhere in its opinion, the Chancery Court, applying a classic business judgment rule
analysis, declined to second-guess the reasonableness of the special committee's decision to
commit to pay Odyssey the topping fee and break-up fee. Id. at 783 ("These are precisely
the sort of debatable questions that are beyond the expertise of courts and which the business judgment rule generally protects from substantive review for wisdom.").
If J.P. Stevens were decided today, the directors would be required under Macmillan
and Paramount to demonstrate the reasonableness of the topping fee and break-up fee
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The topping fee and break-up fee thus were sustained under a conventional business judgment rule analysis because the directors' decisions
so far afield" as to
to grant these concessions to Odyssey were "not
173
warrant an inference of inappropriate motive.

The Chancery Court again applied a business judgment rule analysis in rejecting Revlon claims in In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation.174 This decision arose out of an auction for control of RJR

Nabisco, Inc., which, after successive rounds of competitive bidding,
became a battle between the investment firm of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. ("KKR") and a management buy-out group that included
F. Ross Johnson (RJR's President and CEO) and two prominent investment banking firms (the "Management Group"). 175 The eventual
purchase price paid by KKR was $25 billion, making RJR Nabisco the
1 76
largest takeover in history.

Certain RJR shareholders sought to enjoin the KKR tender offer
extended pursuant to the merger agreement.

77

Among other things,

the shareholder plaintiffs argued that (i) the "auction was cut short
provisions-both instances of disparate treatment of bidders purportedly for the benefit of
shareholders-in the context of enhanced scrutiny. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989); Paramount Communications v. QVC Network,
637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
173. J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 783. Chancellor Allen also applied a traditional business
judgment rule analysis to dispose of the shareholders' Revlon claim in Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., C.A. No. 6085, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67 (Del. Ch. May 19,
1988), aff'd, 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989):
[P]laintiff is certainly incorrect to assert that [Revlon] recognized a duty on the
part of directors when a corporation is "for sale," to get the highest available
price. Rather, the duty can only be to try in good faith, in such a setting, to get
the best available transaction for the shareholders. Directors are not insurers.
Id. at *50. See also In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, Del. Ch.
LEXIS 110, at *37-39 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8,1988) (applying "business judgment form of judicial
review," the court rejected a Revlon challenge to a management-led buy-out where the
board conducted a "market check" in lieu of an auction); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 71, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988)
(applying what appeared to be a traditional business judgment analysis in enjoining an
asset lock-up option and other measures that improperly foreclosed competitive bidding).
But see id. at *15 ("The Board, therefore, failed to act rationally to meet the high standards
articulated in Revlon."); id at *11 ("'Revlon ... requires that there must be the most
scrupulous adherence to ordinary principles of fairness in the conduct of an auction for the
sale of a corporate enterprise"') (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., Nos.
415 & 416, 1988 (Del. Nov. 2, 1988) (bench ruling)).
174. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *38-40, *46-47, *56-58 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
amended Feb. 14, 1989), appeal refused, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989).
175. Id at *2.
176. Id. at *3; DeMott, supra note 19, at 1.
177. RJR Nabisco, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *1-2.
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with 'substantially equivalent' bids on the table,'
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and (ii) the RJR

directors breached their Revlon duties by conducting an ineffective
auction. 179 In refusing to enjoin the transaction, the court specifically
rejected the proposition that the decisions of an informed, disinterested, and appropriately motivated board nevertheless can be set
aside under Revlon if the auction somehow achieves a less favorable
price than might otherwise have been obtained. 180 The court rea-

soned that such an interpretation of Revlon would improperly require
judicial review of the substance of a board's auction decisions. 181
178. Id. at *8. In recommending the KKR deal, the special committee of directors that
evaluated the bids perceived a risk that an attempt to engage in further negotiations with
either the Management Group or KKR might result in the withdrawal of either party from
the bidding process. Id. at *33. The KKR deal was also seen, among other things, as
offering shareholders greater equity participation in the acquired company. Id.
179. Id. at *9.
180. Id. at *61. The court thus observed:
I take it to be the case, ordinarily, that such substantive review of the business
decision with these characteristics is unauthorized. The claim is that the Revlon
case establishes an exception to the business judgment form of judicial review in
the context of a "sale" of a corporation. In this setting, it is claimed that even a
fully independent board has a duty, distinct from its omnipresent duty, to act in
good faith and with due care, to conduct a fair (or alternatively an effective) "auction." Thus, that case is said to create distinctive "Revlon duties" that exist not as
a subset of traditional duties of loyalty and care but independently. Under this
view, if on a post hoc review an auction is said to be unfair ... or ineffective or
"unauction-like" in some material respect, the results may be set aside even if no
breach of directorial duty of care or loyalty is involved. This is an interpretation
of Revlon that I do not share.
Id.
181. Id. The court recognized, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court's November 1988 bench ruling in Macmillan suggested a potentially more probing level of judicial
review. See id. at *64 (questioning whether the Macmillan bench ruling suggests "traditional business judgment analysis or refer[s] to an independent, post hoc judicial evaluation
of fairness or effectiveness of the auction apart from the good faith of directors and officers") (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., Nos. 415 & 416, 1988 (Del. Nov. 2,
1988) (bench ruling)). Some three months after the Chancellor's decision in RJR Nabisco,
the Delaware Supreme Court issued its full opinion in Macmillan which included, among
other things, a criticism of the Chancery Court's use of an "ordinary business judgment
rule analysis" in RJR Nabisco and other decisions discussed above. See Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989) (criticizing In re RJR Nabisco,
Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
amended Feb. 14, 1989); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1989
Del. Ch. LEXIS 71 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
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(3) Summary

The surge of takeover activity in the late 1980s afforded numerous opportunities to apply Unocal's enhanced scrutiny test. In resolving challenges to various antitakeover measures, the courts routinely
invoked Unocal's "omnipresent specter" of director self-interestlater clarified as a "potential" conflict due to the possibility of an entrenchment motive. During the same period, the Chancery Court relied on a traditional business judgment rule analysis to resolve
"Revlon" claims attacking the conduct of directors in a corporate auction or other change-of-control setting.
As discussed in Part HI, Macmillan soon announced that some
form of enhanced scrutiny would govern claims even in the sale-ofcontrol context-at least in takeover cases involving disparate treatment of competing bidders-not just when directors use defensive
measures to avoid a takeover. In either setting, enhanced scrutiny
continued to rest on the proposition that directors face a potential
conflict of interest regardless of whether they are facilitating or resisting a change-of-control transaction.
MI.

Macmillan and Its Progeny-Enhanced Scrutiny and the
"Omnipresent Specter" Rationale in Corporate
Auctions

The Delaware Supreme Court announced in Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.182 that enhanced scrutiny also would be applied
to the conduct of directors in the sale of a corporation. The courts
thereafter applied such scrutiny to change-of-control transactions, citspecter"
ing the Macmillan court's importation of the "omnipresent
183
rationale from Unocal into the Revlon setting.
A. Macmillan
In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's refusal to enjoin an asset lock-up agreement and other
measures that improperly ended an auction for control of Macmillan.184 Although the Chancery Court found that KKR, the winning
bidder, received preferential treatment throughout the auction, it con182. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
183. Id. at 1287; see also infra notes 207-224 and accompanying text.
184. Id. at 1264-65, 1288. The written opinion in Macmillan was issued in May 1989,
some six months after the Delaware Supreme Court announced its decision in open court
following oral argument. ld. at 1265 n.2.
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cluded that such favoritism was not "material" because rival suitor
Robert Maxwell was neither misled nor deterred from submitting a
prevailing bid. 18 5 Consequently, it declined to enjoin the asset lock-up
18 6
option granted to KKR.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appropriate standard of review was one of entire fairness. 187 The court
reasoned that the protection of the business judgment rule was unavailable because (i) Macmillan's management directors breached
their duty of loyalty (by according special treatment to KKR as management's favored bidder) and (ii) the company's outside directors
breached their duty of care (by failing to exercise appropriate supervision over the auction).' 88 The Supreme Court also had little difficulty
concluding that the board's conduct in the auction "fail[ed] all basic
standards of fairness."'1 8 9 Among other things, KKR repeatedly received tactical advantages denied Maxwell, including clandestine
"tips" about Maxwell's bids and access to the company's confidential
185. Id. at 1264, 1278-79.
186. Id. at 1278-79. The Chancery Court enjoined the operation of the company's
poison pill, however, because it concluded that the company's shareholders should have
the opportunity to consider Maxwell's alternative bid. Id. at 1278.
187. Id. at 1265, 1279-81.
188. Id. See also id. at 1265 ("With the divided loyalties that existed on the part of
certain directors, and the absence of any serious oversight by the allegedly independent
directors, the governing standard was one of intrinsic fairness."). The inability of the Macmillan board to obtain the protection of the business rule thus resulted from evidence
showing a dysfunctional board process-i.e., a process tainted by director disloyalty and
lack of care. See, e.g., id. at 1264 ("[T]he record reflects breaches of the duties of loyalty
and care by various corporate fiduciaries which tainted the evaluative and deliberative
processes of the Macmillan board ....
");id. at 1272 (management directors' search for a
potential acquiror who would enhance management group's equity position "undoubtedly
led to the tainted process which we now confront"); id. at 1280-81 ("While any one of the
identifiable breaches of fiduciary duty, standing alone, should easily foretell the outcome,
what occurred here, including the lack of oversight by the directors, irremediably taints the
design and execution of the transaction."); id. at 1283 (management directors' failure to
disclose "tip" and other favoritism to KKR constituted a "fraud upon the board"). See
generally supra Part II.B.
189. Id. at 1280. Notably, the court condemned the management directors for their
acts of disloyalty with as much force as it chastised the outside directors for their failure to
exercise appropriate oversight. Compare id. at 1279 (referring to the "illicit manipulation
of a board's deliberative processes by self-interested corporate fiduciaries") and id. at 1282
(management directors' "knowing concealment of the tip at the critical board meeting of
September 27th utterly destroys their credibility") with id. at 1280 ("The board was torpid,
if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly independent auction.... [T]he board materially contributed to the unprincipled conduct of those upon whom it looked with a blind
eye.") and id. at 1281 ("[A] board of directors... may not avoid its active and direct duty
of oversight in a matter as significant as the sale of corporate control.").
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financial information. 190 The Supreme Court also concluded that se-

nior management and the company's financial advisor committed a
"fraud upon the board" by failing to disclose the tips that KKR had
received in the final round of bidding. 19'
(1)

Enhanced Scrutiny for Auctions

The Delaware Supreme Court's entire fairness analysis was sufficient to resolve the appeal in Macmillan. Nevertheless, the court ad-

ded a discussion at the end of its opinion expounding on the nature of
directors' duties, and on the role of the reviewing court, in the context

of an auction. 92 Significantly, Macmillan announced that the "enhanced duty" Unocal imposes on directors who seek to thwart a takeover also arises when directors oversee an auction for corporate
control.' 93 Thus, by broadening Unocal's "omnipresent specter" rationale for antitakeover cases to encompass any case "where issues of
corporate control are at stake,"' 9 4 the Delaware Supreme Court im-

ported the concept of enhanced scrutiny from Unocal into the Revlon
context.

19

190. Id. at 1281, 1283. The court also determined that Macmillan's financial advisors
deliberately misled Maxwell at the end of the auction by purposefully failing to disabuse
Maxwell of his mistaken belief that he had submitted the highest bid. Id. at 1281.
191. I. at 1283. The court also analyzed the asset lock-up option within the Revlon
framework. Id. at 1286. The court determined that the lock-up was invalid because it was
not necessary to draw any of the bidders into the contest, and it effectively ended the
auction in exchange for an increase in KKR's bid that was "nominal at best." Id.
192. Id. at 1286-88.
193. The court thus observed:
[L]ike any other business decision, the board has a duty in the design and conduct
of an auction to act in "the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders."
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-56; Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341-42.
However, as we recognized in Unocal, where issues of corporate control are
at stake, there exists "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders."
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. For that reason, an "enhanced duty" must be met at the
threshold before the board receives the normal protections of the business judgment rule.
Id. at 1287. The Macmillan court also observed that there is no legally-mandated formula
for directors to follow in conducting an auction, "only that they observe the significant
requirement of fairness for the purpose of enhancing general shareholder interests." Id. at
1286; see also Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
194. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1287.
195. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court also noted disapprovingly that the Chancery
Court had not explicitly applied Unocal's enhanced scrutiny in earlier cases involving
"Revlon" claims. Id. at 1287-88; In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No.
10389,1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, amended Feb. 14,1989); In re Holly Farms
Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 71 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1988); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS
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(2) Enhanced Scrutiny for Every Auction?

The scope of Macmillan's enhanced scrutiny pronouncement was
unclear, however. Certain language in the opinion construing Revlon
suggested that enhanced scrutiny would apply in every corporate auction. 196 On the other hand, Macmillan, like Revlon, involved a sale of
control in which the auctioneers improperly "play[ed] favorites with
the contending factions."'1 97 Moreover, Macmillan strongly suggested
that enhanced scrutiny "only" is applied in an auction setting when
competing bidders receive "unequal" treatment:
At the outset, the plaintiff must show, and the trial court must find,
that the directors of the target company treated one or more of the
respective bidders on unequal terms. It is only then that the twopart threshold requirement of Unocal is truly invoked, for in Revlon
we held that... "directors cannot fulfill their enhanced198
Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions."'

Thus, although Macmillan could be read broadly as requiring enhanced scrutiny in every auction, the court suggested a narrower
interpretation. 199
110 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770
(Del. Ch. 1988). Nevertheless, while noting that the Chancery Court appeared to have
applied an "ordinary business judgment rule analysis," the Macmillan court determined
that the it had been applying a de facto enhanced business judgment rule analysis. Id. at
1288 & n.40 (citing Fort Howard, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *35). See generally supra
Part II.C(2).
196. The Macmillan court stated as follows:
Although the board's responsibilitiesunder Unocal are far different, the enhanced
duties of the directors in responding to a potential shift in control, recognized in
Unocal, remain unchanged. This principle pervades Revlon, and when directors
conclude that an auction is appropriate, the standard by which their ensuing actions will be judged continues to be the enhanced duty imposed by this Court in
Unocal.
Id. at 1287 & n.39 (footnote omitted). Cf. id. at 1285 ("At a minimum, Revlon requires that
there be the most scrupulous adherence to ordinaryprinciples of fairness .... ") (emphasis
added).
197. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986); see also Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1277-78.
198. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288 (emphasis added) (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184).
199. See also Prentice & Langmore, supra note 85, at 467 (Macmillan "extended Revlon's enhanced standard of review to the auction context, requiring whenever a board running an auction extends concessions or benefits to one of the bidders, that the action be
reasonable in relation to the threat to be avoided or to the benefit to be gained") (footnote
omitted); Comment, Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc.: "Enhanced Scrutiny"-Delaware's
Judicial Standard of Review for a Single Bid CorporateAcquisition?, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L.
139, 151 (1993) (observing that the Macmillan court "refined the application of the Unocal
test to Revlon situations, by stating that when Revlon duties attach, directors' actions
would be reviewed under the Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard only if there was disparate treatment of one or more bidders") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); Note,
When Delaware CorporateManagers Turn Auctioneers: Triggering The Revlon Duty After
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This narrower reading of Macmillan was also logically sound. In
borrowing Unocal's "omnipresent specter" rationale for use in the
Revlon context, the Macmillan court did not explain why the motives
of a predominantly disinterested board should automatically be regarded with suspicion. Certainly questions of improper motive do not
arise simply because directors have decided to sell the company (and
thus have acted against the potential self-interest in maintaining control addressed in Unocal).200 Something more-like the "disparate
treatment" of competing bidders-would appear to be required
before enhanced scrutiny would be triggered in an auction.201 Only at
that point have the directors arguably engaged in conduct (comparable to the adoption of defensive measures in the Unocal context) that
203
22
gives one grounds to question their motives. 0 Thus, "only then"
should the directors be required to demonstrate at the threshold that
the Paramount Decision, 16 DEL. J. Conp. L. 187,195 (1991) ("Board decisions made while
under the Revlon duty are afforded the protection of the business judgment rule, unless a
showing has been made that bidders in the corporate auction were treated on unequal
terms."). Interestingly, the Paramountcourt quoted extensively from this portion of the
Macmillan opinion but omitted any reference to the "only then" analysis. Paramount
Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 & n.16 (Del. 1994).
The Delaware Supreme Court also has alluded to Revlon's uncertain boundaries and
requirements. See, e.g., Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1285 ("At a minimum, Revlon requires that
there be the most scrupulous adherence to ordinaryprinciplesof fairness . . . .") (emphasis
added); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68 (Del. 1989) ("To
the extent that Revlon instructs a board to obtain the best available transaction for its
shareholders, the Fairchild directors complied with Revlon."); id. (third party's "failure to
submit a firm and unconditional offer precluded a bidding contest foreclosing plaintiffs'
reliance on Revlon.") (emphasis added).
200. Note, Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.: CorporateAuctions Now Require
Sharper Supervision By Directors,39 AM. U.L. Rlv. 721, 759 (1990) [hereinafter Macmillan Note] (analyzing Macmillan court's reliance on Unocal's "omnipresent specter" rationale for review of conduct of board in auction context); Note, Review of Board Actions:
GreaterScrutiny for GreaterConflicts of Interest,103 HARV. L. REv. 1697 (1990) [hereinafter Conflicts Note] (Macmillan's "joint application" of Revlon and Unocal "seems logically
inconsistent"); but see Theodore N. Mirvis, Paramount I and 1I:The Bookends of Delaware Law, 12 BANx & CoRP. GOVERNANcE L. Rm. 63 (1994) (arguing that Paramount's
enhanced scrutiny test for all change-of-control transactions is warranted because of the
potential for improperly motivated board action in every auction).
201. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288.
202. Disparate treatment arouses the suspicion that a board may be improperly motivated (and/or unduly influenced by senior management) to steer a transaction to a bidder
who appears friendly to incumbent executives. See infra notes 348-350 and accompanying
text; see also infra note 223.
203. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

there is "a rational basis for the action such that the interests of the
' 2 °4
stockholders are manifestly the board's paramount objective.
B. Macmillan's Progeny
After Macmillan, the Delaware courts continued to invoke Unocal's "omnipresent specter" as the rationale for applying enhanced
scrutiny in change-of-control transactions.
(1) Delaware Supreme Court Decisions
In Barkan v. Amsted Industries,2 0 5 the Delaware Supreme Court
applied enhanced scrutiny in affirming the Chancery Court's approval
of a class action settlement involving a management-sponsored leveraged buy out of Amsted Industries, Inc.2 0 6 One of the various shareholder plaintiffs opposed the settlement, asserting that the directors of
Amsted had breached their Revlon duties by selling the company in a
20 7
manner not designed to maximize the price paid to shareholders.
Noting that the principles of Unocal applied to a change-of-control
transaction, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized what it regarded as the potential for self-interested decisions by directors in this
context:
We believe that the general principles announced in Revlon, in Unocal... and in Moran ... govern this case and every case in which a
fundamental change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated
....
[A] court evaluating the propriety of a change of control or a
takeover defense must be mindful of "the omnipresent specter that
204. Id. at 1287. The Macmillan court articulated the following test of enhanced scrutiny for addressing instances of disparate treatment of competing bidders in an auction for
corporate control:
In the face of disparate treatment, the trial court must first examine whether the
directors properly perceived that shareholder interests were enhanced. In any
event the board's action must be reasonable in relation to the advantage sought
to be achieved, or conversely, to the threat which a particular bid allegedly poses
to stockholder interests.
Id. at 1288 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
205. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
206. Id. at 1286.
207. Id. at 1285. Among other things, the shareholder plaintiff opposing the settlement
took issue with the board's "passive" approach to the sale of the company (which was
limited to negotiations between a special committee of independent directors and the management buy-out group). Id. at 1283, 1286-88. The Amsted board did not conduct an
auction for the company or canvass the market to determine whether higher bids could be
elicited. Id. at 1287. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 730,731 (1985) (arguing that the law should require open bidding when management
proposes a buy out and that "other potential buyers should be given the time and the
information necessary to bid").
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a board may be acting primarily in its own interests,
rather than
20 8
those of the corporation and its shareholders."

The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's approval of the
settlement, noting that the Amsted directors "could conclude in good

faith that they had approved the best possible deal for
209
shareholders.
Later decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court provided further
(albeit limited) insight into the nature of a board's "enhanced duty" in
the context of a sale of control. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instru-

ment Corporation,210 a decision announced only four days after
Barkan, proceeded for the most part on a traditional business judgment rule analysis in assessing the conduct of the directors of Fairchild
211
Camera & Instrument Corporation in auctioning the company.
Briefly addressing the "subordinate" issue of the plaintiffs' Revlon
claim, 212 the Citron court affirmed the Chancellor's findings that the
Fairchild board had not "'play[ed] favorites,' consistent not only with
Revlon but with any 'enhanced' duty which... was enunciated under
Unocal .... "213
In Time-Warner,21 4 the Delaware Supreme Court applied a Uno-

cal analysis to uphold a decision by the Time directors to "recast"
Time's merger agreement with Warner Communications, Inc. in response to an unsolicited tender offer by Paramount Communications,
Inc. for any and all shares of Time.215 Time-Warner actually was not a
208. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Unocal, 493
A.2d at 954). The court in Barkan similarly observed that Revlon sought to prevent the
"conflicts of interest that arise" in the takeover context "by demanding that directors act
with scrupulous concern for fairness to shareholders." Id. at 1286.
209. Id. at 1288.
210. 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989).
211. See, e.g., id. at 64. Although the change-of-control transaction in Citronoccurred
in 1979, the court, citing Barkan, assumed that "Revlon strictures apply retroactively." Id.
at 68.
212. Id. at 67.
213. Id. at 68. See also Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990) (suggesting continued application of enhanced scrutiny when board moved from antitakeover
strategy to rapprochement with unwelcome suitor) (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989)); id. at 1148 ("When the sale of El Paso became
inevitable, the El Paso board properly attempted to obtain the highest price and best transaction for the company and all its shareholders. Their actions survive the enhanced Unocal
scrutiny.").
214. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
215. Id. at 1152-55. The original merger agreement between Time and Warner contemplated a combination of the two companies through a stock-for-stock merger transaction.
Id. at 1146. The rules of the New York Stock Exchange (but not Delaware law) required
that Time shareholders vote to approve the issuance of Time shares required by the proposed merger. Id. After Time mailed out proxy statements soliciting the shareholders'
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Revlon case, the court reasoned, because the evidence did not show
that Time's board, in negotiating an agreement with Warner, made the
dissolution or break-up of the company inevitable. 216 Although for
this reason the Time-Warner court ruled Revlon inapplicable, it nevertheless suggested that enhanced scrutiny must be applied whenever
Revlon duties are in fact triggered. The court thus observed that
"[w]ithin the auction process, any action taken by the board must be
reasonably related to the threat posed or reasonable in relation to the
advantage sought .... -217
(2) Chancery Court Decisions
In Roberts v. General Instrument Corp.,2 18 the Chancery Court
applied enhanced scrutiny in refusing to enjoin a tender offer by
Forstmann Little for all shares of General Instrument pursuant to a
negotiated acquisition agreement. Citing Macmillan's criticism of the
Chancery Court's use of an "ordinary" business judgment analysis for
resolving Revlon claims in earlier cases, 21 9 the Chancellor paused to
observe that "[t]his court has been pointedly instructed" to apply "an
220
enhanced test" in such circumstances.
vote on the merger, Paramount announced a tender offer to purchase all shares of Time for
$175 in cash per share (later increased to $200). Id. at 1147. Fearing a disapproving shareholder vote on the merger, Time's directors decided to "recast" the combination whereby
Time would (i) launch a cash tender offer for 51% of Warner's stock in cash and (ii) subsequently acquire the remaining Warner shares in exchange for a combination of cash and
securities. Id. at 1148-49.
216. Id. at 1150. The Time-Warner court's emphasis on the dissolution or breakup of
the company as the trigger for Revlon duties--contrasted with the Chancellor's reliance on
a change-of-control test-engendered some speculation that a change-of-control transaction that left the acquired company intact might not trigger Revlon. See infra notes 282-285
and accompanying text.
217. Id. at 1151 n.14 (citations omitted); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931, 1941 (1991) (characterizing the decision in
Time-Warner as a "Doctrinal Retreat": "The Supreme Court seems to reject the Chancery's enhanced review of board decisions in favor of a simple business judgment test that
unwinds Unocal.").
218. C.A. No. 11639, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 138 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), reprintedin 16
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1540 (1991).
219. See supra notes 165-182 and accompanying text.
220. Roberts, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 138, at *23. The Chancellor thus explained:
In each instance where the board is not predominantly self-interested or under
the control or dominating influence of a person with a conflicting interest, the
principal judicial inquiries relate to whether the board was adequately informed
and acting in good faith. This court has been pointedly instructed, however, that
"where issues of corporate control are at stake" action of even a disinterested
board must meet an enhanced test before they will qualify for the deference that
courts ordinarily accord to good faith business judgments.
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Roberts also reflected a clear understanding that the Delaware
Supreme Court's rationale for enhanced scrutiny in the takeover setting was the "omnipresent" concern for improperly motivated board

action. For example, in referring to the "enhanced" level of judicial
review, the court in Roberts quoted Barkan's reference to the "omnipresent specter" in the context of a "change of control or a takeover
defense .... ,221 The Chancellor also effectively distilled the principle

of enhanced scrutiny in the Revlon setting into an inquiry that includes an assessment of the bona fides of the decisionmakers:
In such a setting the additional level of inquiry comes to this:
whether the circumstances afford a disinterested and well motivated
director a basis reasonably to conclude that if the transactions contemplated by the merger agreement close, they will represent the
best available alternative for the corporation and its
shareholders. 222

The court concluded that the General Instrument board acted reasonably in negotiating the acquisition, because, among other things, the
directors (i) acted with adequate information and (ii) negotiated a "fiduciary out" that preserved the company's right to pursue a better
transaction if one became available.22
Id. at *23-24 (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del.
1989)).
The court in Roberts also implied that Macmillan was unclear as to whether enhanced
scrutiny was required in all takeovers or only in auctions involving unequal treatment of
competing bidders: "This enhanced test requires a judicial judgment of reasonableness in
the circumstances. It is plainly required when, in the course of an auction sale, some discrimination in favor of one party is shown ... ." Id. at *24. The Chancellor sidestepped
this debate, however, by concluding that the mere signing of a merger agreement like the
one in Roberts, "even an agreement with a fiduciary-out, constitutes discrimination in favor
of the party acquiring rights under the merger agreement," and thus triggers the enhanced
scrutiny of Macmillan. IL
221. Id. at *22 (emphasis added) (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279,
1286 (Del. 1989)).
222. Id. at *24-25. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Chancellor appeared to link the
court's enhanced scrutiny of the directors' conduct with a concern for the motives of directors in the takeover context. See id. at *25-26 ("The first question ... is whether this
transaction is ... a bargain reached at arm's length ... or whether it is a transaction in
which a senior management, hopeful of participating with the buyer in the future ownership of the enterprise, affected negotiations by assisting the buyer to the shareholders detriment."); id. at *28 ("I cannot provisionally conclude that the special committee was not
appropriately informed, was inappropriately manipulated to the shareholders detriment or
behaved unreasonably in relation to the goal they sought to obtain.").
223. Id. at *27-28. See also In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
C.A. No. 12085, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 195, at *14 (Del. Ch, Nov. 8, 1991) (adopting the
Roberts analysis and applying enhanced scrutiny to assess the strength of claims to be released in a settlement arising out of a negotiated acquisition transaction); id. at *35-36
(concluding that the board satisfied its duty of care by having a "body of reliable evidence
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(3) Summary
Macmillan announced that the decisions of an informed and disinterested board in the context of a change-of-control transaction may
be subjected to enhanced scrutiny. For example, Macmillan plainly
requires such scrutiny of a board's decision to treat competing bidders
unequally. The court was less clear, however, on whether enhanced
scrutiny applies in every change-of-control transaction-as now required by Paramount.22 4 In all events, the development of enhanced
scrutiny through Macmillan and its immediate progeny reveals a continuing concern for the "omnipresent specter" that even a disinterested board may be improperly motivated when overseeing the sale of
a company.
IV. Paramount-From "Omnipresent Specter" to
Transaction Significance-the New Justification for
Enhanced Judicial Scrutiny
In ParamountCommunicationsv. QVC Network,22 5 the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's decision to enjoin a
stock option agreement and other defensive measures (including Paramount's poison pill Rights Agreement) that were designed to facilitate Viacom's proposed acquisition of Paramount Communications.
The court ruled that the Paramount directors acted unreasonably by
holding steadfast in their commitment to merge with Viacom and re22 6
sisting QVC Network's more valuable acquisition proposals.
Both the Paramount board's use of defensive measures and its
discriminatory treatment of QVC as a competing bidder offered the
court an opportunity to apply enhanced scrutiny based on the "omnipresent specter" rationale of earlier precedent. Instead, the Delaware
Supreme Court announced a more sweeping formulation of the enhanced scrutiny test. The court's latest pronouncement on enhanced
scrutiny requires a judicial assessment of the "reasonableness" of directors' conduct, including the substance of the decisions they make,
in every change-of-control transaction.2 2 7 Gone, apparently, is the
court's earlier concern for the elusive "specter" of potential conflicts
that even outside directors are thought to face "where issues of corpo[upon which it] could reasonably conclude that it was getting the best deal possible for
Vitalink's shareholders") affid mem., 610 A.2d 725 (Del. 1992).
224. See infra Part IV.
225. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
226. Id. at 48-50.
227. Id. at 45.
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rate control are at stake."'22 Instead, Paramount emphasizes the
"considerable significance" 229 of a change-of-control transaction as
the justification for requiring heightened judicial scrutiny in such
cases. According to the court, such scrutiny is necessary in transactions as significant as a sale of control "to ensure" that "the directors'
conduct.., is reasonable." 230
As discussed below, the court's newly adopted role as insurer of
the reasonableness of all "significant" board decisions has disturbing
implications for the business judgment rule. Paramountessentially reflects a policy judgment that takeovers are simply too important to
shareholders to accord deference to directors' decisions, even when
the board is informed, disinterested, and acting in good faith. The
court, in effect, has identified takeovers as a special category of transactions ineligible for traditional business judgment rule protection. In
furtheiance of this new policy, the Paramountcourt has instituted judicial review of the reasonableness, or fairness, of every change-ofcontrol transaction. The decision thus suggests an unwelcome shift in
Delaware's model of corporate governance to a scheme that unnecessarily elevates the value of accountability to shareholders at the expense of managerial authority and discretion.
A. Factual Background of the ParamountDecision

Paramount and Viacom explored the possibility of a combination
as early as 1990, but meaningful efforts to pursue a transaction did not
occur until 1993.231 In early July of 1993, serious negotiations occurred between Sumner Redstone-the chairman, chief executive officer, and controlling stockholder of Viacom-and Martin Davis-the
chairman and chief executive officer of Paramount.232 They tentatively agreed that Davis would become chief executive and Redstone
would be the controlling stockholder of the combined company.233
The Paramount board was informed of the status of the negotiations
228. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989).
229. Paramount,637 A.2d at 43.
230. Id. at 42. See also L at 43 ("[t]he courts will apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure
that the directors have acted reasonably").
231. Id. at 38. In the late 1980s, Paramount investigated the possibility of acquiring or
combining with other companies in the entertainment, media, or communications industry.
Id. at 38. In furtherance of this strategy, Paramount made an unsuccessful tender offer for
Time in 1989. Id. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del.

1990).
232. Paramount,637 A.2d at 38.
233. Id.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

and thereafter approved an Original Merger Agreement between Par34
amount and Viacom.2
In the merger as originally conceived, Paramount shareholders
would exchange their shares for a combination of Viacom stock and

cash valued at $69.14 per share. 235 Redstone, because of his substantial ownership of Viacom, would emerge as controlling stockholder of
the combined Viacom-Paramount entity.236 The Paramount directors
also agreed to three defensive provisions: a No-Shop provision, a Termination Fee, and a Stock Option Agreement.237 The Stock Option

Agreement-regarded by the Delaware Supreme Court as the "most
significant deterrent device" 23 8-granted Viacom an option to
purchase 19.9% (approximately 23.7 million shares) of Paramount's
outstanding common stock at the "deal price" of $69.14 per share.239
Viacom's right to exercise this option would arise if any of the trigger240
ing events for the Termination Fee occurred.
One week after Paramount's agreement to merge with Viacom

was announced, 241 QVC proposed a transaction in which QVC would
234. Id. at 39.
235. QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1250 (Del. Ch.
1993), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). Under the terms of the Original Merger Agreement,
Paramount would merge into Viacom, and each share of Paramount common stock would
be converted into: (i) one-tenth of a share of Viacom Class A Voting Stock; (ii) ninetenths of a share of Viacom Class B Non-Voting Stock; and (iii) $9.10 in cash. Paramount,
637 A.2d at 39.
236. Paramount,637 A.2d at 38; QVC, 635 A.2d at 1265.
237. Paramount,637 A.2d at 39. Under the No-Shop provision, the Paramount directors committed not to solicit any other acquisition proposal and not to pursue a competing
transaction unless a third party made an unsolicited written proposal that was not subject
to any financing contingencies. Id. Essentially, the Termination Fee obligated Paramount
to pay Viacom a fee of $100 million if the Viacom-Paramount merger was not consummated. Id.
238. Id.
239. QVC, 635 A.2d at 1271; Paramount,637 A.2d at 39. The Stock Option Agreement
also contained two provisions that the court regarded as "unusual and highly beneficial to
Viacom." Id. The first of these, a "Note Feature," enabled Viacom to pay for the option
shares with a "senior subordinated note of questionable marketability" instead of the
$1.6 billion in cash that otherwise would be necessary. Id. The second was a "Put Feature," under which Viacom could simply elect to require Paramount to pay it the value of
the option in cash. Id. This "value" would be the difference between the exercise price of
$69.14 and the market price of Paramount's stock when the put was exercised. Id.
240. Id. The Termination Fee (and Viacom's rights under the Stock Option Agreement) would be triggered if (a) Paramount terminated the Original Merger Agreement
because of a competing transaction; (b) the shareholders of Paramount did not approve the
merger; or (c) the Paramount directors recommended a competing transaction. Id.
241. When Paramount and Viacom announced the proposed merger, Redstone described the transaction as a ".marriage"' that would "'never be torn asunder' and stated
that "only a 'nuclear attack' could break the deal." Id.
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acquire Paramount in exchange for a package of securities and cash
worth approximately $80 per share, over $10 more per share than the
consideration offered to Paramount shareholders by Viacom.242
Although the Paramount board eventually authorized management to
meet with QVC, discussions proceeded slowly.243 QVC, therefore,
announced its intention to launch a tender offer for 51% of Paramount's outstanding shares at $80 in cash per share. 244 The QVC
tender offer was conditioned on the invalidation of the Stock Option
Agreement, which at that point was worth more than $200 million to
Viacom 24-5
Within hours after QVC announced its tender offer, Viacom and
Paramount opened discussions for a revised transaction and "serious
negotiations" ensued. 246 These negotiations led to an Amended
Merger Agreement in which Viacom agreed (i) to make a tender offer
for 51% of Paramount's stock at $80 in cash per share and (ii) to acquire the remaining shares in exchange for Viacom securities. 247 Significantly, however, the "defensive measures" (including the Stock
Option Agreement) that were "designed to make a competing bid
more difficult were not removed or modified."2' 48 Nor did Paramount
seek to exploit its new leverage with Viacom by attempting to eliminate or modify these measures. 249
In keeping with its obligations under the Amended Merger
Agreement, Viacom promptly commenced its tender offer; QVC's
tender offer formally commenced two days later.250 QVC Chairman
Barry Diller then met with representatives of Paramount to propose
242. Id. at 39-40.
243. Id. at 40.
244. Id.Under the terms of QVC's proposal, the shares of Paramount stock not acquired in the tender offer would be converted into shares of QVC common stock in a
second-step merger. Id.
245. Id. With the market price of Paramount's stock rising in response to increasing
bids by Viacom and QVC, the value of the Stock Option Agreement to Viacom soon increased to nearly $500 million. Id. at 40 n.5.
246. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court emphasized that QVC's emergence as a rival bidder
gave the Paramount board "considerable leverage" and "the opportunity for a 'new deal'
with Viacom .... ." Id.
247. Id. The Amended Merger Agreement also gave Paramount some added flexibility. Paramount reserved the right to use its poison pill to block the Viacom transaction if
Paramount's directors determined that their fiduciary duties required them to pursue a
better alternative. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 41.
250. Id.
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"'auction procedures"' for a "'fair bidding process." ' 25 1 Diller was

rebuffed, however. Paramount asserted that auction procedures were
inappropriate and not in keeping with Paramount's contractual obli252
gations to Viacom.
Thereafter, Viacom unilaterally increased its tender offer price to
$85 per share and offered a comparable increase in the value of securities to be exchanged in the second-step merger transaction.25 3 QVC

promptly increased its tender offer from $80 to $90 per share and increased the value of the securities in its second-step merger proposal

by a comparable amount.25 4 At this point, QVC's $90 bid exceeded
Viacom's $85 offer by more than $1 billion in overall transaction

value.a55 The Paramount directors nevertheless determined that
QVC's latest offer was not in the shareholders' best interests, purportedly because (i) the QVC bid was "excessively conditional" and (ii)
the Viacom transaction offered more promising future business pros56
pects than the QVC proposal.
The Chancery Court determined that the Paramount directors
came under, but failed to satisfy, Revlon's mandate to seek the best
available transaction when they committed Paramount to a merger

that would shift majority voting control from the company's public
251. Id.
252. Id. Paramount's response in this regard reveals the larger legal dispute that
caused Paramount to lose the case. Relying on Time-Warner-see supra notes 215-218 and
accompanying text-Paramount essentially asserted that it was free to rebuff QVC's higher
bids because its proposed merger with Viacom did not contemplate a "break-up" of Paramount and thus did not trigger Revlon duties. Id. at 46; see also QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1263-64 (Del. Ch. 1993), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994). Given their perception that Revlon was inapplicable, Paramount's directors apparently concluded that they were free to hold fast to a strategic combination with Viacom
that they believed offered brighter future economic prospects than a takeover by QVC.
Paramount,637 A.2d at 46. Both the Chancery Court and Supreme Court rejected this
argument because (i) Redstone would emerge as controlling stockholder of the combined
Viacom-Paramount enterprise (whereas, in Time-Warner, control would remain among the
disaggregated public stockholders) and (ii) such a change of control, whether or not accompanied by a breakup of the company, was ruled sufficient to trigger the Revlon duty to
seek the highest possible price for shareholders. Id. at 38, 46-48; QVC, 635 A.2d at 126467.
253. Paramount,637 A.2d at 41.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 50; QVC, 635 A.2d at 1256, 1269-70.
256. Paramount,637 A.2d at 41. Prior to the Paramount directors' meeting to consider
QVC's $90 bid, Paramount Executive Vice President Donald Oresman circulated a memorandum to the directors summarizing what Oresman listed as the "'conditions and uncertainties' of the QVC offer. This analysis left at least one board member with a "very
negative impression of the QVC bid." Id.
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stockholders to Sumner Redstone.257 The Chancery Court therefore
issued a preliminary injunction (i) restraining enforcement of the
Stock Option Agreement and the No-Shop provision and (ii) preventing the Paramount board from using a poison pill to preclude share258
holders from considering the QVC offer.
B. The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the Paramount directors
breached their fiduciary duties by approving the Original Merger
Agreement with Viacom and by subsequently resisting QVC's more
valuable acquisition proposals. 259 Applying Revlon and a newly formulated enhanced scrutiny test, the court concluded that "the Paramount directors' process was not reasonable, and the result achieved
'260
for the stockholders was not reasonable under the circumstances.
In approving the Original Merger Agreement, the Paramount di-

rectors "gave insufficient attention to the potential consequences of

the defensive measures demanded by Viacom. '' 261 These defensive
provisions, including the Stock Option Agreement, were problematic
because they made Paramount less attractive to other bidders. 2 62 The

Paramount directors also breached their fiduciary duties by failing to
exploit the negotiating leverage they acquired with Viacom after QVC
emerged as a competing bidder that "persistently demonstrated its intention to meet and exceed the Viacom offers .... "263
257. QVC, 635 A.2d at 1265-70.
258. Paramount,637 A.2d at 36, 41; see QVC, 635 A.2d at 1270.
259. Paramount,637 A.2d at 51.
260. Id.at 49 (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. 1d See also id at 39 ("Because the Stock Option Agreement was not 'capped' to
limit its maximum dollar value, it had the potential to reach (and in this case did reach)
unreasonable levels."). As Vice Chancellor Jacobs astutely observed in granting QVC's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the uncapped'Stock Option Agreement had the potential to reward Viacom for making a low initial bid and to unfairly penalize any competing bidder that might later emerge:
With no upper dollar limit on the value of the stock option, that option would
foreseeably operate to reward Viacom for making a low initial bid, because its
value was tied to the original September 12 Viacom deal price of $69.14. If a
bidding contest developed, the costs to a competing bidder foreseeably could
(and did) rise to stratospheric heights.
QVC, 635 A.2d at 1271.
263. Paramount,637 A.2d at 49. Moreover, the directors apparently failed to appreciate that the Stock Option Agreement, Termination Fee, and No-Shop provision "were impeding the realization of the best value reasonably available to the Paramount
stockholders." Id. at 50.
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The Paramount court also chastised Paramount's directors for
"squander[ing]" a final opportunity "to eliminate the restrictions they
had imposed on themselves. ' 264 QVC's eventual bid of $90 per share
exceeded Viacom's $85 offer by more than $1 billion in overall transaction value.265 As the court remarked, this "significant disparity"
could not be "justified on the basis of the directors' vision of future
strategy, primarily because the change of control would supplant the

authority of the current Paramount Board" to implement that vision
266
"in any meaningful way."

What is noteworthy about Paramount,however, is not the outcome of the litigation. QVC could have won under a straightforward
application of Macmillan or Unocal.267 Paramount is significant be-

cause the court's rationale for applying enhanced scrutiny in a corporate takeover breaks new doctrinal ground. As Chancellor Allen
astutely observed in RJR Nabisco, "in the law, to an extent present in

few other human institutions, there may be in the long run as much
importance ascribed to the reasoning said to justify action, as there is
in the actions themselves. 2 6 8 Thus, it is to the Paramountcourt's rationale that this Article now turns.
264. Id. The court also suggested that the Paramount directors improperly allowed
themselves to be misled by management's self-serving criticism of the QVC offer as "conditional." Id.
265. Id.; QVC, 635 A.2d at 1256, 1269-70.
266. Paramount,637 A.2d at 50. In the view of the Paramount court, the directors'
"uninformed process" also deprived their "strategic vision" of much of its credibility. Id.
This characterization of the board's process appears to be based, in part, on the fact that
the directors were not provided with a "quantitative analysis of the consideration to be
received by the stockholders" under the competing proposals. Id. at 41. The only comparison the directors received was based on then current market prices of the bidders' stock,
both of which had been fluctuating constantly during the bidding process and thus were
"poor measures" of the actual stock values. Id. at 41 & n.8. See also id. at 44 n.14 ("When
assessing the value of non-cash consideration, a board should focus on its value as of the
date it will be received by the stockholders. Normally, such value will be determined with
the assistance of experts using generally accepted methods of valuation.") (citing In re RJR
Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 73 (Del. Ch. Jan.
31, amended Feb. 14, 1989)).
267. For example, the uncapped and arguably confiscatory Stock Option Agreement
could have been invalidated (i) under Macmillan as discriminatory and unreasonable in
relation to the advantage sought (a signed deal for a strategic combination with Viacom),
Mills Acquisition.Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989), or (ii) under
Unocal as an unreasonable defensive measure which, either alone or in combination with
the board's selective use of the poison pill, improperly foreclosed the shareholders' opportunity to consider the far more valuable QVC offer. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see also QVC, 635 A.2d at 1270 (citing AC Acquisitions
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 116 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
268. RJR Nabisco, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *41.
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Enhanced Scrutiny Reformulated

Rather than invoke the "omnipresent specter" rationale, the

court in Paramountemphasized the "[s]ignificance" of a change-of269
control transaction as the justification for heightened scrutiny.
First, the court emphasized that a sale of control adversely impacts the

voting rights of public stockholders who are collectively relegated to a
minority ownership position. 270 The majority owner of a corporation
effectively controls the company's destiny.271 Heightened scrutiny is
appropriate in this context, the court reasoned, because Delaware

courts traditionally have been vigilant "to protect stockholders from
unwarranted interference with such [voting] rights. ' 272
The court also emphasized the considerable economic significance of a takeover transaction. 273 A change-of-control transaction
269. Paramount,637 A.2d at 42. The court's initial discussion of the applicable legal
principles was entitled "The Significance of a Sale or Change of Control." Id. (footnote
omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id The Paramountcourt thus emphasized the practical reality that stockholder
votes become "mere formalities" in this context because a majority stockholder can use its
voting power to control the election of directors, cause a breakup of the corporation, "cash
out" the public stockholders, or engage in other extraordinary transactions against the will
of the minority. Id. at 42-43. The minority therefore "must rely for protection solely on
the fiduciary duties owed to them by the directors and the majority stockholder, since the
minority stockholders have lost the power to influence corporate direction through the
ballot." Id at 43.
272. Id at 42 & n.11 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.
1971); Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982); Centaur Partners, IV v.
National Intergroup, 582 A.2d 923, 927-28 (Del. 1990); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84
(Del. 1992); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988)); see also
id. at 45 ("[E]nhanced scrutiny... is mandated by ...the threatened diminution of the
current stockholders' voting power.., and ... the traditional concern of Delaware courts
for actions which impair or impede stockholder voting rights.").
273. Paramount,637 A.2d at 43. The Paramountcourt's opinion is replete with references to the significance of a change-of-control transaction as justification for enhanced
scrutiny in this context. See id. ("The Paramount-Viacom transaction has economic consequences of considerable significance to the Paramount stockholders."); id. at 44 ("[T]he
role of outside, independent directors becomes particularly important because of the magnitude of a sale of control transaction and the possibility, in certain cases, that management
may not necessarily be impartial."); id (the board's assessment of "practical considerations
relating to each alternative ...[is] important because the selection of one alternative may
permanently foreclose other opportunities"). The link between the Paramountcourt's emphasis on transaction significance and the court's perceived need for enhanced scrutiny in
all takeovers is demonstrated clearly by the following discussion:
There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders than
a sale of control or a corporate break-up. Each event represents a fundamental
(and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from a
practical standpoint. It is the significance of each of these events that justifies: (a)
focusing on the directors' obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to
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presents a potentially unrecoverable opportunity for the stockholders
to obtain a control premium for their shares.27 4 Consequently, "[t]he
courts will apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure that the directors have
acted reasonably" in seeking the transaction "offering the best value
'275
reasonably available to the stockholders.
Before Paramount,the courts had described a board's Revlon duties in similarly general terms. 276 Paramountexpanded the role of the
courts in this context, however, by (i) explicitly linking enhanced scrutiny to the general Revlon duty to seek the best deal available and (ii)
announcing judicial review of the reasonableness of a board's decisions in this context. 277 The Paramountcourt explained:
The key features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a) a judicial
determination regarding the adequacy of the decision-making process employed by the directors, including the information on which
the directors based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of
the reasonableness of the directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing. The directors have the burden of278
proving that
they were adequately informed and acted reasonably.
Paramountthus explicitly requires substantive judicial review of the
merits of a board's decision in the takeover context-even decisions
by a disinterested and informed board acting in good faith. To be
sure, the court emphasized that judges will "not substitute their busithe stockholders; and (b) requiring a close scrutiny of board action which could
be contrary to the stockholders' interests.
Id. at 47-48.
274. Id. at 43; see also id. at 45 ("[A]n asset belonging to public stockholders (a control
premium) is being sold and may never be available again."); id. at 47-48 ("[A] sale of
control ... represents a fundamental (and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the
corporate enterprise from a practical standpoint."); QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1267 (Del. Ch. 1993) ("This is the only opportunity that Paramount's shareholders will ever have to receive the highest available premium-conferring
transaction."), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
275. Paramount,637 A.2d at 43.
276. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989); see also
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("[T]he board must act in a
neutral manner to encourage the highest possible price for shareholders."); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("The duty of the
board . . . [is] the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit."). Macmillan added some specific requirements of reasonableness, but this test
was reserved for instances in which a plaintiff first demonstrated that a board had treated
competing bidders on unequal terms. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288 (requiring directors, upon a plaintiff's showing of disparate treatment of competing bidders, to show that
"the board's action [was] reasonable in relation to the advantage sought to be achieved, or
conversely, to the threat which a particular bid allegedly poses to stockholder interests");
see also Paramount,637 A.2d at 45 & n.16.
277. Paramount,637 A.2d at 45.
278. Id.
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ness judgment for that of the directors .... ,"279 Nevertheless, review-

ing courts will in fact examine the wisdom of the directors' decision in
every takeover transaction to "determine if the directors' decision

'280
was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.
In sum, Paramountrequires enhanced judicial scrutiny for "reasonableness" of all aspects of a change-of-control transaction-not
just for suspicion-triggering board conduct such as unequal treatment

of competing bidders or the adoption of defensive measures. This all-

encompassing requirement is a direct result of the court's doctrinal
shift from an "omnipresent specter" rationale-which arguably limited enhanced scrutiny to such suspicion-triggering conduct-to the
far broader rationale of transaction "significance."
(2) Revlon Trigger Clarified

Paramountalso removed the uncertainty left by Time-Warner as
to whether a change-of-control transaction triggers a board's Revlon
duty to achieve the highest value reasonably attainable for shareholders .

81

Macmillan and Barkan both stated that Revlon duties would

arise in such circumstances.m Time-Warner introduced an element of
uncertainty, however, when the Delaware Supreme Court relied on
"different grounds" in affirming the lower court's ruling that Revlon
duties did not arise.2 3 Consequently, a debate ensued after TimeWarneras to whether the court had "narrowed the universe of Revlontriggering events and eliminated 'change of control' from that
universe."284
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 48. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986).
282. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989)
("Although the board's responsibilities under Unocal are far different [when the company
is for sale], the enhanced duties of the directors in responding to a potential shift in control,
recognized in Unocal, remain unchanged.") (citation and emphasis omitted); Barkan v.
Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("We believe that the general principles
announced in Revlon, in Unocal... and in Moran . ... govern this case and every case in
which a fundamental change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated.") (citations
and footnote omitted).
283. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990)
("[W]e premise our rejection of plaintiffs' Revlon claim on different grounds, namely, the
absence of any substantial evidence to conclude that Time's board, in negotiating with
Warner, made the dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity inevitable, as was the
case in Revlon.").
284. QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1265 (Del. Ch.
1993); see also Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772,781 n.4
(D. Del. 1988) ("To require that the Revlon principle apply only to an offer to purchase
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The Paramount court clarified that a transaction involving a

change of control, whether or not accompanied by a break-up of the
company, will trigger Revlon duties and enhanced judicial scrutiny. 285
In this regard, the Paramountcourt again emphasized the significance

of, and potentially irrevocable change in a corporate enterprise that
2 86
can result from, a sale of control.

C.

Critique of Paramount'sEnhanced Scrutiny Rationale

The Paramountcourt's new requirement that all corporate takeovers receive enhanced scrutiny unnecessarily expands the role of the
courts. The court has shifted its threshold focus in such cases away
from the integrity and effectiveness of the board's decision-making
287
process to the significance of the transaction to be acted upon.
Under Paramount,if a sale or other change of control is proposed, the
transaction is deemed significant and enhanced scrutiny is triggered
even if the board (i) is informed, disinterested and independent, (ii)

has acted in good faith, and (iii) has not treated competing bidders
unequally or engaged in other "specter"-raising conduct.
100% of a company's stock would ignore the inevitability of a break-up which could follow
a partial tender offer."); In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A.
No. 11495, Del. Ch. LEXIS 196, at *24-28 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992); Alan E. Garfield, Paramount- The Mixed Merits of Mush, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 35 n.6 (1992); Note, Defenders
of the CorporateBastion in the Revlon Zone: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 40 CATH.U. L. REV.155, 181-82 (1990) (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's modification of the Chancellor's analysis in Time-Warner regarding the circumstances under
which Revlon duties are triggered); Note, Radically Altered States: Entering the Revlon
Zone, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 760, 766-67 (1990) (noting ambiguity in change-of-control test
for triggering Revlon duties); Conflicts Note, supra note 200, at 1702 n.42 ("Paramount's
meaning and, hence, the definition of a transaction that 'triggers Revlon' remain unclear.");
Note, supra note 199, at 240 ("Other than when a board initiates a bidding process seeking
to sell itself, a board will be charged with the Revlon duty only if it takes action that makes
the break-up or dissolution of the corporate entity inevitable."); In Paramount's Defense,
CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Mar. 1994, at 5, 6-8 (discussing uncertainty created by TimeWarner decision as to whether change of control triggered Revlon).
285. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 47-48 (Del. 1994).
286. Id. The court thus observed:
There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders than
a sale of control or a corporate break-up. Each event represents a fundamental
(and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from a
practical standpoint. It is the significance of each of these events that justifies: (a)
focusing on the directors' obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to
the stockholders; and (b) requiring a close scrutiny of board action which could
be contrary to the stockholders' interests.
Id.
287. See generally supra Parts II.A and III; Macmillan Note, supra note 200, at 756
("The focus of the Macmillan holding was the conduct of the board of directors.") (footnote omitted).
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The Paramountcourt's announcement that it will not defer to a
board's decision in such circumstances runs counter to Delaware's
long-standing model of corporate governance. First, as discussed below, the court's concern for shareholders' voting rights as a justification for enhanced scrutiny is misplaced. Second, the economic
significance of a takeover, without more, does not immediately call
into question the capacity of the selling corporation's board to function properly. Under Delaware's established model of governance,
there must be evidence of some destabilizing influence on the board's

decision-making process-e.g., gross negligence, disloyalty, or that
"species of director interest" 88 that arises when a board resists a takeover or otherwise acts suspiciously so that the directors' motives may
legitimately be questioned-before the deference customarily accorded to facially-valid board action is displaced.2 9
288. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115 (Del. Ch.
1986).
289. See generally supra Part I.B. The Paramount court's holding that Revlon duties
were triggered by the proposed change-of-control transaction with Viacom otherwise represented a sensible application of earlier precedent and a helpful clarification of TimeWarner. In Time-Warner, where Revlon was found inapplicable, the court gave great deference to the Time directors' vision of the long-term strategic benefits of a combination with
Warner. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990)
(validating the directors' perception of Paramount's unsolicited offer as a threat under
Unocal because "Time shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount's cash offer in
ignorance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with
Warner might produce"); see also id. ("[P]recepts underlying the business judgment rule
militate against a court's engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the
relative merits of a long-term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders."). The
Paramountcourt sensibly concluded that the Paramount directors' long-term vision for the
company was not dispositive of the Revlon issue because the contemplated change of control with Viacom "would provide the new controlling stockholder with the power to alter
that vision." Paramount,637 A.2d at 43; see also QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1266-67 (Del. Ch. 1993) ("[O]nce the Viacom transaction is complete Mr. Redstone will have absolute control" and "shareholders can have no assurance
that they will receive the long-run benefits claimed to justify the board's decision to prefer
Viacom over QVC."), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
The Paramountcourt also wisely resisted making any broad doctrinal pronouncements
as to the type of control that will trigger Revlon or, conversely, as to the types of structural
protections for minority stockholders that might avoid the Revlon mandate in this context.
A board's fiduciary duties in such circumstances necessarily will turn on the unique facts of
each case. Thus, the Paramountcourt chose the better course by limiting its Revlon-trigger
analysis to the facts before it. Paramount,637 A.2d at 42 n.12, 43 n.13; see also Arnold v.
Society For Say. Bancorp, C.A. No. 12883, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 275, at *32-34 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 15, 1993) (Revlon not triggered in stock-for-stock merger transaction where control of
merged entity remained in the public market); John L. Hardiman & James C. Morphy,
Paramount v. QVC: Revlon Withstands the Test of Tune, 12 BANK & CoRP.GOVERNANCE
L. REP.57,58 (1994); Richard D. Katcher & Steven A. Rosenblum, Questions Paramount
Leaves Unanswered, 12 BANK & CoRp. GovERNANcE L. REP.53, 55-56 (1994); Dennis J.
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(1) Takeovers and the Voting Rights Cases-A Square Peg in a Round
Hole
The Paramountcourt justified applying enhanced scrutiny in part
because Paramount's proposed combination with Viacom "threatened
[a] diminution of the current stockholders' voting power" and Delaware courts traditionally have demonstrated "concern... for actions
which impair or impede stockholder voting rights .... ,,290 To be sure,
the public stockholders' collective voice would be inconsequential in a
vote if Sumner Redstone acquired majority control of a combined
Viacom-Paramount enterprise. It does not follow, however, that such
"diminution" in voting power - incident to the disposition of one's
shares for value - constitutes legally cognizable "interference" or an
"impair[ment]" of the public stockholders' voting rights. Indeed, the
line of authority on which Paramount relied for this point strongly
suggests otherwise.
As the Paramountcourt recognized, the Delaware courts consistently have protected shareholders from "unwarranted interference"
with voting rights.2 91 Such "interference," which triggers "careful judicial scrutiny,

' 292

invariably has involved inequitable conduct that is

designed to thwart the existing voting rights of a company's shareholders. In Schnell v. Chris-CraftIndustries, 93 for example, the court
invalidated the decision of a company's managing directors to advance
the date of an annual stockholders' meeting because the directors' action left insufficient time for an insurgent shareholder group to wage a
successful proxy contest.2 94 The court intervened in Schnell because
the corporation's democratic processes had been stymied.2 95 In GiBlock & Jonathan M. Hoff, FiduciaryDuties of Directorsin Negotiating Mergers, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 14, 1994, at 7 ("[T]he [Paramount]court did not clarify what kinds of transactions will
result in a 'sale of control' for purposes of Revlon.").
290.

Paramount,637 A.2d at 45; see also id. at 42-43.

291.
292.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 42 n.11.

293.
294.

285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
Id. at 439. The managing directors' action thus was seen as a manipulation of the

"corporate machinery" for the inequitable purpose of perpetuating their control. Id.
295. See also Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987) (restraining
attempt by incumbent board to postpone date of annual meeting when dissident stock-

holder group appeared to hold proxies for majority of shares); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data,
Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980) (invalidating board's reliance on bylaw to set date

for annual meeting which would have precluded shareholder from conducting a proxy contest); but see Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990) (directors' action

deferring annual meeting, when no meeting date had been set and no proxies had been
solicited, did "not impair or impede the effective exercise of the franchise"); MAI Basic
Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., C.A. No. 10868, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *3 (Del.
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uricich v. Emtrol Corp.,2 96 the Delaware Supreme Court directed the
Chancery Court to appoint a custodian to resolve a deadlock between
two groups of fifty-percent stockholders. 2 97 The deadlock had the ef-

fect of perpetuating the defendant stockholder group's control of the
company's board of directors. 2 98 The court thus concluded that a re-

fusal to appoint a custodian "would, in effect, leave the existing directors in perpetual control of the corporate entity, and would relegate
the one-half owners of the corporation to a perpetual minority status
without remedy or recourse." 299
Similarly, in Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.,3 00 the court invalidated an attempt by the directors of Atlas Corporation to enlarge the
size of their staggered board in response to a shareholder consent solicitation. 301 The board's action made it impossible for the insurgent
shareholder to win control of the board even if supported by a majority of the company's stockholders.30 2 Because the board acted (albeit
in good faith) for the primary purpose of interfering with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote, the Chancellor ruled that the directors

were required to demonstrate a "compelling justification" for their action.303 The court emphasized that "[t]he shareholder franchise is the

ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial
power rests. 3'0 4 Consequently, the incumbent directors' attempt to
30 5
undermine the democratic process could not be sustained.
Ch. June 13, 1989) (upholding decision of board to postpone annual shareholders meeting
to allow shareholders time to evaluate new tender offer and to afford directors a reasonable time to pursue alternative transaction).
296. 449 A.2d 232 (Del. 1982).
297. Id. at 240.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
301. Id. at 652.
302. Id. at 654-55.
303. Id. at 661. The court observed:
The only justification that can, in such a situation, be offered for the action taken
is that the board knows better than do the shareholders what is in the corporation's best interest. While that premise is no doubt true for any number of matters, it is irrelevant ... when the question is who should comprise the board of
directors.
Id. at 663. See also Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Del. Ch. 1987) ("The
business judgment rule ... does not confer any presumption of propriety on the acts of the
directors in postponing the annual meeting.").
304. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
305. Id. at 662-63. In Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992), the court held that a
board's fiduciary duty of disclosure did not require the directors of a privately held company to issue a detailed proxy statement in connection with an annual meeting for which
proxies were not solicited. Id. at 87. Significantly, the court emphasized in Stroud that the
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In sum, Delaware courts have applied heightened scrutiny to in-

validate inequitable board action that interferes with the shareholders' ability to vote their shares effectively in the context of a specific
shareholder vote and in a manner commensurate with the extent of
their holdings.3 0 6 A majority shareholder's power to exercise control
by voting its lawfully acquired shares does not constitute a legally cognizable injury to, or interference with, the voting rights of the minor-

ity. As the Delaware Supreme Court observed under analogous
circumstances in Stroud v. Grace: "The shareholders overwhelmingly

rejected Stroud's nominees. That is not an injury. It is a reality flowvoting rights cases applying "stringent standards of review" invariably have involved a purposeful attempt to deprive shareholders of their existing voting power in the context of a
specific shareholder vote. The court thus observed:
Almost all of the post-Schnell decisions involved situations where boards of directors deliberately employed various legal strategies either to frustrate or completely disenfranchise a shareholder vote. As Blasius recognized, in those
circumstances, board action was intended to thwart free exercise of the franchise.
There can be no dispute that such conduct violates Delaware law.
Id. at 91.
In Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923 (Del. 1990), the
court affirmed a Chancery Court ruling that an 80% super-majority vote requirement in a
corporation's charter was clear and unambiguous and therefore effective to override "the
fundamental principle of majority rule." Id. at 927. In keeping with Delaware's "'general
policy against disenfranchisement,"' the court in Centaur Partnersemphasized that "high
vote requirements which purport to protect minority shareholders by disenfranchising the
majority, must be clear and unambiguous." Id. Centaur Partners thus can be read as a
strong affirmation of the power of the majority to act in a manner contrary to the will of
the minority in the absence of a "clear and unambiguous" agreement to the contrary. This
willingness by the Delaware courts to uphold a majority stockholder's voting power also
finds expression in the following discussion in Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d
840 (Del. 1987):
Stockholders in Delaware corporations have a right to control and vote their
shares in their own interest. They are limited only by any fiduciary duty owed to
other stockholders ....Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings
in a corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale
would profit the minority.
Id. at 845.
306. Chancellor Allen succinctly summarized this position in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp,
579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990):
In each of these franchise cases the effect of the board action-to advance
(Schnell) or defer (Aprahamian) a meeting; to adopt a bylaw (Lerman); or to fill
board vacancies (Blasius)-was practically to preclude effective stockholder action (Schnell, Blasius, Lerman) or to snatch victory from an insurgent slate on the
eve of the noticed meeting (Aprahamian).
Id. at 1123; see also Comment, Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.: Closer Scrutiny of Board
Decisions Under the "Compelling Justification" Standard, 16 DEL. J.CORP. L. 639, 663
(1991) ("[I]n evaluating the board's conduct the courts have employed closer judicial scrutiny when directors use their statutory authority to restrict the ability of the shareholders to
replace them.") (footnote omitted).
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ing from a proper turning of the wheels of corporate democracy
...

.-"307

Thus, a board's decision to approve a change of control

should not be deemed an interference with or impairment of the voting rights of the company's stockholders. If someone purchases, for
value, sufficient shares to acquire majority ownership of a company,
Delaware law vigilantly enforces the right of the majority shareholder
to exercise control 3 08
It is true that the voting rights cases define a unique area in which
director action does not fall within the protection of the business judgment rule.30 9 However, as the Chancellor noted in Blasius, the reason
for this exception is that the "shareholder franchise is the ideological
underpinning" for the exercise of directorial power and thus "in307. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 96. See also Bershad, 535 A.2d at 845 (emphasizing the right
of a majority stockholder to control and vote its shares and to use its majority ownership to
thwart any effort by directors to auction the company).
308. See, e.g., CentaurPartners,582 A.2d at 927; Bershad, 535 A.2d at 845; cf Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) ("[11t is not enough to charge that a director was
nominated by or elected at the behest of those controlling the outcome of a corporate
election. That is the usual way a person becomes a corporate director."). As the Paramount court also noted, the majority stockholder owes fiduciary duties to the minority in
that circumstance. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1994). The court nevertheless suggested that the protection of such fiduciary duties is cold
comfort to shareholders who find themselves in the minority and, thus, unable to influence
corporate direction through the ballot. Id. at 43. Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on why it regarded the imposition of fiduciary duties on the majority stockholder as
insufficient protection for the minority in this circumstance. For example, any interested or
self-dealing transaction would require the majority stockholder to demonstrate its "utmost
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain" in a manner "sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts." Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 710 (Del. 1983); see also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985).
In an arm's-length transaction, the majority stockholder would have every incentive to
get the best possible deal for the corporation and its shareholders because the majority
stockholder would have more at stake than any other investor in the company. See, e.g., In
re Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10418, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 29,
at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1991) (in the merger transaction, "Fulcrum and its affiliates received ... $140 million for their 4.6 million shares [comprising 52%] of Budget stock ....
[T]here can be no question but that Fulcrum's interest was in obtaining the highest possible
price for its stock ...

.");

In re Mobile Communications Corp. of Am., C.A. No. 10627,

1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 4, at *28 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1991) (in considering class action settlement, court noted that directors' substantial stock holdings "created powerful economic...
incentives to get the best available deal in the sale of [the company]"), aff'd mem., 608
A.2d 729 (Del. 1992); Rosman v. Shoe-Town, C.A. No. 9483,1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *45 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1988) ("The economic interest of American Express, as a [10%] stockholder who will likely tender and receive the $9.75 tender price, is the same as the other
stockholders.... [I]ts economic interest in obtaining the maximum price is not in conflict
with the interests of the other stockholders .... ).
309. See, e.g., Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663; Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204,
1206-07 (Del. Ch. 1987).
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volve[s] consideration[s] not present in any other context in which directors exercise delegated power.

'310

The Paramount board's action did not implicate this unique arena
of the shareholder franchise. The board's decision to approve the
transaction with Viacom neither impeded nor interfered with the ability of the company's then-existing stockholders to decide who should
comprise the company's board of directors. Rather, pursuant to the
31
board's mandate to manage the company's "business and affairs," '
the directors approved a transaction they asserted was in the shareholders' best interest. The directors' good faith, care, and loyalty
therefore remained relevant considerations. Consequently, evidence
of gross negligence, disloyalty, or disparate treatment of competing

bidders should have been required before the business judgment
rule's threshold presumptions of propriety were displaced.
(2)

The Unimportance of Being Earnest-EnhancedScrutiny Based on
Transaction "Significance"

The Paramount court's critical pronouncement that enhanced

scrutiny will apply in all change-of-control transactions represents an
unwarranted expansion of the role of the courts in the context of corporate takeovers. 312 The court could have applied enhanced scrutiny
based on the principles of Unoca 313 or Macmillan, given the Paramount directors' decisions (i) to adopt and rely on defensive measures

(like the Stock Option Agreement and poison pill) and (ii) to treat
Viacom and QVC unequally as competing bidders. Instead, the Paramount court announced that enhanced scrutiny will be required for all
takeover transactions-including, apparently, those cases in which an
independent and well-informed board has striven earnestly, in good
faith, and even-handedly to seek the best transaction available.
310. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. See also id. at 663 (court will not defer to action of
directors foreclosing shareholder vote on question of who shall comprise the board of
directors).
311. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
312. The Paramountcourt plainly considered its transaction significance rationale as a
more fundamental and all-encompassing justification for enhanced scrutiny than its concern for the "diminution" of shareholders' voting power. The court's emphasis on the
significance of a change-of-control transaction pervades the Paramountopinion. See supra
note 273. Moreover, while every takeover is "significant," the diminution-of-voting-power
analysis obviously could apply only to a limited universe of takeovers-i.e., those in which
public stockholders are left in a minority position after consummation of the transaction.
313. It is true that the Paramountcourt cited Unocal as independent grounds for enhanced scrutiny. See Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 36, 42,
49 (Del. 1994). The court emphasized, however, that a change of control independently
will trigger enhanced scrutiny. See infra note 320.
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a. A Departure from the Historical Framework

Paramount's transaction-significance rationale represents a substantial departure from Delaware's traditional model of corporate
governance, including the model that had emerged in the decade since
Unocal. Under the framework existing before Paramount,directors

received the protection of the business judgment rule for facially-valid
board action unless the threshold evidence showed (i) a breach of the
directors' duties of care or 16yalty 31 4 or (ii) suspicion-triggering conduct-i.e., "specter"-raising conduct-on the part of the board (such
as the deployment of antitakeover measures or the disparate treat-

ment of competing bidders). 31 5 When no such showing is made, the
courts typically defer to the directors' good faith efforts to pursue the
shareholders' best interests. Now, even when there is no reas*on to
question the board's effectiveness or motives, the courts evidently will

apply enhanced scrutiny in every takeover transaction solely because
31 6
such transactions are significant.
The Paramountcourt's emphasis on transaction significance as a
justification for enhanced scrutiny in all takeover cases alters this established framework by shifting the court's threshold focus away from
the composition of the board and its deliberative processes to the nature of the transaction in question. It is true that a change-of-control

transaction represents a highly significant event for a corporation and
its shareholders. And as the court repeatedly emphasized in Paramount, a board's decision to commit to such a transaction represents a
potentially unrecoverable opportunity for the shareholders to realize
a value-maximizing premium for their shares.31 7 Given these impor-

tant. considerations, the Paramountcourt sensibly concluded that di314. See supra Part I.B.
315. See supra Parts ll.A, ll.B(1), II.C, and III.
316. In the non-takeover realm, the courts generally defer to a board's business judgment unless there is evidence that the board has been grossly negligent or disloyal. See
supra Part I. In the takeover arena, the customary presumptions of the business judgment
rule are suspended provisionally at the threshold if the directors have engaged in conduct
that provides reasonable grounds to question their motives. See supra Parts II and III.
Such conduct by the board can include adopting defensive measures to thwart a takeover
or treating competing bidders unequally where the board has embraced a change-of-control transaction. Id.
317. E.g., Paramount,637 A.2d at 43 ("[IThe current Paramount stockholders will have
no leverage in the future to demand another control premium."); id. at 44 ("[T]he selection
of one alternative may permanently foreclose other opportunities."); id. at 45 ("[A]n asset
belonging to public stockholders (a control premium) is being sold and may never be available again."); id. at 47-48 ("[A] sale of control .... represents a fundamental (and perhaps
irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from a practical
standpoint.").
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rectors in such circumstances come under a Revlon duty to seek the
best value reasonably available.3 18 A fundamental question remains,
however, regarding the appropriate level of judicial review once it is
determined that Revlon applies.
The Paramountcourt appeared to blur this distinction-between
when Revlon duties arise and the role of the court in a "Revlon"
case-into a one-step analysis in which enhanced scrutiny automatically follows once Revlon is found to apply. This "A equals B equals
C" analysis can be seen clearly in the following excerpt from the Paramount opinion:
The consequences of a sale of control impose special obligations on
the directors of a corporation. In particular, they have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek the transaction offering the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders. The courts will apply enhanced
scrutiny to ensure that the directors have acted
3 19
reasonably.
The absence of any meaningful analysis on the important doctrinal question of judicial review likely followed from the court's view
that enhanced scrutiny has been required in this context ever since
Revlon was first decided. 320 Revlon, of course, was not especially clear
regarding whether such scrutiny applied to all takeover transactions or
only to a board's decision to adopt antitakeover measures. 32 ' Mean318. Id. at 43, 46-48.
319. Id. at 43 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 47-48 (requiring "close scrutiny of
board action" in takeover setting because "[t]here are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders than a sale of control or a corporate break-up.").
320. Id. at 36 ("[T]he sale of control in this case... implicates enhanced judicial scrutiny of the conduct of the Paramount Board under Unocal ... and Revlon .... "); id. at 42
("The decisions of this Court have clearly established the circumstances where such enhanced scrutiny will be applied. E.g., Unocal... Revlon .... "); id. at 51 ("We decide only
the case before us-a case which, on its facts, is clearly controlled by established Delaware
law. Here, the proposed change of control and the implications thereof were crystal
clear."); see also Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, Nos. 427, 1993 & 428, 1993
(Del. Dec. 9, 1993) (order) ("The traditional business judgment rule was not applicable,
however, to decisions made by the Paramount defendants ... since Paramount's strategic
alliance with Viacom was predicated upon a sale of control to Redstone."); id. ("The
change of control feature and the defensive aspects of the Paramount-Viacom transaction,
each independently, subjected the directors' decision-making to enhanced scrutiny to determine reasonableness.") (emphasis added).
321. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180-81 (Del. 1986) (applying Unocal analysis to uphold defensive measures) with id. at 182
(applying what appeared to be a conventional duty of loyalty analysis to invalidate asset
lock-up); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 252-53 (suggesting that Revlon
applied a traditional duty of loyalty analysis instead of Unocal's proportionality test to
enjoin asset lock-up granted to favored bidder). Indeed, in the first few years after Revlon,
the Chancery Court did not interpret the decision as requiring enhanced scrutiny of a
board's decision to approve a sale of control. See supra Part II.C(2).
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while, Macmillan seemed to suggest that there had always been enhanced scrutiny in the Revlon context, but "only" when directors
treated competing bidders unequally. 32 2 Paramountnow says that en-

hanced scrutiny is required in all takeovers, not because of "specters"
or suspicions about directors' motives, but because of the significance
of such transactions. 323
In all events, the proposition that Revlon (or Macmillan, for that
matter) announced enhanced scrutiny for all change-of-control transactions certainly is debatable. The more important point is that no

Delaware court meaningfully has examined why such scrutiny is necessary in every takeover, even those in which there is no reason to
question (i) the bona fides of the directors (as would be the case when
directors treat competing bidders unequally or act in some other suspicious manner) or (ii) the directors' ability to function properly
under the circumstances (i.e., free of any conflicting personal interest
or other destabilizing influence). Revlon and Macmillan both involved egregious examples of boards playing favorites among competing bidders at the ultimate expense of their shareholders. 32 4 Both
cited Unocal's "omnipresent specter" rationale, 3 25 and neither purported to identify an entire category of business decisions-i.e., those
322. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,1288 (Del. 1989). In Macmillan, the court suggested that Unocal's principles of enhanced scrutiny "pervade[ ]" RevIon. IL at 1287. Thus, Macmillan certainly could be read as requiring enhanced scrutiny in
all corporate takeovers. A more logical reading of Macmillan, given its reliance on Unocal's "omnipresent specter" rationale, is that enhanced scrutiny may be triggered in the
Revlon context but "only" if the directors arouse suspicion about their motives by treating
competing bidders unequally. Id. at 1288. See also Paramount Communications v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 n.14 (Del. 1990) ("Within the auction process, any action taken
by the board must be reasonably related to the threat posed or reasonable in relation to
the advantage sought.... Thus, a Unocal analysis may be appropriate when a corporation
is in a Revlon situation .... .") (emphasis added) (citing Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288).
Moreover, to the extent Revlon applied Unocal in the auction context, it did so to invalidate the board's favored treatment of one of two competing bidders. See Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 184 ("[W]hen bidders make relatively similar offers.., the directors cannot fulfill their
enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.").
323. Paramount,637 A.2d at 47-48; see also id. at 43-45. Indeed, the only noteworthy
reference to considerations of motive in Paramountreveals the court's continuing trust and
confidence in outside directors to do what is best for shareholders. The court thus emphasized that "the role of outside, independent directors becomes particularly important because of the magnitude of a sale of control transaction and the possibility, in certain cases,
that management may not necessarily be impartial." Id. at 44 (citing Macmillan, 559 A.2d
at 1285). But see Mirvis, supra note 200, at 63 (arguing that a change of control "implicate[s] the 'omnipresent specter' of potential director self-interest ....
It may be that,
after all, there never was a Revlon land. There is only a Unocal universe").
324. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184; Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1281-83.
325. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180; Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1287.
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involving a sale or change-of-control transaction-that automatically
fails to qualify for traditional business judgment rule review because
of the importance of such decisions.
Although the Paramountcourt described its holding as "clearly
controlled by established Delaware law, '3 2 6 the court did not explain
why it had discarded the "omnipresent specter" rationale on which
Macmillan and virtually every other "enhanced scrutiny" takeover
case relied. 327 Nor did the court attempt to identify some other destabilizing influence under which directors are perceived to labor in the
takeover context so that the customary presumptions of the business
judgment rule should be suspended.3 28 The Paramount court essentially made a policy judgment that, when a company is being sold,
shareholders simply have too much at stake for courts to accord deference to the board's decisions. Consequently, the court created a role
for itself as the arbiter of reasonableness for board decisions falling
within this special category of transactions.
326. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51 ("[T]he case before us . . .is clearly controlled by
established Delaware law. Here, the proposed change of control and the implications
thereof were crystal clear."). Indeed, the court introduced its legal discussion with the
heading: "APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF ESTABLISHED DELAWARE
LAW"). Id. at 41.
327. See supra Part III.
328. See generally supra Part I.B. It is also questionable why the Paramount court
perceived a need to institute a layer of judicial review to "ensure" a "reasonable" result in
every takeover. Id. at 43, 45. There was no track record of unremedied dereliction by
boards in this context that might have prompted such a sweeping reformulation of the
enhanced scrutiny test. For example, the directors' various breaches of their duties of loyalty and care in Macmillan triggered an entire fairness analysis. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at
1265, 1279. Similarly, in Cede, the directors' apparently uninformed approval of a merger
transaction prompted an entire fairness analysis. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 366-67 (Del. 1993). Curiously, although Cede (a case plainly involving a change of
control) was decided some seven weeks before the Delaware Supreme Court's bench ruling in Paramount,the Cede court barely hinted at the requirement of enhanced scrutiny for
all takeovers that the Paramountcourt apparently regarded as well-established. See Cede,
634 A.2d at 361 ("In the review of a transaction involving a sale of a company, the directors have the burden of establishing that the price offered was the highest value reasonably
available under the circumstances.").
In Paramount,the favored treatment that Viacom received (including the Stock Option Agreement, the Termination Fee Agreement, and the No-Shop provisions) could have
triggered enhanced scrutiny under Macmillan's specific test for reasonableness once such
disparate treatment had been shown. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288 (holding that a
board's action in treating competing bidders differently "must be reasonable in relation to
the advantage sought to be achieved, or conversely, to the threat which a particular bid
allegedly poses to stockholder interests") (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)). And if Revlon were decided today, the Revlon board's decision to "play favorites" also could be invalidated under Macmillan's disparate treatment
test. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
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b. "Enterprise" Versus "Ownership" Decisions
Paramountis perhaps best explained as a case in which the distinction between "enterprise" issues and "ownership" issues was elevated to a doctrinal level. In his thoughtful 1985 article lamenting the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom,32 9 Bayless Man-

ning predicted (accurately) that the courts eventually would differentiate between "enterprise" issues and "ownership" issues in terms of
the vigor with which courts would review a board's business decisions.330 As discussed below, it appears that the Delaware Supreme
Court has embraced Manning's classifications as a tool for identifying
board decisions that will trigger enhanced scrutiny.331
Manning suggested that "enterprise issues," such as a decision to
expand or contract a company's particular line of business, are unlikely to receive "judicial Monday morning quarterbacking on a
board's decision."33 2 On the other hand, "ownership claim issues,"
i.e., those which pertain directly to a shareholder's economic stake in
the corporation, "are very close to a nerve" and thus could prompt a
court to impose more stringent standards of care and loyalty on the
directors.33 3 As Manning remarked concerning transactions-such as
the sale of a company-that involve "ownership" issues:
[T]hose transactions hit [the shareholder] directly in his role as an
"owner," not "owner of the corporation" as legal doctrine would
have it, but owner of his reified piece of property, his share of stock.
After centuries of a private-property culture, none of us reacts well
to receipt of a letter saying, "This will
inform you that I have just
'334
sold your house. Check is enclosed.

The following year, then-practitioner Veasey (now Chief Justice
and author of the Paramountdecision) authored an article addressing
the business judgment rule in the setting of takeover defenses in which
he embraced Manning's enterprise/ownership analysis. 335 A few years
later Veasey again cited Manning's analysis with approval in an article
329. Bayless Manning, Reflections and PracticalTips on Life in the Boardroom After
Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985).
330. Id. at 6.
331. Chief Justice Veasey, author of the Paramountdecision, previously authored articles as a practitioner in which he referred (explicitly or implicitly) with approval to Manning's analysis. See infra notes 335-337 and accompanying text.
332. Manning, supra note 329, at 5-6.
333. Id. at 6.
334. Id. at 5-6; see also Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("A board of directors' assertion of a unilateral right, under the business judgment rule, to act as a surrogate for the shareholder's independent right of alienation of his stock is troublesome.").
335. Veasey, supra note 24, at 505. As then-practitioner Veasey explained:
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on the directors' duty of loyalty. 336 As Veasey the practitioner then

explained, "the application of the business judgment rule may be
shaped differently depending on whether the issue is an 'ownership'
issue (one involving control or the equity interests of stockholders); or
an 'enterprise' issue (one involving business strategy or
'337
operations).

More recently, in remarks delivered at an ABA symposium on
"New Dynamics of Corporate Governance" (held one week before

the Delaware Supreme Court issued its bench ruling in Paramount),
Chief Justice Veasey identified the enterprise/ownership analysis as an
inquiry which a court "must" undertake. 338 Subject to a disclaimer
that his remarks were not intended to relate to the then-pending Paramount case, 339 Chief Justice Veasey observed: "In evaluating the facts
of each given case, the court must ... consider (a) how the directors

behaved in the boardroom in making their decision, and (b) the entire
It is presumed that decisions of disinterested directors are made in good faith for
a rational business purpose, with due care, and in the honest belief that they are
acting in the best interests of stockholders. These decisions are often 'enterprise'
or operational issues ('shall we buy a new truck?' or 'shall we give Mary a
raise?'). In transactional justification cases such as defenses to takeovers, the issues revolve around stockholder ownership rights and values.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Manning, supra note 329).
336. E. Norman Veasey, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 89.
337. Id. at 2066 n.4 (citing Manning, supra note 329). In a book review authored later
that same year, Veasey again alluded to this distinction between enterprise and ownership
issues, identifying what he referred to as a "compartmentalized" category of jurisprudence
involving "contests for control" in which the Unocal analysis is applied:
To permit a court to determine the "reasonableness" of actions of business people
or to substitute the court's judgment for that of the directors is anathema to those
who would be reluctant to countenance any significant erosion in the business
judgment rule. If, however, the limitations on the application of judicial review
and burden-shifting of Unocal are clearly understood, judicial management of
contests for control takes on a life and culture of its own, including a jurisprudence unique to control contests .... This jurisprudence may be appropriately
compartmentalized so as not to be expanded unduly in allowing courts to substitute their judgment for that of the directors. Indeed, there seems to be a resistance, at least by Delaware courts, to expand the Unocal doctrine to other
traditional business judgment rule applications such as statutory directorial prerogatives, purely enterprise decisions, directorial pecuniary liability . . . and in
other areas.
Veasey, Book Review, supra note 86, at 577-78 (footnotes omitted).
338. E. Norman Veasey, Professionalism and the Corporate Counselor, Remarks of
Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey at ABA Symposium, "New Dynamics of Corporate Governance," at 8-9 (Dec. 2, 1993).
339. Id. at 5-6.
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factual setting including the nature of the corporate transaction which
3 40
is implicated. (Is it an 'enterprise' or an 'ownership' decision?)"

In his scholarly commentary on this subject, Professor Dooley
similarly embraced Manning's analysis as a largely "useful" classification.341 Significantly, Professor Dooley did not invoke Manning's enterprise/ownership dichotomy as a justification for a court's
substantive review of the reasonableness of a board's decision, but
rather as grounds for a closer look by the court at a board's deliberative processes. Professor Dooley thus explained Manning's analytical
model as follows: "It is the 'check is enclosed' metaphor that best
captures the limits of the 'ownership claim' issues where the court will
be inclined to look closely at the informational processes of the board.

Certainly, it describes precisely the most notorious 'process' case of
our time, Smith v. Van Gorkom. ' 342 Paramount,of course, extends

the analyses of Manning and Professor Dooley by requiring enhanced
scrutiny of the reasonableness of both the process and the substance
343
of a board's decisions in the context of a change of control.

340. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). In Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1378 (Del.
1993), the Delaware Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Veasey, alluded to the greater deference accorded to decisions of a board that fall within the area of
directors' business expertise. In language implicitly suggesting an "enterprise" issue analysis, the Nixon court observed:
In a case where the court is scrutinizing the fairness of a self-interested corporate
transaction the court should articulate the standards which it is applying in its
scrutiny of the transactions ....While the court is not expected to substitute its
business judgment for that of the directors in areas where particular business expertise is an ingredient of the decision, the reasonableness of the business judgment of the conflicted directors' decision must be examined searchingly through a
principled and disciplined analysis.
Id.(footnote omitted). By implication, the court in Nixon suggested that it would be more
comfortable assessing the wisdom of a board's decisions in a context where business expertise is not at the core of the board's decision, perhaps including larger decisions like a sale
of control that directly and immediately affect the shareholders' ownership in the
company.
341. Dooley, supra note 14, at 474 n.47.
342. Id. at 473 (footnote omitted); but see Pelto, supra note 24, at 848 ("The degree of
deference given directors by a rule designed to give shareholders the benefit of superior
management expertise is inappropriate when the decision involves the shareholder's own
investment. The courts, therefore, should scrutinize directors' decisions that affect corporate ownership.").
343. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994) ("We
further hold that the conduct of the Paramount Board was not reasonable as to process or
result."); id. at 45 ("[A]n enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of the reasonableness of
the substantive merits of a board's actions."); id. ("courts will not substitute their business
judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was, on
balance, within a range of reasonableness.").
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Foreshadowing Paramount's emphasis on the irrevocable conse-

quences of a change-of-control transaction, 344 Professor Dooley helpfully differentiated further between "ownership" decisions in which a
board thwarts a takeover (and thus causes the corporation to remain

independent) and "ownership" cases in which a board commits to a
sale or change of control. As Professor Dooley explained, a decision
by the board to prevent a sale and a decision to sell the company both
significantly impact the shareholders as owners of the corporation. 345
Nevertheless, it is cases in this latter category, like Van Gorkom, that

are more likely to invite judicial review because "the board decides to
change irrevocably the nature of the shareholder's claim by selling the

company for cash or securities of another firm.

'346

The foregoing analysis suggests a greater inclination by the courts
to review carefully those decisions by boards that raise shareholder
"ownership" issues. Paramountgoes beyond the commentators' recognition of this practical reality-that courts will pay close attention
to a board's deliberative processes in this context 347-by instituting a

layer of substantive judicial review as to the reasonableness of a
board's decisions in every corporate takeover. The Paramountcourt's
introduction of such substantive review thus exalts the enterprise/

ownership analysis into a doctrinal litmus test for isolating a category
344. See supra notes 273-275 and accompanying text.
345. Dooley, supra note 14, at 474.
346. Id. at 475. As Professor Dooley explained:
Perhaps what distinguishes the "check is enclosed" cases such as Van Gorkom is
the finality of the event. Once the board decides to change irrevocably the nature
of the shareholders' claim by selling the company for cash or securities of another
firm, the value of the residual interest in the selling firm is fixed forever. There is
no other remedy-not even the option of "turning the rascals out" by electing a
new board, an option that remains open to the frustrated tender offeree.
Id.
347. In applying a traditional business judgment rule analysis to the sale of control in
In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110
(Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), Chancellor Allen sensibly suggested that the magnitude of such a
transaction requires a greater undertaking by the board to make an informed decision:
The more significant the subject matter of the decision, obviously, the greater will
be the need to probe and consider alternatives. When the decision is to sell the
company, or to engage in a recapitalization that will change control of the firm,
the gravity of the transaction places a special burden upon the directors to make
sure that they have a basis for an informed view.
Id. at *4-5; see also id. at *42 ("The need to exercise judgment is inescapably put on the
board at points in an auction process and the validity of the exercise of that judgment is
appropriately subjected to a business judgment form of judicial review."). The Macmillan
court later criticized the Chancellor's failure to apply an enhanced scrutiny analysis in Fort
Howard. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989).
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of decisions in which the court will dislodge the authority of the board
without regard to the directors' independence, care, or good faith.
c. Problems with Paramount's Requirement of Substantive Review for
All Takeovers
Whether Paramount'srationale is described as one of transactionsignificance or an enterprise/ownership analysis, 348 the decision's
overly-broad requirement of enhanced scrutiny for every takeover
transaction can be justified under neither Unocal (and its progeny)
nor the principles underlying the business judgment rule.
i. The Unocal-Macmillan Model
Assuming one accepts Unocal's premise that even outside directors face some "species of ... interest" 349 in resisting an unsolicited
takeover bid,350 enhanced scrutiny is justified in such a setting because
348. Although the Paramountcourt did not explicitly adopt Manning's enterprise/ownership analytical model, the decision can readily be explained within Manning's "ownership issue" framework. Under prior precedent, the courts justified enhanced scrutiny in
the takeover context based on the "omnipresent specter" of potential self-interest or some
other perceived destabilizing influence upon the board. See supra Parts II.A and III. The
Paramountcourt eschewed this analysis, relying instead on the significance of a sale of
control transaction to the corporation's owners as justification for applying heightened
scrutiny. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42-43, 45, 47-48
(Del. 1994).
349. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115 (Del. Ch.
1986).
350. Tracing the source of the "omnipresent specter" is a more daunting task than it
might appear at first blush. In coining the "omnipresent specter" phrase, the Unocal court
relied on Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962), in which the court concluded that
"directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest" when they cause the corporation to repurchase its shares when a threat to control exists. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (quoting Bennett, 187 A.2d at 409). Bennett, however,
did not separately analyze why outside directors should be deemed "conflicted" in such
circumstances. The only authority on which the Bennett court relied for its conclusions was
a law review note on the lower court's decision. See 187 A.2d at 409 (citing Note, Boardof
DirectorsMay Not Ratify Chairman'sPurchaseof CorporateShares to PreventAssumption
of Control by Another Without Adequate Study of Threat to Corporation,62 CoLuM. L.
REv. 1096, 1100 (1962)). The author of the Note, meanwhile, opined in similarly conclusory terms that a board's objectivity is open to question in this context: "Certainly those
in control have a personal interest in perpetuating their control." Note, supra, at 1100.
Despite the numerous cases after Unocal in which enhanced scrutiny was applied to
assess the validity of various defensive measures, the courts never meaningfully developed
or explained the potentially destabilizing influence that this "species of director interest"
was thought to create. See supraPart II.B. Moreover, it is difficult to square the potential
conflict of interest that outside directors are thought to face when confronting a takeover
with the cases which hold that fees paid to outside directors do not constitute a legally
cognizable interest. E.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988) (allegation that
directors "are paid for their services as directors" does "not establish any financial inter-
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there are threshold questions about the board's ability to function
normally, i.e., independently and disinterestedly. Similarly, the suspi-

cions about directors' motives that arise when a board treats competing bidders unequally in an auction supplies the justification for
enhanced scrutiny in the takeover context. 35' In this latter setting, the

potential self-interest that outside directors are thought to confront
when resisting a takeover is obviously not present. Nevertheless,

when bidders receive unequal treatment, a red flag goes up because
there is concern that the board, as auctioneer, may be improperly mo-

tivated-or unduly influenced by senior management-to steer the
est" for purposes of determining demand futility); Day v. Quotron Sys., Inc., C.A. No.
8502, Del. Ch. 1989 LEXIS 164, at *19-20 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 1989) ("Citicorp's stated
intention to retain Quotron's directors and management following an acquisition does not
render Quotron's outside directors 'interested' in this transaction by reason of their accepting normal directors' fees."); Lewis v. Straetz, C.A. No. 7859, slip op. at 12 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 12, 1986) ("The mere fact that the directors are paid fees for their services as directors
does not impugn their ability to act"); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 107475 (Del. Ch.) (the business judgment rule's "presumption of good faith is heightened"
when "a majority of the directors are independent or outside directors receiving no income
other than usual directors' fees ....),affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Block et al., supra
note 27, at 73 ("Allegations that the directors are paid for their services as directors, without more, do not establish a material financial interest") (footnote omitted). Yet there is
some sense in the cases that even outside directors are thought to be "interested" (perhaps
psychologically, if not financially) in preserving their control and that of the corporation's
management. Judge Posner drove home this point well:
When managers are busy erecting obstacles to the taking over of the corporation
by an investor who is likely to fire them if the takeover attempt succeeds, they
have a clear conflict of interest, and it is not cured by vesting the power of decision in a board of directors in which insiders are a minority ....No one likes to
be fired, whether he is just a director or also an officer. These so-called outsiders
moreover are often friends of the insiders. And since they spend only part of
their time on the affairs of the corporation, their knowledge of those affairs is
much less than that of the insiders, to whom they are likely therefore to defer.
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300
(7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("But the very idea that, if
we cannot trace with precision a mighty flow of dollars into the pockets of each of the
outside directors, these directors are necessarily disinterested arbiters of the stockholders'
destiny, is appallingly naive."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Prentice & Langmore,
supra note 85, at 473 (outside directors' "economic and psychological ties" with management can create a circumstance in which "outside directors cannot easily stand up to the
insiders even if they wish to do so").
351. Under a more sensible "narrow" reading of Macmillan (see supra Part III.A(2)),
enhanced scrutiny should be applied to a board's decision to treat competing bidders unequally because such conduct raises a threshold question about the directors' motivations.
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1287-88 (citing Unocal's "omnipresent specter" of potential selfinterest and formulating enhanced scrutiny test for disparate treatment of competing
bidders).
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transaction to a bidder perceived as friendly to management, instead
352
of resolutely seeking the best available price from all comers.
Paramount's sweeping requirement of enhanced scrutiny for
every transaction in which a board agrees to a takeover cannot be
justified within this established framework. If a board approves a
change-of-control transaction in a setting in which all suitors are
treated evenhandedly, why should the court act as the objective arbiter of reasonableness? Absent disparate treatment of competing bidders (or some other suspicion-triggering conduct), there is no specter
of potential self-interest or improperly motivated board action to justify enhanced scrutiny.
ii. Business Judgment Rule Concerns
Paramount'stransaction-significance rationale essentially reflects
a policy judgment that the court must ensure reasonableness in all
takeovers because of the importance of such transactions to the corporation's owners.3 53 This judicially-imposed requirement is problematic, however, because it runs afoul of the principles underlying the
business judgment rule. As shown below, the reasons for deference
are as compelling in this setting-assuming there is no disparate treatment or other suspicion-triggering conduct-as in the context of more
routine enterprise decisions.
As shown earlier, the courts' professed lack of competency in
business matters has been discredited as a justification for deference
under the business judgment rule.354 Nevertheless, the Delaware
Supreme Court gave credence to this rationale relatively recently in
Nixon v. Blackwell.355 One could surmise therefore that the court's
competency concerns, if any, would be far less acute, and therefore
352. Revlon addressed this precise concern by emphasizing that directors "cannot fulfill their 'enhanced' Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions" when
competing "bidders make relatively similar offers. .. ." Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). In Roberts v. General Instrument
Corp., C.A. No. 11639, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 138 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), Chancellor
Allen also alluded to this concern by noting the potential for senior management to attempt to influence negotiations for selfish reasons. "The first question ... is whether this
transaction is ... a bargain reached at arm's length ... or whether it is a transaction in
which a senior management, hopeful of participating with the buyer in the future ownership of the enterprise, affected negotiations by assisting the buyer to the shareholders detriment." Id. at *25-26.
353. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994).
354. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
355. 626 A.2d 1366, 1378 n.14 (Del. 1993) ("[C]ourts are 'ill-equipped' to make business decisions.") (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-28 (N.Y. 1979)).
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less of a perceived barrier to judicial review, when the business at
hand involves the directors' narrowly-focused obligation to seek the
best available transaction. 356 Combining this fact with the perceived
"rare situations" 357 in which Paramount'senhanced scrutiny test will
be "compartmentalized," 3 58 may explain the court's willingness to
craft a larger role for itself in this context.
But these reasons are unpersuasive. Paramountspecifically refers
to the deference of the business judgment rule in terms of the board's
managerial authority, not the court's purported lack of expertise in
business matters. 359 Moreover, as noted earlier, 360 practitioner Veasey, later Chief Justice and author of Paramount,co-authored an arti'36 1
cle disparaging the competency rationale as "nearly indefensible."
It is therefore unlikely that Paramount's imposition of heightened
scrutiny on all takeovers was attributable to competency concerns. Instead, Paramountdisplaced the board's managerial authority because
of the significance of takeovers to the shareholders and the "owner362
ship" issues that such transactions present.
The problem with Paramount,however, is that the generally accepted reasons for deference under the business judgment rule have
continuing and vital application in the takeover setting notwithstanding the importance of a takeover transaction to the corporation's
shareholders. Specifically, deference is appropriate in the takeover
context because it will benefit shareholders (i) by encouraging risktaking by the board in structuring and negotiating a transaction without the disruptive and destabilizing prospect of substantive judicial review and (ii) by upholding the directors' managerial authority and
thereby strengthening the board's negotiating position in pursuing the
best available transaction.
356. Paramount,637 A.2d at 44 ("In the sale of control context, the directors must
focus on one primary objective-to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders-and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to further
that end."); cf.Easterbrook & Fischell, supra note 35, at 1161-98 (arguing that shareholders
are as well-equipped as managers to decide whether to accept or reject a tender offer
because "[t]he decision does not involve management of a corporation's affairs in any
meaningful sense").
357. Paramount,637 A.2d at 42.
358. Veasey, Book Review, supra note 86, at 577.
359. Paramount,637 A.2d at 41-42,45 n.17; but see id. at 45 ("The board of directors is
the corporate decision-making body best equipped to make these judgments.").
360. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
361. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 521.
362. See supra Parts IV.B(1) and IV.C(2)(b).
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A board's decisions in the context of a change-of-control transaction may not involve such purely entrepreneurial matters as product
development and marketing strategies. There are plenty of risks to be
weighed and judgments to be made, however, when a board places a
corporation on the auction block. Such judgments of course must be
made in good faith, with appropriate information and care, and with
the singular goal of obtaining the best available transaction for the
shareholders. But the directors also need to make these judgments
without the destabilizing prospect that the courts will unfairly secondguess their decisions with the benefit of after-acquired information.
Directors will be required to exercise judgment at any number of
points in the auction process. 363 For example, in RIR Nabisco, the
special committee accepted KKR's offer over the management
group's substantially equivalent bid because it was late in the game
and the committee's advisors feared they were perilously close to
"overtrading [the] transaction with KKR and ... losing them as a
bidder." 364 In Citron, the Fairchild board accepted Schlumberger's
"take-it-or-leave-it, $66 that day" offer (instead of Gould's higher but
less certain $70 offer) when, unbeknownst to the Fairchild directors,
Schlumberger's board also had authorized a bid as high as $70 per
share.3 65 Such judgments do not readily lend themselves to substantive after-the-fact review by the courts, but that is what Paramount
now requires.
Even the apparently simple act of setting an auction deadline can
involve issues of judgment and strategy.3 66 Moreover, as Vice Chan363. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989) ("We
recognize that the conduct of a corporate auction is a complex undertaking both in its
design and execution."); see also In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No.
10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *58 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, revised Feb. 14, 1989) (describing
the difficult risk/benefit calculations inherent in negotiating with multiple bidders); In re
Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *42
(Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) ("The need to exercise judgment is inescapably put on the board at
points in an auction process ....").
364. RJR Nabisco, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *52; see also Citron v. Fairchild Camera
& Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68 (Del. 1989) ("Fairchild's board came under no legal
duty to give Gould one more opportunity to submit a firm unconditional bid and risk
losing the Schlumberger offer.").
365. Citron, 569 A.2d at 62 & n.12; see also In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
C.A. No. 8453, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 49, at *46 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, revised Mar. 26, 1993)
(upholding decision by Sea-Land board, when confronted with "a firm-and extremely
short-deadline," to accept CSX Corporation's acquisition proposal at $28 per share, despite evidence showing that CSX board had authorized bid up to $32 per share), affd
mem., 633 A.2d 371 (Del. 1993).
366. The recent battle for control of Grumman Corp. provides a prime example. On
March 7, 1994, it was announced that Martin Marietta Corp. and Grumman had agreed to
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cellor Jacobs explained in Paramount before the case reached the
Supreme Court, even competing all-cash bids can require a complex
judgment by the board based on a number of subjective variables. 367
In this regard, it is also worth recalling the Delaware Supreme Court's
admonition in Time-Warner that the court, in applying Unocal's en-

hanced scrutiny, should not "substitut[e] its judgment as to what is a
'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors.

'368

Para-

mount now invites precisely this sort of judicial meddling.
a friendly merger transaction in which Martin Marietta would pay Grumman stockholders
$55 per share, or approximately $1.93 billion, to acquire the company. Three days later,
Northrop Corp. offered to acquire Grumman for $60 per share, or $2.04 billion. On March
28, Grumman announced that it would hold an auction, open to all bidders, with a deadline
of March 31. See Mergers and Acquisitions; Northrop Wins Battlefor Grumman, Facts on
File World News Digest, Apr. 7, 1994, at 244. Faced with offers from two interested bidders, Grumman established a short auction deadline to avoid a prolonged bidding war and
the risk of "disruption to the company's business and ...uncertainty among the company's
constituencies." Roy J. Harris, Jr., Grumman Stock Falls 2.3% Reflecting Uncertainty of
Higher Bids in Auction, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1994, at A4.
Northrop complained that the short auction deadline would hurt Grumman stockholders by "prematurely cut[ting] off potential bidding." Id. Northrop also objected to Grumman's proposed sealed auction procedure because its $60 per share offer was already $5
per share higher than Martin Marietta's bid. James F. Peltz, Grumman Cooled to Northrop's Revised Bid for Takeover, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at D1. Nevertheless, Grumman
held fast to its auction procedures and Northrop submitted an increased bid of $62 per
share, some $70 million more than its initial $60 per share offer. Martin Marietta, meanwhile, declined to increase its initial offer of $55 per share. Roy J. Harris, Jr., Northrop
Offer of $2.17 Billion Wins Grumman, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1994, at A3.
367. As the Vice Chancellor observed:
Although "enhanced scrutiny" must be satisfied before business judgment rule
presumptions will apply, that does not displace the use of business judgment in
the board room. A determination of which of two transactions is the better one
for the shareholders requires the directors to exercise business judgment based on
adequate information. Ordinarily, as between two competing all cash offers, the
board will be required to choose the higher one, but even that is not always the
case if the higher offer is subject to uncertainties that create a significant risk of
nonconsummation. And where, as here, the competing transactions involve stock
as part of the consideration, the valuation of that component requires business
judgment as well.
QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1268 (Del. Ch.), affid, 637
A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). See also Fort Howard, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *41-42 ("Even in
the auction context, if one deal is all cash and more likely to close and sooner, a disinterested board might prefer it to a deal that may be thought to represent a somewhat higher
price, but is not all cash and not capable of closing as quickly.") (citing Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., C.A. No. 6085 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67 (Del. Ch. May 19,
1988), affd, 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989)); but see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) ("The latitude a board will have in responding to differing bids
will vary according to the degree of benefit or detriment to the shareholders' general interests that the amount or terms of the bids pose.").
368. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990). In its
Unocal analysis, the Time-Warner court rejected the plaintiffs' assertions that the only con-
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The chilling threat of substantive judicial review in every takeover will loom as a potentially destabilizing and counterproductive influence upon a board's efforts to fashion an auction and negotiation
strategy for pursuing the best available transaction for the shareholders. To be sure, Paramountcontains various disclaimers that "a court
should not second-guess" a board's decision in this context "even
though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may
have cast doubt on the board's determination. '369 The problem with
this analysis is that any substantive review for reasonableness will necessarily create far more uncertainty and instability than a more deferential process-based analysis. 370 Such substantive review also will
undermine the board's authority as centralized decisionmaker.
The deference of the business judgment rule is intended to pro-

mote and uphold the board's managerial authority as a "centralized
decisionmak[er]" 371 for the firm.372 The predictability, stability and
enhanced negotiating power that result from upholding the board's
managerial authority would seem as vital (if not more so) in the setting of an auction or negotiation for sale of control as in the context of
routine "enterprise" decisions.373 Yet, without requiring any showing
ceivable threat posed by an all-cash offer is inadequate value: "Plaintiffs' position represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of review under Unocal principally
because it would involve the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a 'better' deal
for that of a corporation's board of directors." Id. at 1153.
369. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
370. Interestingly, the Cede court criticized as "unhelpful" and "confusing" the Chancellor's formulation of a "reasonable person standard for determining the materiality of a
given director's self-interest in a challenged corporate transaction." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 (Del. 1993); see also id. at 364 n.31 ("The reasonable person
standard lacks precision.").
371. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 522.
372. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
373. See Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 267 (noting the "substantial risk that the shareholders ... will... accept an offer that as a group they would otherwise have chosen to
reject, or that they may accept an offer at a price a good deal lower than the one they might
have received in a negotiated transaction or auction"); Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers
as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity
Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 53, 57-58 (1985) ("Conscientious managers of a target company may be able to negotiate with the initial [tender] offeror and other potential bidders
to extract gains for the shareholders that shareholders would not realize if they responded
individually.") (footnote omitted); Prentice & Langmore, supra note 85, at 445-47 (arguing
for the authority of a board to "just say no" in the context of an auction if bidding fails to
reach an adequate level, so that "target boards should be able to bargain on behalf of
target shareholders to obtain as large a premium as possible"); cf. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1119 (Del. 1994) ("'The power to say no is a significant
power. It is the duty of directors serving on [an independent] committee to approve only a
transaction that is in the best interests of the public shareholders .... ') (quoting In re First
Boston, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10338, slip op. at 15-16 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1990)).
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of disparate treatment of competing bidders or other suspicious con-

duct, Paramounthas displaced the deference that otherwise should be
374
accorded to a board's decisions in this context.
As former-practitioner Veasey and Professor Dooley observed in
their scholarly analysis of the business judgment rule, the power to
interfere is tantamount to the power to decide. 375 The business judgment rule thus protects shareholders from each other by minimizing
shareholder interference with the board's exercise of its managerial
authority.37 6 In this regard, it is worth noting that the shareholder
who seeks to enlist the court's aid in interfering with the board's auction decisions often will be one of the competing bidders whose interests may not necessarily be aligned with those of shareholders

generally.
In all events, it may reasonably be assumed that shareholders
would benefit if courts applied the business judgment rule (assuming

the elements of care, loyalty, and good faith are present) and accorded
deference to the decisions of the board in a change-of-control setting.
This approach would maximize the board's negotiating authority and
provide greater certainty to the directors' decisions. 377 Not only
Judge Sand's memorable description of the poison pill's utility as a "shield to fend off
coercive offers, and ... a gavel to run an auction" implicitly recognizes that shareholders
can benefit from upholding such centralized power in the hands of the board in the context
of an auction for corporate control. CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F.
Supp. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059,
1083 (Del. Ch.) ("Household's claim that the Rights Plan provides it with much-needed
flexibility in dealing with potential acquirors is clearly supported by the evidence."), affd,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
374. Unwilling to review the reasonableness of the directors' auction decisions in RJR
Nabisco, Chancellor Allen observed: "To recognize in courts a residual power to review
the substance of business decisions for 'fairness' or 'reasonableness' or 'rationality' where
those decisions are made by truly disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate
care is to make of courts super-directors." In re RJR Nabisco, C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 9, at *41 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, revised Feb. 14, 1989). This traditional business
judgment rule analysis was later criticized in Macmillan. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989).
375. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 32, at 522 ("If stockholders are given too easy access
to courts, the effect is to transfer decision-making power from the board to the stockholders or, more realistically, to one or a few stockholders whose interests may not coincide
with those of the larger body of stockholders.").
376. Id.
377. Upon a showing of disparate treatment of competing bidders, a court would apply
enhanced scrutiny because the suspicion aroused by such unequal treatment justifies elevating the value of responsibility at the expense of the value of authority. Macmillan, 559
A.2d at 1288; see generally Dooley, supra note 14, at 463-64, 467-71 (explaining that responsibility and authority are "antithetical" and that "more of one means less of the
other").
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would the board's negotiating hand be strengthened, but shareholders
of a selling corporation would be less likely to endure the delays and
risks of an unduly protracted bidding process.3 78

At its core, Paramount'simplicit "ownership" analysis-with its
imposition of enhanced scrutiny for all takeover transactions-runs
afoul of the Delaware General Corporation Law's allocation of managerial authority to the board as centralized decisionmaker. Section
141(a) provides that the "business and affairs" of every Delaware corporation "shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors." 379 In upholding antitakeover measures in Unocal and Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court gave special emphasis to the "and
affairs" language of section 141(a), and thus implied that a board is
vested with as much managerial authority in the context of "ownership" decisions as in the context of "enterprise" decisions.38 0 Unfortunately, Paramount's mandate of a reasonableness review for every
takeover will enable shareholders to interfere with the board's managerial authority in cases in which the justifications for deference remain compelling.
iii.

Summary

It is one thing to apply enhanced scrutiny to an "ownership"
claim when the evidence provides good reason to question the direc378. As one observer of the recent battle for control of Grumman Corp. commented, it
was important for a defense industry company like Grumman to avoid "the Paramount
experience," a shorthand description for the "nasty and expensive battle that Viacom Iric.
won over QVC Network Inc. to acquire Paramount ... ." Roy J. Harris, Jr., Northrop
Sharply Objects, Claiming 'Unlevel' Field With Martin Marietta,WALL ST.J., Mar. 29, 1994,
at A3.
379. DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
380. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 & n.6 (Del. 1985);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,1353 & n.11 (Del. 1985); see also Paramount
Communications v. Time. Inc., C.A. No. 10866 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989), reprintedin 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700,749-50 (1990) ("The corporation law does not operate on the theory
that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the
wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the
duty to manage the firm."), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *66 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
revised Feb. 14, 1989) ("[Tlhe board of directors continues, in the auction setting as in
others, to bear the burden imposed and exercise the power conferred by Section 141(a).");
BALOTrI

& FiNKELsTE N, supra note 68, § 4.1, at 4-5 & n.3 (Delaware decisions "read the

words 'and affairs' in Section 141(a) as giving a board of directors additional power to act
in areas which are beyond the scope of the directors' duties in guiding the corporation's
everyday business.") (footnote omitted); FOLK ET AL., supra note 62, § 141.2.4.1 at § 141:44
(discussing Unocal's examination of inherent powers conferred on directors by "business
and affairs" language of section 141(a)).
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tors' motivations. It is quite another to review the substance of a
board's decision simply because an important "ownership" issue is
presented. Paramount's transaction-significance rationale will allow
38 1 to
shareholders to interfere with the board's "inherent powers"
manage the corporation's "affairs" by instituting a layer of judicial review-not contemplated by section 141(a)-of the reasonableness of
all board decisions in all takeover transactions. As the Delaware
Supreme Court pointedly remarked in another context, there is a need
for stability and certainty in the corporation law that should not be
382
compromised by unnecessary judicial tinkering with the statute.
This was a lesson the Paramount court would have done well to
remember.
D. Proposed Standard of Judicial Review for Change-of-Control
Transactions
As discussed above, 38 3 the Macmillan court imported the "omnipresent specter" rationale from Unocal's antitakeover setting to the
takeover realm. 384 To the extent Macmillan could be interpreted as
calling for enhanced scrutiny in all takeovers-including those in
which competing bidders received equal treatment-this importation
was illogical. 385 It is therefore understandable that the Delaware
Supreme Court would use the Paramountdecision as a vehicle to re381. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
382. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 87 (Del. 1992). As the court observed: "It is important that there be certainty in the corporation law. We emphasize that the Court of Chancery must act with caution and restraint when ignoring the clear language of the General
Corporation Law in favor of other legal or equitable principles." Id. (footnote omitted)
(citing Staar Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130. 1137 n.2 (Del. 1991); Alabama ByProducts Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991)).
383. See supra notes 201-205 and accompanying text.
384. Mills Acquisition Corp. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 ("[W]here issues
of corporate control are at stake, there exists 'the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests."') (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). Simply because
a board approves a change-of-control transaction is no reason to suspect or question the
motivations of the directors. To be sure, the possibility exists in this context that an inappropriately motivated board will steer a transaction to a favored bidder to the detriment of
the company's shareholders. See Mirvis, supra note 200, at 63 (arguing that the "omnipresent specter" of potential director self-interest exists in all change-of-control transactions:
"Whether or not to sell, and to whom (and under what conditions) to sell, are questions
that are more alike than they are different"). Such inappropriate motivations, if they exist,
will manifest themselves in suspicion-triggering conduct, which Macmillan's disparate
treatment/enhanced scrutiny test is sufficient to address. Absent such suspicion-triggering
conduct, however, there is no reason to question or suspect the directors' motivations at
the threshold, particularly when they approve a takeover that jeopardizes their own positions of control.
385. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text.
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work the rationale for enhanced scrutiny in cases where directors approve and facilitate a takeover. Nevertheless, the Paramountcourt's
reliance on the "significance" of change-of-control transactions as a
justification for enhanced scrutiny in every takeover sweeps much too
broadly.3 86 Delaware's established model of governance requires def-

erence to the directors' decisions, absent evidence of a destabilizing
influence or some other reason to question the directors' motivations.3 87 The value of accountability is elevated over that of deference
only when there is a demonstrated reason not to trust the directors to
3 88
act independently, advisedly, and in good faith.
Consistent with Delaware's established model of corporate governance, the Delaware Supreme Court should modify Paramount's
overly broad rationale and return its threshold focus in takeover cases
to the composition and activities of the selling corporation's board of
directors.3 89 Absent suspicion-triggering board conduct (like unequal

treatment of competing bidders) or some other reason to question the
board's loyalty, care, or good faith, the court should not apply enhanced scrutiny to a board's auction decisions. In such circumstances,
there is every good reason, as a matter of law and policy, to uphold
the authority of the board and apply the traditional business judgment
rule.

As a matter of law, the Delaware General Corporation Law vests
the shareholders' duly elected board with the power to manage the
corporation's "business and affairs. '390 To afford shareholders access
to the courts for a judicial assessment of the merits of a board's deci386. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42, 43, 45, 48 (Del.
1994).
387. See supra Parts I.B and II.A.
388. See supra Parts I.B and II.A.
389. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1279 ("[A] court ... should decline to evaluate the
wisdom and merits of a business decision unless sufficient facts are alleged with particularity, or the record otherwise demonstrates, that the decision was not the product of an
informed, disinterested, and independent board.") (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)); see also supra Parts I.B, II.A, and III.A.
The proposed standard of judicial review suggested in this section pertains to board
action taken in the context of a sale or change-of-control transaction. Such conduct may
include the board's use of defensive measures to facilitate an orderly and effective auction
or negotiation for a sale of control. E.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683
F. Supp. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The recommendations set forth herein are not addressed to board action that is designed to thwart a potential takeover. Unocal plainly
controls in such circumstances, and this Article does not propose to vary the enhanced
scrutiny test in the antitakeover setting. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). But see supra note 350.
390. DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
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sions in every takeover would effectively supplant this statutory allo-

cation of authority. 391 As a matter of policy, shareholders likely will
benefit by upholding and clarifying the board's authority to pursue the
best available transaction, especially without the uncertainty created
by the prospect of an after-the-fact ruling by the court on whether the

board's

decision

reasonableness.

392

falls within

a judicially-defined

range

of

Heightened scrutiny in change-of-control transactions thus
should be limited to cases in which the directors have engaged in suspicion-triggering conduct, such as the disparate treatment of compet-

ing bidders or the adoption of defensive measures. 393 When directors
have treated competing bidders evenhandedly, 394 and have not other-

wise engaged in some form of suspicion-triggering conduct, the courts
should apply the traditional business judgment rule. On the other
hand, when such suspicion-triggering conduct has been shown, the
court should apply the enhanced scrutiny test developed in Macmillan

395
for such specific instances of disparate treatment.

391. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
392. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
393. Professor Dooley previously has examined Revlon and Interco from a perspective
of suspicion of directors' motives arising from specific actions by directors in those cases:
Revlon and Interco can be seen as cases where the specific action approved by the
board strongly suggests self-interest. Why else would a faithful agent refuse to
permit a competing proposal to be put forward if not for fear that his own proposal is, in fact, not competitive? And why would the honest auctioneer ever seek
other than the highest bid if not to seek side payments or otherwise indulge personal preferences?
Dooley, supra note 14, at 521. If the evidence surpasses suspicion and shows a breach of
any one of the board's duties of care, loyalty, or good faith, then the directors should be
required to satisfy the test of entire fairness. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 361 (Del. 1993); see also supra Part I.B.
394. The disparity of treatment among competing bidders that is sufficient to trigger
enhanced scrutiny should be material to the competition. Thus, the mere signing of a
merger agreement that includes a "fiduciary out" not encumbered by significant disincentives for a potential competing bidder to emerge should not be deemed disparate treatment within the meaning of this test. To be sure, the Chancellor appeared to find disparate
treatment under similar circumstances in Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., C.A. No.
11639, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 138, at *24-28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), reprintedin 16 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1540 (1991). Nevertheless, this ruling may be explained as an effort to avoid
basing the decision on the uncertain scope of Macmillan-namely,whether enhanced scrutiny applies "only" when disparate treatment is shown or in all change-of-control transactions. See id. at *24-26; Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88
(Del. 1989).
395. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288; see also supra note 205. The board's use of
defensive measures in an auction or negotiation for sale or control-such as the continued
deployment of a poison pill during the pendency of an auction-likewise could be subjected to enhanced scrutiny under Unocal. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.,
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Moreover, if the directors satisfy their enhanced "Macmillan
duty" by showing the reasonableness of such disparate treatment (and
3 96
demonstrating that it legitimately furthered shareholder interests),
there is no reason to apply enhanced scrutiny to all other aspects of
the change-of-control transaction. By satisfying the Macmillan test

for reasonableness, the directors would have dispelled the threshold
suspicions that such disparate treatment arouses. Having earned the
court's trust, the directors should be accorded deference in all other
aspects of their decisions (absent some other demonstrated reason to
question the directors' bona fides). 397
This proposed model of judicial review would better accommo-

date the competing goals of protecting shareholders' interests in takeovers and preserving the board's managerial authority under section
141(a). As discussed above, 398 upholding the board's authority in the

takeover context would effectively protect the shareholders' interests
by lending stability to the auction process and strengthening the
board's negotiating position. At the same time, the proposed approach would permit heightened judicial scrutiny, in accordance with
Delaware's established model of governance, when the evidence
shows reasonable grounds to question the directors' motivations.
Alternatively, to the extent the court perceives a compelling need
for a greater judicial role in takeover transactions-because of the important "ownership" issue presented in this context-the court could
apply a modified test of enhanced scrutiny. Under this modified test,
essentially confined to the first prong of Paramount's two-part en571 A.2d 1140, 1151 n.14 (Del. 1990) ("[A] Unocal analysis may be appropriate when a
corporation is iii a Revlon situation ... .") Such scrutiny should be confined to the specific
defensive measure at issue-not extended to every aspect of the board's conduct in the
auction.
396. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288 (holding that a board's unequal treatment of
competing bidders "must be reasonable in relation to the advantage sought to be achieved,
or conversely, to the threat which a particular bid allegedly poses to stockholder interests"); see also In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 782 (Del. Ch.
1988) (upholding a selling corporation's agreement to pay a topping fee and break-up fee
to one of three competing bidders and noting that "[i]t is the shareholders to whom the
board owes a duty of fairness, not to persons seeking to acquire the Company"); In re Fort
Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del Ch. LEXIS 110, at *41 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) ("[A] board ... may never appropriately favor one buyer over another
for a selfish or inappropriate reason, such as occurred in Revlon, but it may favor one over
another if in good faith and advisedly it believes shareholder interests would be thereby
advanced.").
397. But see Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. 1990) (applying Unocal's
enhanced scrutiny to directors' "overall response" to hostile tender offer because "all of
the directors' actions here are so inextricably related").
398. See supra Part IV.C.(2)(c)(ii).
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hanced scrutiny test,3 99 the directors in every change-of-control transaction would be charged with the burden of demonstrating that they
were adequately informed and otherwise free of any material interest
or other destabilizing influence. 40 0 The court would not undertake a
substantive review of the reasonableness of the board's auction deci-

sions, however, unless (i) the director's decision-making process was
found wanting or (ii) the directors had treated competing bidders on
unequal terms or engaged in some other form of suspicion-triggering
conduct. Otherwise, the courts will inappropriately displace the
40 1
board's managerial authority and act as "super-directors.

Of the two standards of judicial review for takeovers proposed
here, the former, with its prerequisite of suspicion-triggering conduct

for any form of enhanced scrutiny, is preferable. This standard, which
builds soundly upon Delaware's established model of corporate governance, would appropriately uphold the statutory authority of the

board. Moreover, it would carefully limit those instances in which the
value of deference would be diminished, and that of responsibility elevated, to cases in which the evidence justifies suspicion of the board's
motivation or ability to function properly as the centralized decisionmaker. The unquestioned significance of a change-of-control
transaction, standing alone, does not supply this justification.

V.

Conclusion

Under the business judgment rule, courts typically defer to a
board's decisions, absent evidence of a breach of the directors' duties
of care, loyalty, or good faith. The courts' reluctance to assess the

wisdom of directors' decisions encourages innovation and en399. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). The
Paramountcourt articulated the following two-part enhanced scrutiny test for all changeof-control transactions:
The key features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a) a judicial determination
regarding the adequacy of the decision-making process employed by the directors, including the information on which the directors based their decision; and
(b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors' action in light of
the circumstances then existing. The directors have the burden of proving that
they were adequately informed and acted reasonably.
Id.
400. Being adequately informed in a takeover transaction naturally requires greater
information than is required for less significant decisions. See, e.g., FortHoward, 1988 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 110, at *5 ("When the decision is to sell the company, or to engage in a recapitalization that will change control of the firm, the gravity of the transaction places a special
burden upon the directors to make sure that they have a basis for an informed view.").
401. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS
9, at *41 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, revised Feb. 14, 1989).
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trepreneurial risk-taking by removing the chilling threat that courts
will unfairly second-guess a board's decisions based on their eventual
outcome. This deference also upholds the corporation law's allocation
of managerial afithority to the board as centralized decisionmaker.
When a shareholder plaintiff provides evidence that the directors have
breached their duties of care or loyalty, or otherwise have failed to act
in good faith, the threshold presumption of propriety attaching to the
directors' decisionmaking is rebutted. The working model of deference is displaced, and the value of accountability is emphasized. Consequently, the directors are required in such circumstances to prove
the entire fairness of the challenged transaction to the shareholders.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court introduced an intermediate or "enhanced" standard of judicial review for cases in which directors attempt to block a takeover and thereby preserve their
positions of control.4 02 In the year after Unocal was decided, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Revlon and announced that directors overseeing the sale of a corporation are
"charged with getting the best price for the stockholders .... "403 It
remained for later cases to clarify the standard of review that would
apply to claims arising in this takeover (as opposed to the Unocal antitakeover) setting.
Three years after its opinion in Revlon was announced, the Delaware Supreme Court declared in Macmillan that the "omnipresent
specter" of potential self-interest which Unocal addresses also is present in takeover transactions "where issues of corporate control are at
stake. '' 4°4 Macmillan was unclear, however, regarding whether enhanced judicial scrutiny would apply in all change-of-control transactions or only in those takeovers in which the directors treat competing
bidders unequally and therefore arouse suspicion about the directors'
motivations. To the extent the Macmillan court intended enhanced
scrutiny to apply in all takeover transactions, the decision arguably
rested on an illogical premise. Specifically, in announcing enhanced
scrutiny for "Revlon" cases, the Macmillan court imported the "omnipresent specter" rationale of Unocal-which addresses the potential
402. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (referring to
directors' "inherent conflict" in this setting); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (describing the "potential for conflict"
which Unocal addresses).
403. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
404. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989).
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conflict that directors face when resisting a takeover-to a board's decision to approve a change of control.
Although the court in Paramountunderstandably sought to modify the reasoning supporting enhanced scrutiny in takeovers, the reformulated rationale which the Paramountcourt developed is overbroad.
The law now requires enhanced scrutiny in every change-of-control
transaction solely because of the significance of such transactions to
the corporation's owners. The admitted significance of a change of
control provides legitimate grounds for triggering a board's duty
under Revlon to seek the best available transaction. It does not follow, however, that the decisions of a board in this context are so inherently open to question or suspicion that the traditional business
judgment rule should not apply.
Paramountdeparts from Delaware's established model of corporate governance-including the model that emerged in the post-Unocal era-by shifting the court's threshold focus away from the integrity
and effectiveness of the board's decision-making process to the importance of the transaction to be acted upon. The Delaware Supreme
Court therefore should modify its overly-broad rationale for enhanced
scrutiny in takeover transactions. Heightened scrutiny should be applied in this context only when the threshold evidence shows that the
board has engaged in suspicion-triggering conduct, like treating competing bidders unequally. Only upon such a showing should the directors be required to demonstrate (i) the adequacy of their decisionmaking process and (ii) the reasonableness of their conduct. Absent
evidence of such suspicion-triggering conduct, the decisions of a
predominantly disinterested board in the conduct of an auction should
be accorded the deference of the business judgment rule from the
outset.
Alternatively, as a means of establishing a greater judicial role in
the context of takeovers, the courts could apply a modified test of
enhanced scrutiny. Under this modified test, directors would have the
threshold burden in all takeover cases to demonstrate the adequacy of
their decision-making process. The courts would not engage in a substantive review of the reasonableness of the directors' decisions unless
(i) the decision-making process was found wanting or (ii) the directors
had treated competing bidders unequally or engaged in some other
form of suspicion-triggering conduct.
Under either proposed standard of review, the court's role would
be more limited than that which Paramountenvisions. Enhanced judicial scrutiny of takeovers would appropriately be limited to cases in
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which there is a demonstrated reason to question the proper functioning of the board. Only when the evidence provides grounds for questioning a board's motives or its capacity to function properly should
the courts decline to accord deference to directors' decisions in the
takeover context. The significance of a change-of-control transaction,
without more, does not supply the justification for such substantive
judicial review.

